BOOKS.
M. YVES GUYOT ON THE WAR.*
M. YVES GIIYOT is a veteran Free Trader. It was not to be for one moment supposed that recent events would have in any degree shaken his faith in the justice of a cause of which he has, throughout a long and honoured career, been one of the most able and distinguished supporters. From one point of view he is unquestionably right. The economic arguments on the subject of Free Trade and Protection are in no way affected by the war. It is, and will always remain, true that commercial liberty is in the interests of the consumers, who in every country constitute a majority, whilst Protection furthers those of a relatively small class of producers. But the most ardent Free Trader must perforce confess that the methods adopted by Germany have introduced political factors into the treatment of economic questions which cannot be ignored. M. Guyot sums up his solution of the problem in a single brief sentence : " Germany must be made a Free Trade country." Thus she will " rebuild the foundations of her prosperity." The execution of this programme may be difficult. The real problem for us to solve will, however, be to ascertain how far even Free Trade England will, at the close of the war, be able to adhere to Free Trade principles. Apart from other considerations, it is certain that indirect taxes will have to be imposed for revenue purposes. I will not, however, • TM Causes and Consequences of tks War. By Yves Guyot. London : Hutchinson and Co. 1105. Od. net.,1
pursue this subject any further, partly because any full discussion would, for the present, be premature, partly also because I have no wish to infringe the unwritten provisions of the treaty of peace which now exists between British Free Traders and Tariff Reformers.
In the account which M. Guyot gives of the relations between France and Germany at the time of the first Franoo-Prussian War, he narrates an incident which, if it really occurred, is of some historical interest. Those who are familiar with what happened at this period will remember that the Emperor William was very desirous of announcing at Versailles his assumption of the title of German Emperor. Prince Bismarck had great doubts as to whether this course was possible or desirable. He feared that strong opposition would be encountered owing to the Particularist sentiments of the various States of Germany. He more especially anticipated resistance on the part of Bavaria. It is known that Count Bray, the Bavarian Minister, whose views were notoriously pro-Austrian and anti-Prussian, was summoned to Versailles. M. Guyot now states, on the authority of Herr de Ruville, whose name is well known to Englishmen as the author of a highly prejudiced biography of Chatham, that Count Bray's original intention was to propose that the King of Prussia and the King of Bavaria should be co-equal representatives of the German Empire. This was a combination which was obviously unacceptable both to the Emperor and to Prince Bismarck. Count Bray was, therefore, about to break off the negotiations and return to Munich. On November 6th, 1870, however, it is said, "he had a long interview with Prince Bismarck and came away from it a changed man. From being an opponent of the German Empire he became an ardent enthusiast for it." The explanation Herr de Ruville gives for this sudden change is that M. Rouher, who, it will be remembered, was one of the most important of Napoleon III.'s Ministers, had deposited a number of papers in the Château of Cercay, near Brunoy, with the object of preventing their falling into the hands of the Germans. The Château, however, was captured by the Gorman troops and the papers sent to Prince Bismarck. They were found to contain autograph letters from the Grand Duke of Hesse, the King of Wurttemberg, and the King of Bavaria, which clearly showed that they and other German princes had in the past been false to tile cause of Germany, and had earnestly solicited the co-operation of Napoleon III. against Prussia. Bismarck, it is stated, thus " possessed a powerful blackmailing weapon," for he was able to threaten the various minor German princes with disclosUres which would have aroused German opinion against them. Bray, Beust, and Dalwigk, the Hessian Minister, were therefore obliged to change the whole of their attitude. This, Herr de Ruville says, " is the key to the foundation of the German Empire, a phenomenon of which no satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given."
I am unable to express any opinion as to the authenticity of Herr de Ruville's statements. No mention of the discovery of the C,ergay papers is made by Busch in his Secret Pages of Bismarck's History, neither is anything said of them in Bismarck's own Reflections and Reminiscences. There can, however, be no doubt that, just previous to the war of 1870, Napoleon III. had been negotiating, possibly without the knowledge of his Ministers, for a coalition of Austria, Italy, and France against Prussia.
M. Guyot gives a very lucid and succinct account of the events which preceded the outbreak of the present war, and although it cannot be said that he adds anything very material to the information previously available, he none the less reminds the public of some circumstances which, even if known, are apt to be forgotten. In the first place, it is as well to remember that a full and accurate historical account of the war can never be written until the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Vienna are prepared to divulge the secrets in their possession. It is highly improbable that those secrets will be fully disclosed to the eyes of the present generation. As regards Austrian action, the following, which appeared in the Gazette de Lausanne of December 17th, 1914, and which was written by an Austrian diplomatist, is of somewhat special interest :- "Berlin incited our diplomacy to extreme measures [against Serbia], and the moment it appeared that, after all, a compromise might be reached, launched her ultimatum to Russia. We were thus forced into war. Our country is the only one which has not, up to the present, published the diplomatic documents relating to the period immediately before the war. We could not do so without exposing Germany."
