TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CASABLANCA INCIDENT. THE latest news encourages the belief that the Casablanca incident, which as we write is causing no small amount of anxiety in the diplomatic world, will be satisfactorily settled. In ordinary circum- stances, and if we were writing of any other Power than Germany, we should say that there could be no possible question of the incident going further than a temporary interchange of asperities. The international atmosphere is, however, at this moment so electric owing first to the action of Austria- Hungary, and then to the publication of the German Emperor's interview, that it is difficult to feel quite certain that diplomacy will be able to play its part of smoothing over local squabbles such as that on which the Casablanca incident rests. Thus, though in other circumstances it would be incredible that war, or even the serious threat of war, could arise out of the present conditions, we are bound to feel very considerable anxiety until the incident is finally closed.
Our chief ground for this anxiety is the fact that the action which Germany is now taking—that is, the attempt to bully, and so to humiliate, France— must be described as something of a diplomatic habit. If we look back over the history of the past ten or fifteen years, we shall note that, not once only, but many times, when Germany has found herself in a tight place diplomatically, or, again, has for some reason or other desired to distract the attention either of her own people or of the rest of the world, or of both, her plan has been to bully the French and to show her teeth and growl defiance across the Western frontier. The old instructions, "No case; abuse plaintiff's attorney," have been parodied in the German Foreign Office : " When things look disagreeable and unpleasant for us anywhere, make it hot for France." The capital example of this policy was seen when the German Government realised that not only had we composed our various grounds of quarrel with France, and made an Agreement thoroughly satisfactory to both States, but, further, that there was " danger of a compromise breaking out " between us and Russia. Germany at first took the news of the Entente with France philosophically enough, partly because she did not believe in its endurance, but still more because she was not in a position to be anything but philosophic. When however, the success of the Japanese armies and the internal troubles in Russia for the moment rendered it impossible for Russia to play a strong part in European diplomacy, the German Foreign Office suddenly woke up to the fact that they had been deeply injured by not being officially informed of the under- standing between France and Britain, though in reality the whole of the negotiations were well known to them. In this mixed mood of wounded pride and injured innocence they at once turned to the device of " making it hot" for France. France was told, almost in so many words, that to come to an understanding with Britain must be deemed to be per se an act of hostility towards Germany, and a German emissary (Prince Donnersmark) was sent to Paris to explain to the governing men in France, and to the French people generally, that the German Emperor's patience was nearly exhausted, and that France must remember that an understanding with Britain would not, and could not, protect her from invasion. Germany might be unable to hurt Britain, and might even suffer in her trade and colonial possessions, but that would not matter. France, prostrate before the military strength of Germany, would be made to pay the bill, and more than the bill, for any German losses. Though her military preparations were at that time anything but complete, France met this bullying with great dignity and great firmness, and all friends of European peace must feel devoutly thankful to her for the courage with which she kept her indignation within bounds, and refused absolutely to lose her self-control or to show her resentment at German menaces. What has been happening over the Casablanca incident appears to be very much on the same lines. The German Government are very greatly annoyed at the remarkable solidarity of the Agreement between Russia, France, and Britain. Here is one reason for again having resort to the policy of " making things hot" for France. Added to this, however, there is the extraordi- narily complicated and disagreeable situation, internal and external, voluntarily created by the publication of the German Emperor's interview. The German Government are, in a word, exceedingly sore at the turn affairs have taken, and very anxious to distract attention, both at home and abroad, from their loss of diplomatic prestige. Accordingly they have revived the Casablanca incident, which a few weeks ago seemed destined to take the usual course of such incidents. All the weapons usually employed in diplomatic bullying have been used by Germany during the past week.
It may perhaps be asked why we should feel a special anxiety on the present occasion, and why we do not expect that things will go as they have gone before and end in a moral victory for France. Our reason is that there are signs of the French temper giving way, and of a tendency both amongst French statesmen and the French public to say that Germany is going too far, and that there must be a limit to their being constantly harried by their Eastern neighbour. We may regret this tendency to lose patience on the part of France ; but we can hardly be surprised at it, and we must remember in addition that France is inclined to be less patient by reason of two circumstances. The first is her sense that there never was a time when not only the understandings between Russia and France and Britain and France, but also that between Russia and Britain, were stronger or more clear. France feels that, provided she does nothing provocative or rash, she may take it for granted that her friends of the Triple Entente will stand by her, and that her neighbour Italy (and, we may add, Spain) may in the special circumstances be relied upon to give no sort of encouragement to Germany. Austria, unfortunately, is not at the moment in a position to do much for the peace of Europe. or to protect the rights of individual States ; but Austria, it may be said with certainty, is the only Power likely to support Germany. But in the event of war, Austria would have her hands more than full owing to the Slavonic question. She would have to choose, and choose at a most unfavourable juncture, whether she was going to become a Slavonic State, or merely to revolve as a satellite. of Germany. Her Slavonic populations would probably demand at the very least neutrality ; and if that were refused them, Austria might find plentiful occupation for her armies in keeping down her anti- Teutonic populations, and preventing internal dissensions from breaking into flame.
