SATELLITE JAPAN
By SIR PAUL BUTLER HE United States was the principal agent in bringing Japan to I her knees, and she has since supplied the forces and met the expenses of occupation, with little more than a token contribution from the British Commonwealth. As the head of an exclusively American military government, General MacArthur is the
architect of the new structure to which the Japanese are making gestures of conformity. In the future beyond the restoration of peace, it will be the United States to whom Japan must look for the financial assistance which she will need to rebuild her shattered economy. Since he who pays the piper calls the tune, these facts have always warranted the inference that American conceptions of policy will prevail in all fundamental aspects of a Japanese peace treaty ; and any doubts upon this score must have been dispelled by the economic blizzard which has now broken over this country, and in varying degrees over the Empire.
On the other hand, as the outcome of the war and of her sub- sequent commitments in Japan and Korea, the United States has assumed vital responsibilities in the Northern Pacific, at a moment when we are preoccupied with a domestic crisis, when chaos is deepening in China and when Russia has to all appearances repudiated the conception of One World. On balance, therefore,. we should welcome this American predominance in Japan, since the alternatives might be either a spread of anarchy to the island fringe of Northern Asia or its disappearance behind an Asiatic iron curtain. That such a prospect, however depressing, cannot be dismissed as ex- travagant is indicated by the dangerous friction between Russia and the United States which persists in Korea, as well as by the gathering signs that Communist Manchuria may split off from the Chinese republic.
For all this, the terms of peace to be imposed upon Japan remain of intimate concern to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. It is most appropriate that their representatives should be exchanging views this week at Canberra, where the delegates, in addition to the conditions and sanctions which British interests demand that Japan should accept, will no doubt also consider the implications of recent American policy in the Far East. To take the latter aspect first, it seems that, with the widening of the gulf between the United States and Russia and the frustration of American attempts to promote unity in China, the emphasis of American policy has shifted. Less importance may now be attached to the growth of democratic institutions and the exaction of reparations than to the retention of Japan in the American camp after the end of the occupation. In fact, the United States may be coming, however unwillingly, to look upon Japan as an outpost against Soviet penetration in Asia. This would entail rapid reconstruction of Japanese economy, provision of a higher standard of living than has hitherto been contemplated and reliance upon a bureaucracy which, although purged of active militarist ingredients, would be unlikely if left to its own devices to show marked inclination towards western democratic institutions. Thus General MacArthur has been represented on various occasions as affirming the need to hold Japan up rather than to keep her down ; as advocating American occupation of Okinawa, both as " a strategic frontier of the United States and a guarantee for Japan against aggression" ; and, at a time when her recent Asiatic victims are still confronted by semi-starvation, as demanding for his fief x,son,000 tons of imported foodstuffs during the coming year.
These utterances of the Supreme Commander, whose great prestige as a military leader has been enhancd by his conspicuous admini- strative success in Japan, have not been challenged by an American public obsessed with fears of Russia. Although they may not represent official views in Washington, the proposal of the State Department that the framework of a peace treaty should be con- structed by the eleven Powers represented upon the Far Eastern Commission, instead of by the Foreign Ministers' Committee, would have the effect of by-passing a Soviet veto. Notwithstanding the insignificant Russian contribution to Pacific victory, the Soviet Government has refused this invitaton to collaborate on an equal footing with the Powers whose efforts and sacrifices did in fact lead to the overthrow of Japan. Presumably some means will be found of surmounting this immediate difficulty ; but if the ten remaining Powers led by the United States should be compelled to conclude peace with Japan without Russian participation, the result would be the extension to the Far East of the cleavage between eastern and western zones which already exists in Europe.
Seen against a background of confusion in Asia, all this leads indirectly to the conclusion, perplexing indeed when one recalls the emphatic official views so recently expressed in America and other Allied countries regarding the subjection to be imposed upOn Japan, that the wheel may be turning full circle. In Korea, Formosa and Manchuria material, conditions at least are far worse today than under the oppressive Japanese regime ; and it may in time be realised that the Japanese conception of their mission as a " stabilising force in East Asia," which was never questioned by world opinion before the Manchurian Incident, had some justifica- tion. Such a re-interpretation of their international record would naturally be highly gratifying to the Japanese, who have always shown themselves adept at exploiting a rift between the Great Powers. Already a new assurance may be detected in Japanese official state- ments. Mr. Ashida, the Foreign Minister, was recently represented as stating that Japan would endeavour to retain her sovereignty over any territory formerly administered by the central Japanese Govern- ment (which would include Okinawa and the Kuriles) and to secure the right to maintain a large armed police force. Another official spokesman went even further, and alluded to Japanese hopes to recover Formosa. A dominant bureaucracy might be expected, after the occupation ends, to recall the political and economic successes of the Meiji technique, and endeavour to reproduce it.
.How would this re-orientation of American policy towards Japan affect the interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth? Ideally, we should of course much prefer a demilitarised and adequately supervised Japan, restored to genuine independence and permitted a standard of living and restricted industrialisation which would encourage the growth of democracy while at the same time precluding the intensive competition in export markets from which we suffered between the wars. Probably this pattern would satisfy the needs of the Empire as a whole, including those of Australia and Ii2dia, who need the revival of the Japanese market for their wool and cotton, and of those Crown Colonies to the rise of whose standard of living cheap Japanese consumption goods of fair quality made a substantial contribution.
But if Japan must recede to satellite status (and under existing Far Eastern conditions this seems unavoidable), it is obviously preferable that she should enter the American orbit rather than the Russian. On the economic side the United States has already shown an understandable desire to create a favourable Japanese trade balance, thereby reducing her own financial liabilities. The pursuit of the political motives suggested above would probably involve a higher level of industrial production (in consumption goods at least) than some manufacturing interests in this country might think desir- able. It would, however, be economically unsound to restrict the dis- tinctive Japanese industrial capacity in a period of general inflation when Asia is starved of commodities which no other country can produce at acceptable prices. Furthermore, once the principle that Japan must export to live has been recognised, it would be almost impossible in the long run to restrict the output and range of her permitted industries. This seems to have been admitted, so far as textiles are concerned, -by the President of the Board of Trade when he stated in the House of Conimons on October 28th, 1946, that the British Government did not consider it practical to perform a surgical operation on those of Japan's export industries which have no direct war potential. Perhaps this satellite status would be the best short-term solution of the Japanese problem. Under American protection and backed by American resources and capital, the national capacity for organised and sustained effort should produce a more rapid return to relative prosperity and stability than seems likely in other Far Eastern areas. If this appears inequitable to the Chinese, it must be remembered that their inherent political disunity has lost for them the opportunity of reconstruction with American assistance. As for the security aspect, General MacArthur's expectation that Japan will be incapable of renewed aggression in the foreseeable future may prove better founded than his hopes for her conversion to Christianity and democracy. It is quite true that, deprived of her overseas empire and of free access to strategic raw materials, Japan will lack the potentials of a great military Power. Material precautions should, however, be reinforced by an objective international outlook towards Japan which has hitherto been lacking. A revival with the passage of time of the illusions regarding Japan's character and political intentions which were so prevalent in the first decades of this century might still give her a second innings.
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