TERMSOF PEACE.—A VOICE FROM THE GRAVE. G OOD luck and one
of Messrs. Thorp's provincial cata- logues of second-hand books lately put into our posses- sion a square-shaped pamphlet of the year 1710 entitled " Considerations on Peace and War, under the following Heads : I. Whether it be the Interest of the Allies to consent to a Peace in this Conjuncture. II. Upon What Conditions a Lasting Peace may be Expected. III. The Means for Obtain- ing such Conditions. (London : Printed for B. Bragge at the Raven in Paternoster Row.)" The appropriateness of the pamphlet to our circumstances is so amazing, and the verve of the pamphleteer is so memorable—his style is full of point, and his policy of patriotism and good sense—that we cannot resist making some extracts from his pages. He may have been too impetuous, but he had the root of the matter in him. He wanted to " engage the enemy more closely ! " and he wanted to avoid at all costs a patched-up, unper- manent peace. Above all, he wanted to destroy the condi- tions which had made Louis XIV., our then enemy, the scourge of freedom.
The pamphlet is dedicated to the Right Honourable John Lord Sommers, Lord President of Her Majesty's most Honour- able Privy Council. The dedication opens with these words :— " If anything can justify the Presumption of this Address, it is the Importance of the Subject, which may render it worthy of Your
Lordship's most serious and mature Attention ; since the Happiness of three Kingdoms has so great a Dependence on their Governors apprehensions of the Circumstances of their Enemies."
Then follows a preface :- " The Blessings of Peace are so many and so valuable, that nothing is more natural than to wish for the Enjoyment of them. But as it is the Thing, and not the Name of Peace only that is desirable, the Design of this short Tract is to convince such of my Countrymen as are not already sensible of it, that it is not yet time to conclude a Peace, except wo should suffer our selves to be deluded into such a one, as would m all probability entail upon us greater Miseries than those we have hitherto undergone. . . . I shall say little to the Style and Method, which must be submitted to other Judgments. Every Subject can't be handled with equal Fluency ; nor did I so much attend to the Cadency of Words and Smoothness of Expression, but that I must acknowledg that more leisure might have made the Piece more polite. However, such as it is you have it ; I hope I have writ so as to be understood, and only wish the thing may be of as much Service to the Nation, as it was intended by the Author."
There is an analytical table of contents, some of the headings Df which we give here :— "The Plan of the Discourse. . . Six Conditions necessary for securing the Peace of Europe. There can be no effectual security for the Peace, without restoring the States of France. . . . That the Allies might much advance their Affairs by a Descent. That this would not prejudice but further their Designs in Flanders. Several Thoughts concerning the Refugees. . . . Reasons for encouraging a Descent from Antient and Modern History. The Policy of France and their Thoughts as to a Descent."
By " Descent " our author means a sudden and unsuspected invasion of, or attack upon, the enemy. He writes of a descent or invasion as modern critics write of a diversion. He would have called the Salonika Expedition a descent, and would probably have approved it. His words, indeed, raise the whole problem of petits paquets. That our author perceives, and he gallantly does battle with those who, then as now, declared that the war could be won in Flanders and France and nowhere else, and that it was a crime to withdraw a single soldier from the Western Front :- "To this [the plea for a descent] it will perhaps bo objected, That there will be no occasion for a Descent, since the Duke of Marlborough's Army is already quartered on the Frontiers, and will be joined again next Spring by the Prince Eugene with the Imperial Forces which served under him this year, in order to penetrate into Picardy next Campaign : That the sparing Troops for a Descent would weaken His Grace's Army, which is not fit to bo done, etc. 'Tis true there is some Probability that these two famous Heroes may in a Campaign more finish their glorious Progress, which possibly may end at the Louvre. Our British Scipio has spread our Fame from the Danube to tho Banks of tho Meese, the Dyle and the La-.3 ; and in concert with his Companion in Arms and . Glory, the Saviour of Italy, and the other Terror of Franco (whom I would call the modern Hannibal, if possessing all his warlike Wiles and Vertues, he were not exempted from his Vices) he has almost broken the Oppressor into Pieces, and carry'd the Terrors of the War to his very Door. Nay, they have already pull'd down his strongest Defences, and reduced three of his Impreen,, ables [Tourney, Lille, and Menin], and I suppose have now convinc'd him, that he has too presumptu- ously assumed his darling Title of Invincible, which cannot with safety be ascrib'd to the greatest Conqueror, till Death has put it beyond the Power of his enemies to foil him. But yet as I believe it will bo allow'd that it is also possible this may take more than one or perhaps two Campaigns to perform, it may not be amiss to endeavour to fall upon such Methods as may be most effectual for furthering their progress on that side, by making a Diversion somewhere else that may very much facilitate their Designs. . . . As to the Objection of weakening the Duke of Marlborough's Army, I answer in the first Place, That if proper Measures be taken to propose effectually the Thing to other Powers, we need not be alone in the Undertaking : Nor are we under any necessity of weakening much our Army in Flanders for such an Expedition. But if we did draw off a few Battalions from thence, and if they be imployed in a proper place, they will infallibly make such a Diversion as will oblige the Fr.onch to detach at least twice the number from their Army. . . . It may perhaps be urged, that such an Expedition might be attended by many Dangers and Difficulties, and that the late Disaster of the King of Sweden, so recent in our Memory, ought to make us well consider the Consequences of such an Attempt, before we go upon it. Why truly I never heard that anything could be undertaken In War without some Danger. But if the Advantage that probably may attend the Success be such as may be worth the running of the Hazard I think we should not be deterred from it on that Account. The King of Sweden, indeed, has lost his Army, but most people (nay his own Generals) think he has no body to blame for it but himself."
