28 APRIL 1928, Page 5

The French Elections T HE first ballots of the French elections

which took place last Sunday have put M. Poincare in a most promising position. It seems almost certain that he will return to power with a large majority, and it may be that at the second ballots next Sunday he will even receive a sweeping majority.

A French general election is a long business. At the first ballots only those are elected who have an absolute majority. At the second ballots a relative majority is enough. Naturally in constituencies where there are several candidates every conceivable kind of bargaining (some of it unprincipled) occurs between the two sets of ballots. The present scrutin d'arrondissement—for the scrutin de Este disappointed most people, even many of its most enthusiastic supporters, and was accordingly abandoned—tends to encourage the haggling which is now proceeding. It ties the deputy more consciously to a necessarily small community, and if it makes him acutely aware of his obligations it also heightens in his supporters the sense of the hold that they have upon him. The attention of all is turned inwards upon the smaller unit instead of sweeping over a larger field. To say this is not to defend the scrutin de Este, which did not work well, but the old method now restored has also its disadvan- tages in such a country as France with its multitude of political groups. M. Briand years ago uttered a cry from the heart when he described the arrondissements as stagnant pools.

When we write only 184 deputies, have been returned for the 612 seats to be filled in the Chamber. These include 78 Republican Democrats, 56 Republicans of the Left, 16 Radical Socialists, 14 Socialists, 9 members of the Right and five Republican Socialists. It will be seen that the vast majority of those elected belong to the Centre and Right, but this fact must not be taken in itself as an index to the composition of the new Chamber, as in France the absolute majorities at the first ballots are always obtained by the conservative parties. In the constituencies where there was no absolute majority the Socialists and the Radical Socialists made a poor show, but oddly enough—since that poor showing suggested a swing away from the Left—the Communists did well in some of the large towns. They have not, as yet, won a seat, but they may improve their position next Sunday.

The most interesting question now is how the Radicals, Socialists and Communists will conduct their bargaining. In some constituencies a Socialist would certainly be returned if the Radical candidate would retire ; in others a Radical would certainly be returned if the Socialist would retire. Socialists, however, will probably let in a Communist rather than vote for a Radical. The relation between Socialists and Communists is a little like that between Liberals and the Labour Party here ; it is possible that the Socialists will help a Communist, but unlikely that the Communists will have any truck with a Socialist. For the Communists are under strict orders from Russia, whence, it is said, they derive their money, as they undoubtedly derive their instructions. What- ever may happen in such accommodations, it is certain that a Socialist would let in anybody rather than a member of M. Poincare's National Union.

It is already safe to say that nothing like the old Cartel will reappear. Its financial performances thoroughly alarmed the careful French investor, that is to say the average Frenchman. In little more than two years between 1924 and 1926 the Cartel Government brought the rate of exchange down from 70 to 240. But that is perhaps an unfair way of putting it. A good Cartellist explains that there were many causes for the slump which would have operated whatever Government had been in office. Let us say, then—to be on the safe side— that the rule of the Cartel Government coincided with this appalling collapse. The limit set to the legal note issue was grossly exceeded ; the debt to the Bank of France which had been temporarily reduced by M. Poincar4 mounted up again, and, when the Cartel Government ceased to rule, the balance of a few thousands which they had found in the Treasury had been turned into a note issue of more than £120,000,000.

At that point M. Poincare formed his National Union Government, which drew upon all parties except the extremists of both wings. His object was, and has remained ever since, to be the saviour of the franc. Intent upon his single task he so altered his attitude towards Germany that he became scarcely recognizable as the author of the provocative Riihr policy. Perhaps he was too busy with finance to have time for a dangerous foreign policy which requires at the least a very watchful anxiety, or perhaps he was really persuaded into a new frame of mind by M. Briand. Even if M. Briand's persuasions were not so potent as is sometimes said, M. Poincare was evidently enough of a realist to adapt himself to a coalition spirit. The perils of a forward policy against Germany, whatever the explanation may be, disappeared and M. Poincare performed a prodigious feat of financial reconstruction. He modestly says that his work is not finished, and that his " experiment " must continue, but even now it is impossible to think of any other Frenchman who could have done what M. Poincare has done with perfect clearness of vision and unwavering determination.

In these circumstances foreign policy has not been prominent in the election campaign. The chief issue has been whether M. Poincare should be taken at his word, and be allowed to go on " saving " his country or whether the country is already safe enough for another Govern- ment to be allowed to take a hand and introduce those social reforms about which M. Poincare has been purposely silent. It seems that the majority of Frenchmen have made up their minds that the country is not yet safe enough. Salvation must go on. M. Poincare, who haS become as much the master of one phrase as Cato the Elder, must be kept where he is. Few onlookers will dispute the wisdom of the electors who remember what it was like to look insolvency in the face two years age. They are only displaying a natural instinct of self- preservation.