The Future of Hong Kong
IN 1943, when China joined the United Nations and foreign Powers ceded their extra-territorial rights, the question of the future of Hong Kong was raised by China, but was withdrawn for discussion at some future date. One wonders when that time will be. So far the Peking Government•has laid no claim to ownership of the Colony, but if the matter ever falls within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, two vital propositions will be found to affect it. They are self-evident and universally admitted, and they form the leitmotiv of Dr. Davis's really excellent monograph. The first is that from every point of view except the political one, the Island, Kowloon and the New Territories which form the Colony's hinter- land are part of China. Ninety-eight per cent. of its population is Chinese, forty per cent. of its trade is with China, and its social, commercial and financial security have usually been affected by events on the mainland. So close indeed is this connection that policies of municipal reform, social services, housing and so forth are dictated largely by the standard of living in South China. Marked disparity between the two would lead to mass immigration, and this, because of the vast amount of coast-wise shipping and innumerable anchorages, would be difficult to control. The natural resources of the Colony would be strained to breaking point. The second proposition, equally forceful, is that Hong Kong is an original creation, out of next to nothing, of British mercantile genius. It was ceded in perpetuity by China after the Treaty of Chuen-pee in 1841, a barren, disease-ridden, well-nigh waterless island, with a population of under 2,000—mostly fishermen or pirates. The British then conceived of it, apparently, as a temporary trade centre whose importance would lapse when normal facilities at Canton had been restored. Today its population has increased a thousand-fold, and is near the two million mark. It is perhaps the largest port for trans-shipment in the world, and in 1940 more ships entered Hong Kong harbour than any other.
Ultimately the ownership of Hong Kong may be decided on grounds of expediency. There is no doubt that a free port -vith no customs tariff except on certain goods consumed in the Colony, with an incredibly light scale of harbourage dues and all sorts of inducements to business interests—next to no income-tax, no excess profits tax and a general absence of " squeeze "—is greatly beneficial to South China. Would Hong Kong remain a centre of world trade under Chinese administration ? Would it be able to offer the same security for stored goods as attracts Chinese merchants away from similar out-ports, the immunity of price fluctuation that has brought banking, shipping and insurance to Hong Kong from Shanghai and Tientsin ? Such questions involve the whole future of China's internal stability and its relations with the outside world. No doubt popular Chinese sentiment would like to see the Colony restored to China. But it is doubtful whether a plebiscite in Hong Kong today would reveal any particular trend. In the first place, the majority of Hong Kong Chinese are transients—either those who enter to earn money with which they can eventually return and make homes in China proper or those proceeding as labourers to the Dutch East Indies; Malaya and elsewhere. Secondly, there seems to be fairly general contentment among Chinese residents
under British rule. The standard of living is not good, of course. But it is so much worse everywhere else. Chinese residents are not conscripted into British forces, and, above all, life in Hong Kong has hitherto been noticeably more secure.
These points are implied rather than fully discussed in Dr. Davis's book, but he provides a reliable background of facts from which the main considerations inevitably emerge. The book is most useful for reference purposes, although I find the romanisation of place-names typically obscure and the attempt to translate them
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