But the pamphlet is not confined to advocating a policy of diversion, which we quote, of course, for its historical rather than for its practical interest. Plenty of other subjects are dealt with ; for example, the possibility of invasion :— " It has always been the policy of France to carry the War into their Enemies Country ; and /tithe they be infinitely inferior to the Allies by Sea, such an Opinion have they of the good effects of an Invasion, that they would certainly have landed their Troops last year, if our Fleet had not prevented them. And as we have, I hope, no reason to be apprehensive of their Strength at Sea, if we will be at the pains to exert our own; I think we should endeavour to try the experiment with them, which they wer so lately about to put in practice against us."
It is when we reach our author's remarks on the inexpedi- ency of making a premature peace that the pamphlet betomes of serious import it( ourselves and is more than a curious historical parallel. Substitute " Germany " for " France and we want no better warning than the following:- " It is an old Observation, and a true one, That the French have for the most part repair'd by their Craft and Subtlety in Negotiations. the Losses they have sustain'd in War ; and I am afraid wo shall have more reason than ever to say so, if a Peaces be concluded upon the Terms that are now, or have been lately proposed by France. . . . The Kingdom of France is so rich in itself, and produces so vast a quantity of the most valuable Merchandises and Commoditioa ; and Commerce and Naviga- tion have boon of late so vastly improved by the excellent Laws ()Ash- lish'd for that purpose and the Encouragement given to Trade ; that were it possible that Nation could be so far exhausted as not to have a Millioa of Mony in the Kingdom, yet give thorn but ten years Peace and Trade. and they will be able once again to wrestle for the Universal Empire, for which they have from the time of Francis L so eagerly contended. . . . Therefore I think the Allies ought not to let slip tho present Oppor- tunity, to try whether this may not bo the time appointed by Heaven, for making Retaliation to that provoking Nation, for the manifold Desolations with which they have afflicted all their Neighbours. . . . Our enemy is by the Goodness of God brought to groat Straits, as 'tie in vain for him any longer to dissemble. . . . They have lost the best of their Generals, their Armies are dispirited, their People discontented, the Poor in the greatest Misery, and the Rich in the greatest Perplexity. Their Trade is interrupted by Sea (except to Spain and its Dependencies) and their Harvest and Vintage have boon very had those two years past ; the Royal Treasury is long ago exhausted, the Crown considerably is debt, and their Credit in general sunk at home and abroad. To make a peace with them now, without such Terms as we find that haughty Monarch is absolutely rosolv'd not to consent to, is to profane the Good- ness of God in throwing away and despising his Mercies. Tho Continu- ance of the War a little longer, will by God's Blessing make us our selves the absolute Masters of the Terms of Peace. And therefore whatever the Hardships of it may be, we should endure them with Cheerfulness, as the Forerunners of a long and certain Peace. That unhappy people pays much dearer for a War that compleats their Ruin, than we do for the same War, without which our Destruction could not have been provente,L Let us then imitate their Patience, and the unshaken Constancy and Firmness of the rest of our Allies, who are resolved to stand it out to the last Extremity ; and never consent to any Peace with the Common Enemy, till a more real and effectual Security bo obtain'd for the Preser- vation of it., than that of the Faith and Honour of the Most Christian King, which he has ever made subservient to his Interest, or rather to his Ambition."
