December 1916 : A Question of History By H. WILSON
HARMS.
AS S the Spectator pointed out a week ago, Lord Beaver- brook's new volume on the political crisis in this country at the end of 1916 raises issues of the first im- portance historically. The full story of a change of Government which is claimed to have had a direct and vital bearing on the fortunes of the War, and which cer- tainly had a vital bearing on something less important, the fortunes of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, has still to be written. One or two biographies touch on it. Mr. J. A. Spender will no doubt deal with it fully in the life of Lord Oxford, on which he is now at work. Mean- while, Lord .Beaverbrook has given us his record of those fevered days at the beginning of December, 1016, with every incident outlined and appraised in meticulous detail.
That the record is sincere need not be questioned. How far it can be accepted as the last word on the events it deals with is another matter. That is true particularly of the episode on which the whole decision turned, the interview between Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law on the afternoon of Sunday, December 3rd. when Mr. Law charged by the Conservative Ministers in the Cabinet to convey to the Prime Minister a resolution meant to be friendly to him, left Mr. Asquith actually under the impression that the Tory section of the Cabinet was solidly hostile. The first glance at the resolution had been enough to show Lord Beaverbrook himself (then Sir Max Aitken) that it was directed against Mr. Lloyd George, and his explanation of why a mind so acute as the Prime Minister's failed to appreciate that at all is a strangely laboured affair. That Mr. Asquith, with the resolution before him, should have remained completely blind to its implications is, in fact, inexplicable. If Mr. Bonar Law had never produced the resolution at all, but simply given his own account of the views of the Conservative Ministers—from which Mr. Law himself, as a strong supporter of Mr. Lloyd George, sharply dissented—everything that happened would be intelligible enough, But Lord Beaverbrook implies throughout that the resolution was duly handed by the Conservative leader to the Prime Minister. That was, of course, the general assumption at the time, in spite of a story current in the innermost political circles that Mr. Law had been dis- suaded by none other than Lord Beaverbrook from show- ing the document to Mr. Asquith. But Lord Beaverbrook refers quite definitely in his book to " the resolution of the Conservatives presented by Bonar Law."
It is necessary to sketch very briefly the background of the events of the fateful Sunday. Towards the end of 1916 there was general dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war, and changes both of men and of methods were demanded.. Mr. Lloyd George was a conspicuous critic of the Government of which he was is member, and on November 25th, in concert with Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson, he drew up a memorandum urging the formation of a War Council, or " civilian general staff," of which he himself was to be chairman. On Thursday, the 30th, Mr. Bonar Law laid the memorandum before, his Conservative colleagues, who strongly disapproved of it, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Long reinforcing their oral criticism by subsequent letters to Mr. Law. On the Friday morning Mr. Lloyd George submitted the mem- orandum to the Prime Minister, who expressed his disagree- ment with it in a reasoned reply. On Saturday, the Daily Express and the Daily Chronicle came out with news of a Cabinet crisis. On Sunday Reynolds's Newspaper, owned by Sir Henry Dalziel, a close associate of Mr. Lloyd George, announced that Mr. Lloyd George would resign
if his views did not prevail. On the same morning, Sunday, the Conservative Ministers met at Mr. Bonat Law's house, expressed great indignation at the Reynolds's article, and feeling that things had come to a head, drafted a resolution designed, according to Lord Beaverbrook, to force a crisis which would mean the elimination of Mr. Lloyd George and a reconstruction of the Government with Mr. Asquith still as Prime Minister. " Mr. Bonar Law after much hesitation gave Isis approval to the resolution and promised to take it to the Prime Minister that after- noon at three o'clock " (Beaverbrook, p. 214.) The resolution ran as follows :
" We share tho view expressed to you by Mr. Bailor Law some time ago that the Government cannot continue as it is.
" It is evident that a change must be made, and in our opinion the publicity given to the intention of Mr. Lloyd George makes recon- struction from within.no longer possible.
" We, therefore, urge the Prime Minister to tender the resignation of the Government.
"If he feels unable to take that step we authorise Mr. Bonar Law to tender our resignations."
It is not a document distinguished by clarity or felicity of expression, but the decisive paragraph, as Lord Beaver- brook repeatedly insists, was the second. The political choice at the moment was between Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, and this paragraph was an undisguised criticism of Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Asquith, who mayor may not have been lacking in vigour, but was, at any rate, not lacking in acumen, could never have failed to appreciate that the moment he saw the resolu- tion. But did he see it ? No one, reading Lord Beaver- brook, could have any doubt about that. But Lord Beaverbrook, after all, can only speak at second-hand. There were only two first-hand witnesses to what happened at Downing Street that Sunday afternoon, and they, like so many other actors in the drama of the moment, are both dead. But it is clearly to them that we must turn first. Mr. Bonar Law has apparently left no record of the incident. If he had, Lord Beaverbrook would certainly have known of it and quoted it. Mr. Asquith referred to it, so far as I know, only once, but that reference, unless his word is to be doubted, is decisive. The chapter on the change of government in his Memories and Reflections is contributed by Lord Crewe. He, of course, deals with the Conservative resolution, and Mr. Asquith adds this footnote (italics mine):
" The resolution referred to by Lord Crewe, which was passed by the Unionist Ministers on Sunday, December 3, but was not show.
to me by Mr. Bonar Law, was to the following effo •t • "
The date when the footnote was written is not clear, but it needs a great deal of second-hand evidence to upset so categorical a statement by the chief actor in the drama. That statement, moreover, explains much that would else be inexplicable. Lord Beaverbrook himself, indeed, observes that it was only when the Conservative Ministers, not satisfied that Mr. Bonar Law had represented their intentions accurately at 10 Downing Street, sent three of their number the next day to assure Mr. Asquith that the resolution was meant to be friendly, not unfriendly, to him, that lie grasped the situation for the first time. Whether subsequent history would have been different if he had realized it on the Sunday afternoon (critical moves were following each other almost hourly) is matter for speculation. But the events of 1916 are now becoming history, and it is important that the history should be accurate. Many who could have confirmed or corrected this version or that are gone. Those who remain will, it may be hoped, lay their memories under tribute while they still can in the service of truth.
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