TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA, PERSIA, AND BRITAIN.
THE death of the Shah is chiefly important because it gives an opportunity for Russia and Britain to place their Asiatic relations on a firmer and more friendly basis. Happily, we have already advanced some way in the direction of an understanding with Russia, and of getting her statesmen to realise that as long as she does not threaten our possession of India we have not the slightest desire to check her development or withstand her influence in other parts of Asia. We may now afford her tangible proof of how genuine is our desire to stand on friendly terms with her, instead of wounding her susceptibilities as regards Persia. In our belief, Russia has not, and never has had, any primary wish to conquer India. She has always had, however, an intense desire to reach the warm and open water. When she found that it was we who prevented the realisation of this aspiration in the direction of Con- stantinople and the Mediterranean, and that we also withstood similar aspirations in the direction of the Persian Gulf, Russia, checked by us in so vital a matter, naturally enough devised means for hitting back at her antagonist. The easiest form of counter-attack that came to her hand was to threaten India ; and undoubtedly in the past she has menaced India, and has even prepared to make that menace good. k The fact, however, has always remained that the underlying object was not the conquest of India, but some action intended to make us realise that we could no strike her without the danger of being struck. in return. Fortunately, our statesmen have slowly come to realise t facts, as have also a large portion of the public. ' Hence the nervousness in regard' to Russia's intentions towards India has very greatly diminished, and there is an increasing willingness to treat her on a reasonable instead of a panic basis, not only as concerns Turkey, but in the matter of Persia2 For ourselves, we say plainly that if future develop. ments, such as internal anarchy in Persia, should make Russia desire actually to reach the Persian Gulf, and to establish herself upon its waters, we should have no objection to such action, provided that certain reasonable precautions were taken in regard to the possession of that portion of the lower Persian Gulf which lies nearest to India. We have never been able to see why, as long as we maintain command of the sea, the possession by Russia of a port or ports on the Persian Gulf should in any way endanger our Indian Empire. What would endanger that Empire is the loss of our sea power. But that is a loss we shall not suffer through Russia possessing even another Port Arthur on the Gulf. Sea power, as the world saw in the struggle between Russia and Japan, belongs not to those who hold gigantic fortresses or naval stations on land, but to the possessors of floating and mobile engines of war. Though, no doubt, naval bases and coaling-stations are necessary adjuncts of naval power, it is on ships in the last resort that sea power rests. To put the matter in another way. Our sea power would be much more seriously menaced by Russia spending five or six millions on new naval construction than by the building of a great naval fortress on the Persian Gulf. If Russia were in the future to build such a fortress and to place part of her naval force there, our proper answer would be to keep a larger squadron in the Gulf or in Indian waters. Such an answer might no doubt be costly, but it would be infinitely cheaper than pursuing the old policy of checking Russia in such a way as to induce her to threaten India by land through the building of strategic railways and similar preparations. We would far rather fight Russia by sea than by land.) But in our opinion there will be no,need to fight Russia in Asia on either element for the next fifty years—and no one in politics can hope to look farther ahead than that—if only we are not so foolish as to make her believe that we have determined to say "Check ! " to her dearest political aspirations.
We have stated our view in regard to the question of the Persian Gulf, but at the present moment there is no need to look so far ahead as this. The Russians just now have, we are convinced, no plans for establishing
themselves upon the Persian Gulf, or for doing anything beyond maintaining their accustomed position in Persia. That is, they are not asking at present for any special rights or privilegea in the Persian Gulf or in Southern Persia generally. All they want is to maintain the dot= quo, and to make sure that during a time of preoccupation with their internal affairs the condition of things in Persia shall not change for the worse as far as they are concerned, either by the increased influence of Britain or of Germany, which is beginning to get an important posi- tion in Persia. That we shall be quite willing to give Russia the fullest assurance that we have no intention of taking advantage of her internal difficulties for selfish ends cannot be a matter of doubt. Again, we can assure the Russians that we shall not listen to any proposals from third parties which would be injurious to Russia. At the same time, we have no fear or jealousy of German influence in Persia, and would do nothing whatever to interfere with the legitimate expansion of her trade in that part of the world. German enterprise and German commercial ability ought to have their legitimate reward in Persia as else- where, and we feel sure that there will be no attempt on the part of our Government to play the dog-in-the-manger as regards Germany—provided that her action is fair and considerate as regards Russia—or to claim for ourselves any trading privileges which will not be given to Germany, and, indeed, to the whole of the world. To recapitulate : our main object in dealing with the Persian question should be to make things as smooth and easy as we can for Russia, and to allow nothing to be done which may prejudice Russia's natural aspirations when an improvement in her internal position once more allows her to turn her attention to the expansion and development of her Asiatic possessions. It would be not only unjust., but absurd, not to admit that the fact that Russia is the nearest and greatest neighbour of Persia gives her what is virtually a preferential claim in regard to the settlement of Persian affairs. It is fortunate that at a moment so critical, and at the same time so fraught with possibilities for a better understand- ing with Russia, our diplomatic representative in Persia is not only a man of first-rate ability, but is also possessed of a thorough knowledge both of Persian and Russian affairs. Though Sir Cecil Spring-Rice has only just taken up his residence at Teheran as Minister, he was for many years stationed in Persia, and has an intimate knowledge of the language and nature of the people. Again, owing to his having occupied the post of First Secretary at St. Petersburg, he is well conversant with Russian feeling in regard to all Asian problems, and is not likely either to misunderstand or to underestimate Russian claims. Finally, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice is a man of large knowledge and wide experience of European as well as of Asian politics. He is not one of those men who in concentrating themselves upon the local situation and local details lose touch with the higher and greater aspects of international diplomacy.
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