The pamphleteer's wise argument as to the impossibility of expecting that any people will spontaneously and during foreign war assert their right to rule their own fate and be captains of their own souls must be our next quotation :-- " Now if in the very Centre of a Nation, where the Government to as arbitrary as at Constantinople, some of the People are come to that extremity as to despise Gallies, Racks and Wheals; what numbers may wo suppose to be in the same sentiments, and what might we not capon from a Nation so justly exasperated, if we did but afford them the opportunity, which it is in our power to give thorn, of recovering that antiont Gallick Liberty which they have now too dearly paid for the loss of, ever to suffer themselves to be tricked out of it again : and which would be to us their Deliverers perhaps the only certain Pledg of our future Security and Repose ? To expect that the people without any foreign Aid should take up Arms for the Recovery of their Liberty, is to believe them Madmen. I hope no body will dony that the Majority of the People of England was sufficiently weary of the Yoko of King James Administration ; .yet I never heard that after Monmouth's Death any body offered to etir till tho Prince of Orange was landed, nor for sums days after. So unwilling are all men to expose themselves to a terrible and a cruel Death, without some reasonable Ground to hope that they may better their Condition : Which the People of France, however much inclined to it, will hardly be able to accomplish of themselves, but might easily do it with some small assistance from their Neighbours : Which I think, were there no other motive to prompt us to it and tho' it were not so visibly as it is our Interest, yet are we obliged by the common Ties of Humanity, much more in Christian Charity, and in Gratitude for our own late Deliverance from the like impending Miseries by such a seasonable and unexpected Succour, to stretch forth our helping Hand to our unfortunate Brethren ; who, I am persuaded, would receive us with as much joy and Satisfaction as his late Majesty King William was roceiv'd here. It will perhaps bo said, as I have hoard it objected by some who have, I doubt, more Tenderness for France than is well consistent with the Character of a right old Englishman ; That the reducing of that Kingdom so low is the Highway to expose once more the Fate of all Europe to the Ambition of the House of Austria, by which France about an ago ago, oven with the Assistance of Britain and Holland, could scarce save herself from being swallow'd up. Why truly I do very well know that time was when Franco was the Bulwark of Europe against Philip II., assisted by the Emperor his Cousin ; and fur that reason I shall never desire the Fall of the French Monarchy, bus only wish for the Reduction of it to a more Christian State."
Here is a passage which throws no little light upon the proper way to treat a military autocracy supported by a Junker class, or, as the pamphlet calls them in plain terms, an " indigent Gentry " :— " Now I shall refer it to the impartial Reader to judge, what an ambi- tious Monarch, commanding so vast a number of indigent Gentry, may not undertake, as long as he is Master of all the Mony in the Kingdom. But if the Power of the Monarch was reduced to its antiont Bounds, the Nobility and the People restored to their native Privileges, and the Disposal of their Purses put in the hands of the States of the Kingdom, as till of late it ever was and ought to be ; the neighbouring Nations might have some reason to expect such a Security for their Repose, as I humbly presume to affirm, they cannot possibly obtain upon any other Foundation whatsoever ; From whence I crave leave to conclude, that it does not seem to mo to be the Interest of the Allies in General, and particularly of her British Majesty, to agree to a Peace on any other Terms. I think it does very clearly follow, That their domestick
Tyranny is the Basis of their foreign Usurpations ; and that if their Power was once reduced to its antiont Bounds at home, it must of consequence sink abroad : as necessarily as the Effect must cease, when the Cause is taken away."
On politicians who are wise after the event and who forgot to prepare till it was almost too late our author is severe :— " It were to be wished that the Gentlemen who are now so full of Fore- eight, and so very apprehensive of the bare Possibility of a remote Danger, had been as willing as they were then able to have prevented the Calamities of these twenty years last pest ; of which tho' they them- pelves ,wero the Authors, by advicing the Court to sacrifice the Empire, Spain, Holland, Our selves, and in short all Europe, to the prevailing Cannons and Pistoles of Lewis XIV. in 1667, 1668, 1672, 1678, and 1684, they do now exclaim against the late and the present Administra- tion, for unnecessarily (as they say) exhausting the Blood and Treasure of the Nation, in a necessary War which they themselves have entailed upon us."
However, he will have no partnership with the pessimists and professional growlers and grumblers, and he denounces "that Set of Men who leave nothing unattempted, which, as they apprehend, may tend to the lessening of the Respect that is due to the Government, or any concerned in it."
Before we leave this anonymous pamphlet we shall venture to make a suggestion as to its authorship. We are led by a close consideration of its style to hazard the opinion that it was written by that most admirable of Whig publicists, Captain George St. Loe, whose eloquent pamphlet on the need for compulsory military service, published about 1695, we have so often referred to and quoted from in these pages. The keenness, the dialectic skill, the lucidity of Considerations on Peace and Was all point to the author being Captain St. Loe. No other man then alive, unless it be Defoe, was capable of work so excellent in the region of political journalism.
Previous page
