BOOKS.
THE VERDICT OF AMERICA.* THE political mind of the Anglo-Saxon is never really at rest unless he can find a moral basis on which to rest the policy pursued by the country of which he is a member. Foreigners, and notably Germans, regard this practice as a mere hypocritical cloak used to veil moral delinquencies, and they point, sometimes with a, show of reason, to the contrast between British theory and British practice. They are unjust. Few individuals, and still fewer nations, arc able invariably to act up to the full standard of that high morality by which they profess to be guided. The Germans, less than any other people, are in a position to cast the first stone at those who are guilty of occasional lapses from the narrow path of rigid morality. But when the most that is possible has been made of British sins, whether of omission or commission, it still remains true that it is more upright and praiseworthy to possess a national conscience, even if it be seared by the remorse consequent on some past errors, than to cast all conscientious motives to the winds and to defend political action by arguments based on that shameless egotism which either denies or wholly ignores the fact that both nations and individuals have a duty to perform towards their neighbours. " Britain's record in the past," Dr. Schmitt,' who is an American Rhodes Scholar, says, " is not unstained.. .. But, compared with the crimson offences
• (I) England and Germany, 1740-1914. By Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, M.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. London: Humphrey Milford. Ns. ed. net.)—(2) The German Empire between Two Ware. By Robert Herndon Fife, Junior Professor in Wesleyan University. London : Macmillan and Co. lee. ed. set.) of Germany, her peccadilloes are insignificant." Without cavilling at Dr. Schmitt's severely impartial verdict. Englishmen may be pardoned for holding that, even if some " peccadilloes " in the past be admitted, they ought is fairness to be balanced by such acts of wise and noble altruism as the sacrifices made to ensure the abolition of slavery, the cession, without compensation of any kind, of the Ionian Islands to Greece, and the treatment of the Boers of South Africa at the close
of a successful war. Professor on visiting the well-kept Berlin Cemetery, " where the dead sleep under roses and eternal green," Is led to the conclusion that " the German soul is no less responsive [than hitherto] to noble impulses." It may be hoped and believed that the remark holds good in so far as many individual Germans are concerned, but the history of Prussian statesmanship from the days of Frederick the Great, and even earlier, to those of the present Kaiser is one continuous record of obedience to ignoble rather than to noble impulses. It is not relieved by any symptom of altruistic motives or sentiments.
The moralizing tendencies of Englishmen render them sensitive to the opinions on British policy entertained and expressed abroad. In the great contest in which they are now engaged they do not look for material help from others, but inasmuch as they hold that they and their Allies, whilst fighting for their own interests, are incidentally acting as the champions of civilization, they yearn for sympathy and for moral support. Neither, on the whole, have they boon disappointed in their expectations. The best elements of the world are ranged in a solid anti-German phalanx. Special importance is, moreover, attached to the trend of American opinion. The Americans, in fact, stand, from the British point of view, in a position which is altogether peculiar. No Inhabitant of those islands would think for one moment of speaking of the citizens of the United States as " foreigners." Community of language, racial origin, political institutions, and habits of thought alike ban the use of the expression. Moreover, the very defects of British character are reproduced, often in a somewhat enhanced degree, on the further side of the Atlantic. When we are taunted, sometimes not without reason, for our " insular " habits of thought, we may reflect that, although it would be technically incorrect to apply the term to the citizens of the United States, it may with great appropriateness be used to designate that segregation from the political mentality prevalent on the Continent of Europe, which is the natural outcome of physical barriers and of the Monroe Doctrine, and which characterizes the opinions of the American masses even to a greater extent than those of their British counterparts. Englishmen, therefore, feel that Americans, although belonging to a wholly separate community, can understand the motives of their action better than any other members of the international family. At the same time, they breathe a different political atmosphere from that in which we live. Their detachment is sufficient to act as some antidote to passion or prejudice. If, being swayed by the ties of kinship, they are not absolutely impartial, they at least occupy a position which should guarantee them against indulgence in excessive partiality.