In the second place, M. Guyot throws a light on the methods adopted by the German Government for manoeuvring the hesitating and only half-willing Ministers of the Sultan into open hostility towards the Allies. He declares that in October, 1914, the Ottoman Government was, as usual, in dire want of ready money. Fethi Bey was therefore sent to Berlin in order to negotiate a loan. The German Government agreed to advance £136,000 to Turkey on the condition that Turkey should immediately attack England and Russia. Fethi Bey replied that " Turkey would give military support to Germany when the particularly favourable moment presented itself, but that the actual ecoasion was unsuitable." On October 27th, on which day Fethi Bey left Berlin, the Goeben ' and the Breslau' passed into the Black Sea in order to bombard the towns on the Russian coast. What followed is thus described by M. Guyot :— " Informed solely by the Press messages, the Turkish Ministers, in their stupefaction, went to the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim, and demanded an explanation. The Ambassador replied : ' Fethi Bey has made a formal promise to Berlin that Turkey
hall enter the war, and-when a promise. is made to our Emperor it has is be kept.' Enver Bey, Germany's tool, was followed by Talaat Bey, and carried the day."
Thus was verified the truth of the aphorism employed by Lord Derby in 1875 when he said that it might be possible to guarantee the Turk against being killed, but that it was quite impossible to guarantee him against committing suicide. M. Guyot's accounk of this episode receives some partial confirmation from Sir Louis Mallet's despatch of November 20th, 1914, which was laid before Parliament (Cd. 7718), but Sir Louis says nothing of the alleged mission undertaken by Fethi Bey. He alludes, however, to a proposal to send Halil Bey to Berlin which was at one time under consideration, but which was abandoned at the instance of the German Ambassador.
The fallacy that Germany was necessarily forced to adopt an expansive policy in order to obtain room for a redundant population has already been exposed by many writer s. It may be as well, however, to quote the figures which M. Guyot gives on this subject. They are conclusive. Germany is at present far from being over-populated. The volume of emigration has for some years past been steadily diminishing. In 1885 one hundred and seventy-one thousand emigrants left Germany. In 1892 the number fell to one hundred and sixteen thousand, and in 1898 to twenty-three thousand, at which figure it remained constant for many years. Tho Pan-Germans, however, urge that if Germany is capable of supporting a population of sixty-eight millions, she will not be able to support one of eighty or ninety millions, and that therefore timely provision must be made for the increase of population which is to be confidently anticipated. In answer to this argument M. Guyot points out that a German population of ninety millions would only mean one hundred and sixty-six to the square kilometre, and that Belgium in 1913 had a population of no less than two hundred and sixty to the square kilometre, without being forced in any marked degree to resort to emigration. M. Guyot considers that the war was mainly caused by the desire of " the Kaiser and the forward party to settle internal difficulties by provoking a great crisis." History has recorded many instances of despotic Governments who have endeavoured to divert the attention of their subjects from internal to external affairs. It may very well be that fear of Socialism on the part of the Kaiser and his advisers was a contributory cause of the war, but it was far from being the sole cause. M. Guyot appears somewhat to overlook the great importance which should be attached to the ambitious projects enter- tained at Berlin in connexion with German domination not only in the Near East but in Asia.
As regards the terms of peace, M. Guyot's proposals are very drastic. He thinks that the Allies should refuse to treat with any member of the House of Hohenzollern, and that no neutral should be allowed to mediate. In common with most of those who have given serious attention to the subject, he urges that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should be divided up. But ho goes much further than this. He holds that not only Austria but Germany should bo dismembered :— " The State which began in 1866 and ends in 1916 must give place to another. As soon as negotiations begin, Prussia must be reduced to the old frontiers she had before the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. The Duchy of Posen, at least a part of Silesia, all Prussia between (and including) Danzig and the mouths of the Vistula and East Prussia must bo restored to Poland. Tho Rhine Province and Westphalia must be declared autonomous. Saxony must recover what she lost in 1815. Frankfort must return to the status of a free city. The annexation of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, and Nassau must be declared null and void, for from the point of view of positive law, the Prussian Diet was not competent to sanction it."
Whilst, however, M. Guyot holds that the two great autocracies must be broken up, he considers it essential that every effort should be made to ensure the disappearance of " bitter memories," and to prevent the future policy of the belligerent States from being dominated by a desire for revenge. It will be found somewhat difficult to reconcile these conflicting aims. It may be asserted with some confidence that nothing would be more calculated to foster a spirit of revenge amongst future generations of Germans than the forced dismemberment of Germany at the hands of her present opponents. The future of Germany must mainly be decided by the German people themselves. The principal object of the Allies must be to secure for themselves guarantees against such an unprovoked attack as that to which they have been recently
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