LORD RAGLAN: A RETROSPECT.
THE best thing, perhaps, in General Airey's address to the officers sitting at Chelsea was his eloquent and touching allusions to Lord Raglan—the noble chief whom no risk could turn back, no danger appal, whose resolution could not be shaken ; who not only never lost heart, but never, if he could prevent it, allowed others to lose heart ; who was as steadfast after the awful battle of Inkerman as he was after the victory of the Alma ; and "who never breathed into the public ear one word of defence for himself." The eloquent denunciations and reckless calumnies of 1854-'5 are no longer heard ; men are not so prone as they were in that season of blind indignation to cast reproaches on the leader of the British army ; and there are few now who are disposed to hold him accountable for all the mischances and errors of the campaign. But his fair fame has not yet received that ample vindication which it will no doubt one day receive when contemporary interests no longer stand in the way, and when that refined and chivalrous consideration for the feelings of others, that suppression of facts which might prove unpleasant to our allies, shall be no longer anything but false delicacy. There are already signs of a wholesome reaction. The chorus of disapprobation which the publication of De Bazancourt's volumes called forth, and the appearance of articles like the paper on the Crimean Expedition in the current number of the orth British Review, avowedly printed for the Rurpose of rectifying French and *Pi. iglish misstatements, are indications that sounder and more accurate views must ere long prevail in these islands. We have suffered considerably as a nation from the seeming necessity of treating our Government and our Generals as if they alone had been responsible for the unfortunate incidents in the war. While that war lasted, it was no doubt for the general good, although not for our good, that the feelings of our friends over the water should be tenderly handled. Now that the war is at an end, there is little reason why we should not be just to ourselves as well as considerate towards them.
The position of Lord Raglan in 1854-'5 was something like that of the Duke of Marlborough in 1705. Foiled on the Moselle by the backwardness of a jealous coadjutor, Marlborough was called by the alarm cf the Dutch to face their enemies on the Meuse. H' e too was a general of confederates, and the sharer of a divided command. Although hampered by the Dutch Deputies, and even by the Dutch Generals, he assumed the offensive, and, by a series of able manceuvres forced the lines of the enemy, and compelled him to fall back behind the Dyle. His next design was to force the passage of the Dyle ; but in this he was thwarted at the moment of success by his colleagues. Again he outmanceuvered the enemy, and had fairly caught him in a position near Waterloo where an instant attack would have sent the enemy in disorder upon Brussels. But just as he was about to engage, the Dutch insisted on holding a council of war, where the majority decided not to attack : the opportunity fled ; the allied army was compelled to retrace its steps, and Marlborough was forced to turn away from the prospect of certain victory. Now the public knew only the barest outline of ' the facts, and Marlborough's skill was ciuestioned in no gentle terms. Marlborough, for fear of offending his allies and giving an advantage to the enemy., refrained from vindicating his own conduct ; and, actually permitted an extremely brief and unfair account of the transaction to appear in the London Gazette without exacting a public correction,lest it should breed dissension between England and the Dutch Republic. Now if so accomplished and successful a general as the Duke of Marlborough could not escape the hasty censure of ignorance and malice, it would be too much to expect that ignorance and malice should spare Lord Raglan. History has long vindicated Marlborough at the expense of 'his colleagues, and we expect that the vindication of Lord Raglan -will involve a large subtraction from those who have been unduly praised. The theory of the Crimean expedition put forward by General Airey and adopted by the North British Review incontestably contains a large amount of truth. It has been stated more than once, in Parliament, that the original design of the expedition
• was the capture of Sebastopol by a coup-de-main. That design did not originate with the Generals, but with the Governments at home. Lord Raglan acted under "very decisive instructions" from his Government. Organized' as a coup-de-main, its sole
chance of success lay in carrying it out as a coup-de-main with unflinching resolution because the Generals were not prepared for a regular campaign—because they were almost without transport, and absolutely without any base of operations except the sea. What happened ? On the voyage to the Crimea it is stated, Marshal St. Arnaud recreated Lord Raglan to attend a conference with a view to reconsidering the expediency of the expedition. Lord Raglan would not be shaken from his purpose. Lord Raglan has been blamed for slowness on the march, and for assailing the front of the Russian position at the Alma. The French were impatient for the advance of the English. Yet we find this statement in the North British Review— "Lord Raglan waited nearly two hours in momentary expectation that they would advance in force to turn the position instead of leaving him to take the initiative by attacking in front, at the 'certainty of an enormous sacrifice of life. It is quite true that the Zouaves behaved with their wonted gallantry, and got near enough to threaten the Russian flank. It is also true, that those French commanders particularly Prince Napoleon, who were nearest to the enemy, became alarmed, and that message after message arrived to say that they were compromis or (as some say) massacres. But so far as could be ascertained from the central station occupied by Lord Raglan and his staff, the French had contented themselves with vigorous skirmishing; and not one of their columns had advanced to the assault, or been engaged, when Lord Raglan, seeing no other alternative left to him, took the bull by the horns, and, with little aid from the promised diversion, ordered the formidable heights before him to be carried at all hazards."
What necessitated the flank-march ? The refusal of Marshal St. Arnaud to carry the batteries at the mouth of the Belbeo. That may have been prudent; but it was a manifest departure from the original plan. When the harbours were seized on the South side, and the troops were in position on the plateau, Lord Raglan, it seems, "proposed to assault the place at once." It was the failure of the French fire on the 17th October, says Sir Richard Airey, that then frustrated the assault. "The damage sustained by our allies compelled some delay, but it was still hoped that the place would be taken by assault; and indeed a day—a near day— was fixed for that operation." When the Russians were retreating from the heights of Inkerman, as we know now in considerable confusion, "Lord Raglan earnestly pressed General Canrobert to bring up his right wing, and attack them as they were crossing the bridge. Canrobert declined, saying 'it was best to leave well alone." On the 6th November, the coup-de-main enterprise was fairly at an end. The resolution taken on that day after a "protracted consultation,"—namely, that of holding fast What had been gained, and gaining more if possible,—" imposed upon the troops great sufferings, and labour beyond their strength, but it saved the allied armies from a great disaster." "Now, for the first time," says General Airey, "we knew that the army would winter on the ridge." These few.statements, which are quite consistent with all we have heard of the matter, go some way to vindicate Lord Raglan's reputation. He accepted the 'command of that army with reluctance ; with reluctance he undertook the expedition to the Crimea ; but, having undertaken the one burden and the other, he bore them nobly to the last ; and among the generals, French or English, who have gone through the fiery ordeal of this war, it will be impossible to find one who deserves better of his country than Lord Raglan.
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