Tho attitude adopted throughout the war by the Government of the United States has certainly aroused in this country a feeling, which it would be an exaggeration to characterize as one of resentment, but which may be accurately described as one of astonishment and disappointment. This feeling, however, has been greatly assuaged by the generous testimony borne by the leading thinkers of America to the justice of the cause for which we are fighting. Dr. Schmitt has evidently examined with great care the history of the events, both remote and proximate, which have led up to Armageddon. He does not hold that Great Britain is wholly blameless in all matters. For instance, ho thinks—erroneously, in my opinion—that the secret arrangement made between France, Spain, and Groat Britain in 1904 about Morocco was " not a creditable business." But he entertains no manner of doubt as to the quarter to which the main guilt of provoking the war should be assigned. " The historian," he says, " is entitled to say that Germany is responsible for the bitterness of feeling and the violence of language which long characterized the discussion of Anglo-German relations." After alluding to the fact that the German Emperor persistently refused to consent to any agreement having the limitation" of armaments for its object, and after stating that " the murders of Serajevo merely furnished the excuse for an aggressive move definitely and carefully planned for the summer of 1914," he dwells on the earnest and sincere endeavours made by Great Britain to preserve peace, and ho concludes with the remark that " Germany must bear almost the entire responsibility for the fatal ending of her rivalry with England." No one with any pretence to impartiality, who has conscientiously examined the facts, could come to any other conclusion, but Englishmen will scarcely admit the necessity or the justice of using the adverb " almost " to qualify this righteous judgment.
It is unnecessary to travel over all the familiar grounds which have led Dr. Schmitt to the delivery of this judgment. It will be more profitable to indicate a few errors into which, from want of full Information, he has unwittingly fallen.
The title-deeds of Lord Beaconsfield to be called " the father of modern British Imperialism are by no means of unimpeachable validity. Neither is it correct to say that, as a consequence of the Colonial Conference of 1911, the overseas Dominions of Great Britain were " admitted into the arcane of tho Foreign Office." The means by
which that admission can be secured have yet to be considered. Again; Dr. Schmitt says that " there is every reason to believe that a coalition of the European Powers to help Spain against the United States was Proposed by Germany, but was quashed byLord Salisbury's intimation.that Great Britain would support the United States." This belief, if it exists, is based on incorrect information. The eympathies of Roman Catholic, Austria were from the first strongly pro-Spanish, and the public opinion of most of the Continental nations favoured the cause of Spain rather-than that of America; but the German Government were nevertheless very desirous of doing nothing to embroil their relations with the United States. It was perfectly well known, and has, indeed, now been admitted by Professor Fish and others, that the Government of the United States earnestly endeavoured to avoid war, and it is almost certain that their efforts would have proved successful had it not been for the Chauvinistic attitude hastily and inconsiderately adopted by Congress. In these circumstances, it was thought by some that a fresh representation by the Great Powers at the last moment in favour of a continuance of negotiations on the terms offered by Spain might not be displeasing to the United States Government. Such a proposal was initiated at a meeting of the Representatives at Washington, and submitted by them to their respective Governments. The British Government declined to associate themselves with it, and a similar course was immediately afterwards followed by Germany ; but it is, to say tho least, highly probable that German action in this sense would have been taken even if Great Britain had not been first in the field. There is, so far as I know, no reason whatever for believing that Germany contemplated the formation of a hostile coalition against the United States and that the project was wrecked exclusively by the action of British diplomacy.
At the risk of again posing to some extent as an adroratue I must also point out that I know of no justification for Dr. Schmitt's statement that, at the time of the Fashoda episode, " Germany offered, so Englishmen believe, to make a demonstration in South Africa if France would hold firm." I -am not acquainted with any Englishmen who entertain this belief, neither am I aware of the authority on which those who entertain it baie the faith which is in them. All I can say is that this is the first that I have ever heard of the matter, and that, if any such action on the part of Germany was taken, it is improbable that information regarding it should not have leaked out in diplomatic circles. I entertain some doubts as to the accuracy of the statement, and I find on inquiry that those doubts are shared by others whose oppor- tunities for acquiring correct information on the subject wore equal, if not superior, to my own. ' I notice, however, that M. Lanessan, in his recent Hisloire de r Entente Cordiale Franco-Anglaise, rather con- firms Dr. Schmitt's statement.
No diplomatic incident of recent years has formed the subject of more numerous myths than the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. Dr. Schmitt says that it " was the work of three men "—namely, M. Delcasse, Sir Thomas Barclay, and the late King Edward VII. M. Dekasse un- questionably contributed largely to the Entente. Of the part played by Sir Thomas Barclay I cannot speak with either knowledge or authority. The attitude of the King was certainly most beneficial. His great personal popularity in France contributed to dispose French public opinion to consider favourably any proposals to restore those friendly relations with Great Britain which had been detrimentally affected mainly by the course of events in Egypt. But in respect to the details of the negotiations which were eventually crowned with success, his Into Majesty did not exercise nearly so groat an influence as is very generally supposed.
