ITALY AND THE YUGO-SLAVS.
SOME weeks ago we wrote expressing gratification at the agreement which appeared to have been reached between the representatives of the Yugo-Slays and the Italian Government. Unfortunately, it now appears that the agreement was less definite than the outside public was led to believe. At any rate, there has recently been a more or less violent agitation throughout the Italian Press on the whole subject of Italy's relations with the Yugo-Slays, and from this agitation we are justified in inferring that the Italian Government is not yet formally committed even to a recognition of the separate existence of a Yugo-Slat State, apart from the question of its future frontiers. Suet uncertainty as exists on this question can only be regardesi as unfortunate for Italy herself as well as for the Entents Powers.
The basis for the division of opinion in Italy on this question can be made clear in a few words. For many years past there has, of course, been in Italy an active agitation on behalf of what is known as Italia Irredenta. This agitation, so far at least as it concerned the eastern shores of the Adriatic, was largely inspired by persons of Italian blood whose homes were in the Italianized cities on those shores. These Italians, living under a foreign flag, were moved by traditions going back to the time when the flag of Venice floated over their ancestral homes. They conceived of a greater Italy which should bring again under the Italian flag the over-seas possessions of the Venetian Republic. Their desire to realize this dream was further stimulated by the hardships they had to endure under Austrian rule. The Austrian Government, conscious of the pro-Italian sentiment .of an appreciable number of its subjects in Dalmatia and m the other Austrian provinces that line the Adriatic, deliberately encouraged its Slavonic as against its Italian subjects. Every kind of administrative favour was given to the Southern Slays to the discouragement of the more intellectually developed Italian population. This policy succeeded so well that Austria was able to create strong support for herself among the Southern Slays, based not on Slavonic affection for Austria, but on Slavonic mistrust of Italy. So much was this the case that when the war broke out the Austrian Government found that it could safely send against Italy Slavonic troops who, if sent against Russia, would desert to the enemy.
Gradually, with the prospect of the break-up of the Austrian Empire, a change has been coming over Southern Slav feeling. The leaders of the Southern Slays have rightly taken the view that it is to their interest to seek the friendship of Italy while forming an alliance among themselves. This was the purpose of the Conference held at Corfu under the presidency of Dr. Trumbich, and of the subsequent negotiations which he conductedwith the Italian Government in Rome. From the Italian point of view, although the extreme Italian Irredentists may be reluctant to recognize the fact, friendship between Italy and the Southern Slays is equally desirable. For if the new Yugo-Slavia, to give this at present vague territory the name which its patriots have devised, were to look to Italy as its big friend in Europe a very valuable barrier would be created in the way of Teutonic ambitions in the Adriatic, and in addition Italy would have at her doors a large and only partially developed territory as an outlet for her commercial activities. If, on the other hand, Italy, in obedience to the aspirations of extreme Italian Irredentists, were to insist on annexing portions of the eastern Adriatic coast which the Yugo-Slays regard as rightfully belonging to them, a permanent hostility might be created.
These are, in rough outline, the broad issues involved ; but, as we know from our own exilerience of Irish and of Indian problems, rough outlines are quite an insufficient guide to the settlement of national rivalries. The issues raised by the Yugo-Slav problem are by no means simple. To begin with, there is no definition of what Yugo-Slavia means from the territorial point of view. More important still, there are at least two quite distinct conceptions of the basis of the proposed Yugo-Slav State. Many Serbians conceive Yugo-Slavia as merely the expansion of the pre-existing kingdom of Serbia. Pan-Serbia is their cry, not Yugo-Slavia. On the other hand, the members of the Yugo-Slav Committee, who profess to speak for all the Southern Slays, are not at all inclined to concede any pre-eminence to Serbia. We learn from the pages of The New Europe that a bitter controversy on this issue is now raging within the ranks of the Serbian Government at Corfu. Such a conflict in itself goes a long way towards justifying the caution which the Italian Government is showing in dealing with the problem. It does not, however, justify the attitude which part of • the Italian Press is attributing to Baron Sonnino. Accord- ing to Baron Sonnino's critics he insists that the Conven- tion of London, which preceded Italy's entry into the war, must be carried out in its entirety. That Con- vention, which has since formed one of the grounds for Bolshevik denunciations of Italian Imperialism, was drawn up at a time when the whole outlook in Eastern Europe was far different from what it now is. The Russian Empire was then virtually intact, and though the Russian armies had suffered some reverses, the belief in the Russian steam-roller had not yet disappeared. The Italians who negotiated the Convention of London in 1915 were justified in arguing that the only way in which Italy could make herself safe on the Adriatic was by annexing all the principal ports and islands, so as to prevent the establish- ment of a strong naval Power within a few hours' steaming of her virtually defenceless coasts. Whether that -naval Power might be a Prussian-controlled Austria or a Slavonic outpost of an imperialistic Russia the danger seemed at that moment equally great to the Italian negotiators.
But to-day we are justified in arguing that this special naval danger to Italy has disappeared. The Entente Powers, by accepting the Czecho-Slovaks as allies, have committed themselves to the break-up of the Austrian Empire, and it therefore follows that there would be no chance of a German Mittel Europa controlling the Adriatic. As regards Russia, the revolution has destroyed the possibility of Russian expan- sion throughout the Balkan States, and it may even be that Russia will not again occupy a place in the worlii as one great unit. It may be added that if the Entente Powers are able to fulfil their obligations to Rumania, as we must assume that they will be, a greater Rumania will be created which would herself be an obstacle to any great Slavonic Power advancing either from Moscow or from Petrograd to the shores of the Adriatic. The maximum naval danger that Italy would have to fear from the Adriatic would be such danger as might be created by a Yugo-Slav State, and that State, assuming it to include the whole of the kingdom of Serbia, would still at the maximum only contain a population of less than a third of that of the kingdom of Italy. Therefore, from the ,naval point of view, the main arguments which inspired and justified the Convention of London in 1915 no longer count. What the Italian Government and people now have to decide is whether they are wise in view of the changed circumstances of Europe to attempt to insist on the letter of a treaty made in 1915. It is evident from the Italian Press that a very large section of the Italian people answer this question with an emphatic negative. They cannot receive too much credit for their great fairness of mind, whatever their opponents may urge against their policy as such.
One factor in the controversy which is being pressed as against the attitude attributed to Baron Sonnino is the important consideration that the United. States was not a party to the Convention of London. Consequently, President Wilson is free to take the line that he will not support Italy in aspirations which conflict with the ideal of self-determination for separate nationalities. Unquestionably the Italians in Dalmatia represent a very small percentage of the population. If the majority is to rule the Italians must go under, and several Italian newspapers are now making the point that unless the Irredentists spontaneously recognize this situation Italy may be placed in the awkward position of having to accept a decision imposed upon her from outside. The matter is obviously one in which the friends and admirers of Italy in this country wish to say nothing that would reflect either upon the statesmanship of the Italian Government or upon the loyalty of the Italian people to the ideals for which the Allies are fighting. We recognize fully that the issue is a complicated one, and we have not even now heard all the facts. The only general consideration which can be advanced with confidence is that the Italians would. be wise in their own interest spontaneously to take the broadest and moat generous view of the problem which now confronts them, and to look rather to the advantages to be gained by cordial friendship with their Yugo-Slav neighbours than to purely strategic considerations, or even to considerations of national sentiment based upon memories of the past.
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