The Constitutional Controversy A LTHOUGH in our view the Government's reform
scheme—now to be reconsidered and perhaps abandoned—contained a grave defect, and was injured by an equally grave omission, much of the criticism by the Opposition has been so factitious that it could only be explained' by partisanshiprun wild. In general there was a good deal to be thankful for in the Government's proposals, and the motive behind them was certainly vfmnd and sincere. If people would examine the facts lastead of searching for Machiavellian intentions, they would have 'to admit that Liberals, at all events, cannot justifiably abuse the Government without making their own past history ridiculous.
In 1922 Mr. Lloyd George, as Prime Minister of the Coalition Government, authorized a scheme for reforming the House of Lords which was so like Mr. Baldwin's scheme that the differences are hardly worth talking about. We say " hardly worth talking about " in the vernacular sense, but in another sense the differences are well worth talking about, for the simple " reason that they could nearly all be adjusted by discussion. Within the past few days Mr. Lloyd George has sent a letter to the newspapers, in which he points out that the proposals of 1922 were a compromise and did not represent his own views. Such a state- ment is bewildering. Mr. Lloyd George, we repeat, was Prime Minister. Naturally, the scheme was a compromise, because every scheme presented by every Cabinet is in some degree a compromise. In a Coalition there is obviously more need for compromise than usual, but the fact remains that Mr. Lloyd George was head of the Government and could have refused his approval. For him to suggest now that he was not responsible is a renunciation of Ministerial responsibility 1-.o which we can recall no parallel.
What was proposed in 1922 was that the House of Lords, in addition to the Royal Peers, the Bishops and the Law Lords, should consist of (a) members elected either directly or indirectly from the outside, (b) hereditary Peers elected by their own order, (c) members nominated by the Crown. It will be noted that Lord Cave, in his statement in the House of Lords last week, reproduced these proposals point by point, except that he omitted the election of members from the outside—and therein, we are convinced, the Government for whom he was speaking were extremely wise. Mr. Lloyd George's Government next proposed that all the members of the reconstituted House, with the exception of the Royal Peers, the Bishops and the Law Lords, should sit for a term of years and be eligible for re-election. There again Mr. Baldwin echoes Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Lloyd George proposed that the new House should consist of about 350 members. Once again the echo was exact.
As regards Money Bills, Mr. Lloyd George proposed, in accordance with the recommendation of Lord Bryce's Commission, that the decision whether a Bill was or was not a Money Bill should rest, not with the Speaker but with a Joint Standing Committee of the two Houses. On this Committee the Speaker would be ex-offteio Chairman, and would have a casting vote. The proposal of 1922 and the proposal of last week „AN-ere identiCal, except that Mr. Baldwin's Government omitted to give the Speaker a casting vote. In our judgment it would be right that the Speaker should have this casting vote. If Mr: Baldwin's proposal went through as it stands, it would be open to the Opposition to say that, in the event of a deadlock on the Committee, the view of the House of Lords would prevail, as then the Bill under discussion could not be certified as a Money Bill. But surely Mr. Lloyd George must see that he has only to put forward such an argument to have it considered. It is not one of those differences which cause irreparable 'division.
Mr. Lloyd George, in order to pretend that the differences between his own scheme and that of the Government are essential, has to fall back upon reminding us that he proposed direct or indirect election of new members of the Upper House from the outside. Here is an appreciable difference indeed, but even this is not a vital one. We are convinced that Mr. Baldwin's plan of having only nominated members from the outside is much the wiser. He sees that the representation in the House of Lords now is extremely unfair to Labour. Mr. Lloyd George would have given the Labour Party a rough-and-tumble chance of getting men of its own persuasion elected ; Mr. Baldwin goes much further, and offers Labour the opportunity of recommending its own nominees, even when a Unionist Government is in power.
It is said, of course, that popular election to the Upper House is much more " democratic." There is logic in this, but it fades upon examination and would disappear altogether in practice. If the Upper House were entirely or even largely elected from the outside, whether directly or indirectly, a rivalry between the two Houses would inevitably be set up. The Upper House would instantly become conscious of acting on some popular authority, whereas now it can boast of none. In a crisis in which the Upper House felt that the country was being terribly misled, it would be sure to try to assert itself against the Commons. " We have as much right to speak as you." As it is, the Lords do not pretend to do more than retard doubtful legislation.
It is surely much that the Government bodily accepted the operation of the Parliament Act—except in reference to the composition of the House of Lords and changes in the Parliament Act itself. We trust that they have been convinced of the extreme unwisdom of these exceptions, which were the great defect in the scheme. They gave the Opposition an all too easy terrain for fighting. But the general acceptance of the Parliament Act as a sequel to the wordy threats of most Unionists in 1911 was a remarkable fact. It was declared in 1911 that the first duty of the next Unionist Government would be to repeal the Parliament Act, just as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is now declaring that the first duty of the next Labour Government will be to repeal the Trade Unions Act.
The attempt to withhold the status and structure of the House of Lords permanently from the normal operation of an Act of Parliament was something like the. first attempt to introduce in this country a written Constitution. We cannot believe that in this matter the Government- had any prospect of maintaining their position. They turned a scheme, which could otherwise have been justified by their electoral promises, into a Constitutional revolution so far-reaching that there was no justification for carrying it through until the verdict ci the country had been obtained at a General Election. The hereditary principle in the House of Lords must be subject to the law of political evolution as much as any other existing institution. It is absurd to say that it shall never be abolished without the consent of the 'Lords themselves, though we heartily agree that, so far as we can see ahead, a partly hereditary and partly nominated Upper House will give us much the most efficient body for its peculiar purpose that we can imagine. If the House of Lords presumed to rule, the hereditary principle would already be obsolete, but the Lords make no such pretence.
The Opposition has also made great play with the argument that the Government plan abolished the Royal prerogative of creating an unlimited number of Peers in order to overcome the recalcitrance in the House of Lords. It is quite true that no swamping creation could have the effect which used to be dreaded by the House of Lords. It will be plain, however, to everybody that this difficulty belongs to every scheme which reduces the number of the House of Lords and dilutes the hereditary members with temporary members from the outside. The difficulty was as clearly present in Mr. Lloyd George's scheme of .1922 as it is now. Can he have forgotten this ?
The great omission in the Government's scheme was that there was no mention of the Referendum. If this simple and unfailing means of determining what the wishes of the people really are in regard to a Bill that has passed through all its stages can be introduced, all the talk about an attempt to vest a perpetual veto in the House of Lords will become the merest nonsense. The objection to the Referendum which seems to have most weight is that it would be invoked against all progressive legislation, and would be allowed to lapse, perhaps for years at a time, when unprogressive Govern- ments were in power. In order to meet that criticism, it might easily be enacted that a Referendum could be demanded at any time in the House of Commons if the demand was supported by one-third of the total strength of the House. If the Government would only adopt the Referendum they would have no more Constitutional troubles.
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