28 APRIL 1928, Page 20

The Causes of the War

The War GUM. By H; W: Wilson. (Sampson Low. 21s.)

It is an historic fact that Austria and Germany began the World War. Austria deClared war on Serbia, Germany declared war In turn on Rusaia, Belgium, and France, and Europe was then ablaze. The violation Of Belgian neutrality compelled Great Britain to declare war on Germany, and then the whole world was rapidly-brought in. These being the facts, the Allies and most of the neutrals—the public opinion of the world, we may say, Otitside Germany and Austria—have from the'firsthlamed Germany for causing the War, and their view is recorded in the Treaty of Versailles which Germany signed after defeat. Hut the German Government throughout the War strove to persuade its people that the Allies had forced Germany to fight in self-defence, and since the War the German Republic has fostered a Most elaborate and vigorous propaganda against the theory of Germany's War guilt. German books and pamphlets on the subject are numerous and somehow find translators

and kindly English 'foreign Publishers, though they cannot possibly be remunerative productions. Here in -England cora,

paratively little attention has been given of late to the question, which most of us regard as settled. The Foreign Office has begun to publish its records from 1898, bearing on Anglo- German relations, and has shown in the 1914 volume, which appeared first, that the Blue-book of documents issued soon after the War began was almost complete as it stood. Dr. Gooch has summarized the many volumes of 'diplomatic reve- lations in a shrewd little book. Sir Charles Oman some years ago stated the case against Germany in a valuable official paper on the origins of the War. But we may say on the whole that the German War guilt propaganda has been ignored.

That experienced and competent publicist, Mr. H. W. Wilson,. the author of Battleships in Action, has now been moved to take up the challenge and to restate the accepted view of the War guilt in the light of the masses of new evidence that have accumulated since 1914. His book, which is tem- perate in style, well planned and carefully documented, deserves high .praise as a trustworthy account of the whole tragic episode. . Like the. best German writers on the theme, notably Brandenburg and Hammann, Mr. Wilson has to begin with a detailed survey of European—and especially German— policy from 1870. On this we need not touch, except to remark that both Brandenburg and Hammann are in close agreement with Mr. Wilson as to the increasingly adventurous, not to say aggressive, character of. German policy- after 1890, when William II. drove Bismarck from office, and as to the disorganization in the German Government which permitted of two or three different and contradictory lines of policy being followed simultaneously. The British Government at the turn of the century, under Lord Salisbury and Mr. (now Lord) Balfour, made repeated efforts towards a close agreement or Entente—even, perhaps, an alliance--with Germany, but was rebuffed every time and forced to turn towards-France in 1903 and Russia in 1907, leaving Germany with her ", faithful second," Austria, and a very doubtful ally in Italy. Germany, feeling her " isolation " as her statesmen expressed it, or rather, as we should say, conscious that by her bad diplomacy she had divided Eurcipe into two opposing leagues, began to increase her armaments, and especially her Navy, at a pro- digious rate. When in 1912 she went so far as to impose a special capital levy to meet the huge demands of her Army and Navy, it was clear to thoughtful observers that the threatened war, about which General Bernhardi and other German swashbucklers were continually boasting at that time, could not be long delayed. William H. was not, perhaps, the subtle schemer for a war of conquest that many of us imagined. He was too volatile and capricious for that. But he was surrounded and dominated by generals and admirals, notably Moltke, Falkenhayn, and Tirpitz, who firmly believed that Germany could conquer Europe and wanted her to do it. Moreover, the temper of the ruling class was bellicose and arrogant in the extreme, hating England and despising France and Russia. All efforts to improve Anglo-German relations— and no one could have tried harder than Lord Grey of Fallodon

were foiled by Germany's rulers in the critical years before 1914.

The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo by an -Austrian Serb on June 28th, 1914, brought the mili- tarists their opportunity. Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign IVIirns' ter, and Conrad, the Austrian Chief of _Staff, had long been anxious to crush Serbia. They persuaded the aged Emperor Francis. Joseph to appeal to the. German Emperor as his faithful ally for support in this design. On July 5th, 1914, William IL impulsively promised his full support and advised Austria to _ act without delay. " If war between Austria and Russia became inevitable, Germany would stand side by side with Austria." The Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, confirmed his master's decision next day. Germany gave Austria a blank cheque. That was her prime offence,

because she must have known that Russia could not look on and see Serbia annexed and Germanized. But she added greatly to her guilt by foiling all the efforts made by the other Powers, and especially by Great Britain, to avert a breach between Austria and Russia. It is true that William II., in a brief moment of sanity, saw that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum went as far as any independent State could do, but he soon reverted to his former view that the Serbs must be disciplined and that Vienna should be left free to do as she pleased, whatever other Powers might say. Mr. Wilson brings out the very important fact, only revealed since the War, that Austria's apparent access of moderation towards the end of July, 1914, when she seemed willing to negotiate with Russia as Lord Grey desired, was a deliberate deception. Conrad- was finding mobilization difficult and wanted to gain time. The Austrian Crown Council had decided beforehand not to make any concession whatever, and were stiffened by the knowledge that Moltke, confident • in the readiness of the German Army, was privately urging Conrad to hasten on war with Russia. It is clear, too, from Mr. Wilson's patient narra- tive, that the German military chiefs chafed against the delays of their clumsy diplomatists, and that they had really wanted to begin operations against France in the last week of July, 1914, instead of in the first week of August. The time gained was invaluable to the Allies..

Mr. Wilson makes short work of the elaborate and fine-spun arguments about the rates of mobilization in Russia and Austria, which were virtually simultaneous. Germany was, of course, ready to the last button long before her ally or her enemies, and the order to mobilize was in her case little more than a formality. She seized English ships at Hamburg three days before war was declared, and may have thought of attack- ing our fleet then—a scheme which was foiled by its concentra- tion at Scapa. A more serious and debatable question is whether the Liberal Cabinet could or ought to have proclaimed, on July 28th, its determination to side with France and Russia if they were attacked by Germany. Mr. Wilson thinks that the Cabinet should not have hesitated till the very last moment. Many German apologists have said the same, and have blamed Mr. Asquith's Ministry for misleading the innocents at Berlin. But on a broad view the Cabinet was surely right to wait. -Ministers were divided ; the British people were not thinking of war ; - until Belgium had been brutally attacked there seemed no absolutely convincing reason why we should join in the quarrel, though after that there was virtual unanimity for the cause of right. Germany by her actions forced us into the War, as she had forced Russia and France, and thus she must bear the main burden of guilt. Mr. Wilson's exposition of the facts will long remain a standard authority on this terrible and enthralling subject,