The American Argument : How Isolationists Help
By ROBERT WAITHMAN
Washington IN America the year 1950 is ending with an argument—one of the big, noisy, free-for-all arguments which must often seem abroad to be tearing this country apart, but which, in fact, are the one sure way of uniting its peoples.
There was just such an argument here when the Neutrality Act was repealed just before Pearl Harbour, when Lend Lease was adopted, when the British Loan was launched, when the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Pact and the first Military Assistance programme were voted. On each of these occasions the believers in the doctrine that is most conveniently if not always accurately identified as isolationism put up the best case they could against the assumption by the United States of fresh commitments to foreign nations. On each occasion they contended that the commit- ment under consideration would be too costly or too dangerous and that the true interests of the United States would be served by a refusal to undertake such new responsibilities.
On each occasion they lost the argument, and the new responsi- bilities were undertaken. But it could be seen that the isolationists on each occasion had performed an invaluable service. They had attracted the attention of millions of Americans who, busy with their own affairs, would otherwise not have perceived that an issue of capital importance was up for decision. They had obliged these millions to inform themselves, if only in a general way, on the subject that was being debated ; and when the decision was taken it was known up and down the country why it had been taken and what benefits could be expected in return for its cost or risk. This knowledge gave the new policy roots and protected it against assaults that would later be made upon it.
The difference between the argument raised in the last few weeks of 1950 and the earlier arguments is that the question at issue is not whether it is wise to embark on a new policy, but whether, in the light of the discovery of some new perils, it is wise to go forward with the old policy. The question is whether, after the demonstra- tion in Korea that the Communist adversary was able to bring about the defeat of American forces and was willing to do so even at the risk of precipitating a world war, the nation is justified in proceeding with a policy which would put further American forces in jeopardy (as it is being contended) in Western Europe.
We shall require, if we are to arrive at any genuine understanding of this argument, to remember that Governments are appointed by their peoples not to perform quixotic gestures toward other peoples, but to safeguard the best interests of the nation they represent. What we think of the argument as Britons, or. Frenchmen, or Dutch- men or Danes is a secondary matter compared with the question " What would I think of it if I were an American ? "
If you were an American you would have been pretty badly shocked by the defeat in Korea. You would be aware—because you would have heard it and read it in very plain terms, on the strength of information from authoritative places—that it is the greater part of the present effective fighting forces of the United States that have been beaten back in Korea. You would have been basing all your calculations hitherto on the assumption that the Communist adversary did not intend a general war, and so you would have assumed that there was no immediate threat to Japan in the Par East and to Western Germany in Europe. But suddenly it would have been put to you that all these comfortable assumptions were in doubt ; that civil defences against possible air attack on American cities were no longer a matter for leisurely discussion ; that, as President Truman said, " this country and the other nations of the free world stand in their greatest peril."
In this frame of mind you would be asked to judge between the argument of the isolationists and the argument- of the Administra- tion in Washington. The isolationists would be telling you that there was nothing to stop the Communists—with " probably over three hundred trained and equipped combat divisions " which (ex-President Hoover says) they and their satellites can muster— from taking over both the European and the Asiatic land-masses. In Europe the non-Communist peoples, excluding Spain, could produce " fewer than twenty combat divisions." But worse than their lack of military strength was their state of mind. The Europeans will to defend themselves was " feeble," their disunities manifest. No reliance could be placed in them.
Therefore (to quote further from Mr. Hoover's recent speech, which has since become a sort of isolationist text) " any attempt to make war on the Communist mass by land invasion, through the quicksands of China, India or Western Europe, is sheer folly. That would be the graveyard of millions of American boys and would end in the exhaustion of this Gibraltar of Western civilisa- tipn "—meaning the United States. The proper course for the American Government now to pursue would be to arm to the teeth American air and naval forces, with the intention of holding the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans " with one frontier on Britain (if she wishes to co-operate) and the other on Japan, Formosa and the Philippines." Such a course would have the additional advantage of reducing American expenditures, balancing the American budget and freeing America from " the dangers of inflation and economic degeneration."
That, with variations and elaborations, would be what the isola- tionists would be telling you if you were an American. But simul- taneously you would be hearing the argument of the Administration, put with great force, urgency and lucidity. The Administration voices would be saying that at every stage in the formulation of present United States policy the isolationist case had been carefully examined, and always—on the basis of the best knowledge and the best judgement of the highest civilian and military officials of the Goverment—it had been rejected. And when the facts had been made known the isolationist thesis had been consistently voted down by the people. For it offered no hope, no possibility of success, no prospect ever of peace and security.
If the United States were to retreat to the positions the isola- tionists sought the free world would be shrunk to a size which would give it little chance of prevailing in the world struggle. The Communists would be enabled to make a quick conquest of the entire Eurasian land mass. Their military and economic power would be increased to an extent which would give them a clear superiority, and they would occupy a strategic position which (in the words of Mr. Dean Acheson) would be " catastrophic for the United States." In such circumstances all chance of. a peaceful settlement of the issues which are now dividing the world would disappear. The American choice would be between accepting any terms the Communists wished to impose and fighting without allies in the certainty of ultimate defeat or surrender. That would be the end of the American heritage.
It was not true (the Administration voices would continue) that the free nations of Europe were hopelessly divided, or that their will to resist had disappeared. On the contrary the appointment of General Eisenhower as supreme commander of a historic united defence force had opened a new prospect which was being embraced with enthusiasm and energy in Western Europe. The free world had immense resources. When they were pooled and developed they would be irresistible. This was the policy which alone presented Americans with the constructive prospect of peace with freedom. If you were an American, which of the two arguments would you accept ? Which course would you want your Government to pursue ?
The Administration will need within the next few weeks to be able to convince the American millions that what it is proposing will have a good chance of working. That is one of the reasons why so much now depends on General Eisenhower. The fact that he has taken the job has in itself given a powerful impetus in this country to the Administration's policy. For Americans respect his military judgements, and the reflection that he would not have embarked upon this adventure if he had not believed that' it would succeed is too obvious for anyone to miss. But it has never been plainer here than it is now that this is a time when American policy can be directly and immediately affected by the bearing and behaviour of the Western European peoples and Governments from this point onward. Doubt and defeatism may bring disaster. But faith and energy will be con- tagious: They will spread across oceans and light up the free world. This, the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, may well turn out in time to come to have been the real turning-point.
Previous page