There is another reason which may incline France to swallow less easily than on former occasions a dose of German bullying. A belief has grown up in France in the last three or four years, rightly or wrongly; that her armies would now be able to give a. very good account of themselves in the case of conflict with even so terrible and well organised a machine as the German nation in arms. Undoubtedly French Generals who a few years ago would have met the foe, if with courage and patriotism, yet with a certain sense of hopelessness, would now enter upon a struggle with the confidence of victory. That is, looking at the matter in the abstract, a circumstance which can hardly be said to make for peace. Nor is the growth of this self-confidence from the military point of view without support in other quarters. The November number of the United Service Magazine contains a striking comparison —noticed by us in greater detail in our review of the magazines—between the French and German Armies as seen at matiuvres last autumn. The writer is a' Mr. Howard Hensman. From this comparison he draws the following conclusions :— " To compare the French and German armies, detail by detail, compels one to the belief, that though the latter nation possesses a huge army and the most wonderful organisation human brains have yet been able to devise, yet the French Army is the one that would command one's faith in the event of a war between the two. The German Army is too mechanical, too stiff, and too automatic in its every movement to encourage confidence. What may be termed ' the human element' is wanting, and it is to be doubted if all the drilling and all the discipline and absolute precision of movement in the world will make up for this great loss. The French Army, on the other hand, is essentially a flexible, intelligent human machine, obeying orders as a matter of course, but each unit of it, down to the individual almost,
capable of • independent thought and action if and when the occasion demands."
No doubt other military critics have been far less - optimistic about the French Army. In spite of this, however, and without adopting all Mr. Hensman's con- clusions, we are inclined to 'believe that the weight of evidence is on his side, not only when he praises the French, • but when he points out certain very grave defects in the German Army. He admits the magnificent accuracy and splendid construction of the German machine, but notes that it has the defects of its qualities in a very marked degree. Indeed, his description of it suggests Matthew Arnold's famous lines on the later Roman Empire :—
" Stout was its arm, each thew and bone Seemed puissant and alive—
But ah! its heart, its heart was stone, And so it could not thrive !"
We cannot leave the subject of the Casablanca incident without pointing out that within the last few. mouths we have twice had striking examples of how unsafe it would be for any nation to rely either upon the sanctity of Treaties, or upon general assurances that arbitration for all smaller incidents will now supersede resort to war or threats of war,—that the Hague Conference precludes for the future the risk of war on matters of punctilio. We have seen in the course of the present autumn a Great Power treat the most solemn and fundamental of international instruments with absolute contempt. She has acted as if Treaties were no more binding on the nations that sign them than the by-laws of a market town. Again, we now see Germany acting in a manner wholly contrary to the spirit of the Hague Convention. France has all along shown herself per- fectly willing to submit the quarrel to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal, and to submit it on the widest basis. . Germany not only refuses submission to the Tribunal unless the reference is restricted, but in a manner both menacing and provocative insists that a preliminary apology shall be made to the German Consul at Casablanca by the French Government,—au apology in regard to which -Germany adds the strange proposal that in exchange she will censure her Consul ! We do not desire to say a single word as to the merits of the Casablanca dispute, but we must point out that submissions to arbitration must become an absolute farce if the preliminary negotiations are conducted in this spirit. The French soldiers in Morocco may have been completely in the wrong. Upon that we prefer to say nothing, as we yet hope that the matter may very soon be sub judice. We can hardly doubt, however, that France is right in insisting that the arbitration should be complete and should apply to the whole dispute. That is the spirit in which the Hague Tribunal can be made useful. Handled as the Germans appear to have handled it during the earlier part of the present week, it can become little more than a cause of increased friction and an instrument in the game of picking international quarrels.
We have given above our reasons for anxiety as to the Casablanca incident. We may say, however, once more that, in spite of these misgivings, it seems to us absolutely incredible that war—war which would involve the whole of Europe—can possibly. come out of so trivial a dispute. The conscience of Europe, we are afraid, does not count for very much, but surely it ought to be strong enough to prevent so terrible a catastrophe. We will say, in conclusion, what we have said elsewhere. Though no responsible person hero would have desired to say or do anything which might even have seemed like urging France on in her resistance to Germany, there was plenty of evidence that the British people were fully prepared to hold loyally to their understanding with France should they have been called on to do so.
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