The part played by different individuals in this epoch-making transaction is, however, of no groat consequence. The general causes which led to the conclusion of the arrangement of 1904 are of greater historical and political importance. The idea that it was the first atop deliberately taken, mainly at the instance of Great Britain, to " isolate " Germany and to form a European coalition hostile to the Central Powers has been sedulously fostered by the Germans. It has been very generally credited. It has been regarded, oven in England, as a clever diplomatic move intended to counter the preponderating influence of the Triple Alliance. Professor Fife says : "Since 1904, English foreign policy has had the ' German peril' as its ground tone. It was that brought England and France together in 1904 to make the Entente." It is highly probable that this theory of the origin of the Entente will float down the tide of history.
Those who have had no actual experience of modern diplomacy are always rather prone to reject explanations of diplomatic action which are simple, and to resort-to others of a more complex, covert, and far. reaching character. This is what has happened in the case under dis- cussion. The immediate origin of the Entente of 1904 is to bo found mainly in the local situation existing at the time in Egypt. Egyptian finance was then in a flourishing condition, but owing to the international fetters imposed on Egypt in circumstances which, in 1904, had wholly ceased to exist, the country was unable to derive any real profit from the surplus funds which, save for these artificial obstructions, would have been available. The position had, in fact, become intolerable. It was determined to make an effort to improve it. A high Egyptian official was sent to Paris in order to feel the pulse of the French Govern- ment. Simultaneously, responsible Frenchmen had come to the con- clusion that it was practically impossible for the British Government
to redeem the pledge to evacuate Egypt, which had been over-hastily given in 1882. They were to some extent mollified by the consideration shown for French interests in Egypt. They rozognized that the policy of " pinpricks," which had lasted for twenty-two years, was of no real benefit to Franco, and might even endanger the peace of Europe. British advances were, therefore, met in a friendly spirit. Naturally, some compensation was expected for any concessions made in Egypt. They were to be found in granting France a free hand in Morocco, where a policy of acquiescence in the progress of French influence, under proper safeguards, seemed to be dictated by the interests of both countries. The idea of extending the agreement to the settlement of various other questions, which had for a long time served as constant sources of irritation, was a very obvious and natural corollary. The matter would have been generally regarded in its true light—namely, as an arrangement of local differences which had for a long time injuriously affected the friendly relations of the two Western Powers— bad not Germany thought fit to interfere. The German Emperor had recently brought a novel and most pernicious principle, fraught with real danger to peace, into European diplomacy. In 1900, he stated publicly that " without Germany and the German Emperor no important step in international policy should be taken, even beyond the seas." An imaginary grievance against France was, therefore, got up. Spurious claims on behalf of individual Germans were easily manufactured, and Europe was brought to the brink of war. Substantially, these are all the main facts connected with the history of the Anglo-French Entente. I can state very positively and confidently that all other explanations should be received by the British public with much scepticism.
I am less familiar with all the details of the negotiations which sub- sequently led to the Anglo-Russian Agreement, but I have no hesitation in saying that it originated from much the same causes as those which operated in the case of the Anglo-French Entente, of which, indeed, it was the logical and perfectly legitimate sequel The long-standing animosity between Great Britain and Russia had bebn productive of no good to either country. The impossibility and undesirability of continuing tho pro-Turkish policy which led to the Crimean War, and which was still followed in the days of Lord Beaconsfield, were generally recognized in this country. The British occupation of Egypt had materially altered the state of affairs in the Mediterranean. Moreover, some settlement of the conflicting claims of the two Govern- ments to predominant influence in different parts of Persia had become extremely desirable. Both Russian and British statesmen welcomed the opportunity afforded for settling their time-honoured misunderstandings.
It was natural enough that both of these arrangements should be viewed with disfavour at Berlin, for the corner-stone of German diplomacy had for many years been the encouragement both of Anglo- French and of Anglo-Russian dissension. But there was nothing whatever in either of these transactions which involved a menace to Germany. If the profession of German pacific intentions had been as true as it was in reality false, German diplomatists should have wel- comed both the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian Agreements as measures calculated to ensure the peace of Europe. They acted otherwise. They deliberately sought what may bo very correctly characterized by the significant French expression: une guerelle
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