BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN CONCERT.
DR. EVANS'S letter in Wednesday's Times is not pleasant reading for Englishmen. It reminds them of a worthless Treaty to which they were parties, and of the forgotten object with which that Treaty was concluded. But for Great Britain, Macedonia would long ago have been delivered from Turkish rule. The Treaty of San Stefano, had it been carried out, would have put an end to all the horrors with which every letter from this unhappy province is filled. The dread of Russia which at that time was the gdverning feature of our foreign policy blinded us to every other consideration, and we deliberately took the initiative in handing back the Macedonians to their oppressors. We willingly admit that this fact does affect us with a special responsibility. Russian aggrandisement had terrors for us which it had not for others. We recognised, indeed, that these terrors did not justify us in simply undoing the work of the San Stefano Treaty. It was necessary to set up another Treaty in its place, and we satisfied our consciences by substituting a reformed Turkey for an unreformed Russia as the instrument of Macedonian amelioration. In theory, the Treaty of Berlin was open to no objection. Russia had set Macedonia free, but at the risk of a serious disturbance of European tranquillity. The other Powers undertook to secure the same end at a less cost. All that Russia could fairly ask was that Macedonia should be as well governed as though the Treaty of San Stefano had remained in force, and for this Europe, mainly at the instance of Great Britain, became respon- sible. All that Macedonia needed for decent government was assured to the province by the Twenty-third Article of the new Treaty. An Elective Assembly, a Governor- General, and reformed Law Courts were to make life and property safe, and if the political aspirations of the people were still unsatisfied, they were not more so than they would have been under Russia.
What the history of the Treaty of Berlin has been every- body knows. When it had deprived Russia of the fruit of her victory, all that the parties to it really cared for had been accomplished. The Sultan very naturally did nothing to give effect to an arrangement which, in so far as it was carried out, deprived him of all substantial authority in the territory which in name had been restored to him. The Powers carefully abstained from employing the one argument which the Sultan understands. And so for nearly thirty years Macedonia has remained in the con- dition described a fortnight back by the correspondent of the Times in the Balkan Peninsula. Turkish misgovern- ment is not the only cause of this miserable state of things. The rivalry of Greek and Bulger has desolated the country, and the strife of Christian with Christian has been added to the older conflict of Christian and Moslem. But this last fact does not relieve the Turkish Government of blame. The Sultan can always put down violence which is not the work of his own soldiers. The Turkish Army, if it were used for that purpose, would very soon impose a common submission on the two combatants. It would be a sufficient condemnation of the Sultan's rule if be merely per- mitted these warring factions' to exterminate one another. The ruler who bears the sword in vain neglects his duty as completely as he who makes a wrong use of the sword. But the charge against the Sultan goes much beyond this. He en- courages the Greek bands as the least dangerous instrument he can employ for the purpose of depopulating Macedonia. They do the work as effectually as his own troops, and he can always disavow their acts when it is convenient to blind a European Concert which, in the persons of some of its members, asks nothing better than to have its eyes bound. And in the meantime the " reforms " which have been introduced under the pressure of English opinion have led to no real improvement. It may be doubted, indeed, whether they have not made things worse. If nothing had been proposed by the Powers, or accepted by the Sultan, there would have been at least a chance that the news of some massacre of more than ordinary brutality would have roused European feeling and led to something more like decided action. As it is, the knowledge that Macedonia is now controlled by a gendarmerie commanded by European officers acts as a salve to so much of the European conscience as is inconveniently tender, and each new outrage only increases the satisfaction that the repre- sentatives of the Powers are on the spot. Near the spot,
but never near enough to prevent or put an end to what is going on, would be amore accurate version of the faeti. The gendarmerie is below its nominal strength. It is not a popular force, and General de Giorgis finds it bard to get recruits. They are less well armed than the Hellenic patriots whom they are supposed to keep in order, and this inferiority in numbers and equipment renders them a Very,
unequal match the Greek predatory bands. Nothing has been done to carry out the judicial reforms which the English Foreign Office has so often pressed upon the Sultan, the abuses of the prison system remain uuremedied, and everything seems to bear out the judgment of the Times correspondent that " since the autumn of 1903 the state of Macedonia has never been so bad as during the last few months." This is the solitary result of that European pressure which, as we have been again and again assured, is the only means of bringing about a better state of things.
If we do not look beyond the four corners of Dr. Evans's proposal, it seems exactly to meet the occasion. . Why has the Concert, failed ? Because no one except ourselves has really cared for its success. It has been of value to • certain of the Powers as a subtle means whereby to restrain Great Britain from exercising on - behalf of freedom and humanity that decisive influence which she and she alone can bring to bear." Dr. Evans proposes that she should no longer lend herself to this process. If "the creation under European sanction of a provincial authority with executive power and controlling an adequate police" is impossible, let our own Government at least " cease to be a party to this solemn trifling," So far we can go along with Dr. Evans. Enough has happened to show quite plainly that the Austro-Russian reforms have no real vitality. The ends to which they are professedly directed are no nearer realisation, and even if they were realised there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they would work any real improvement in the administration of Macedonia. For that we must look to nothing short of the plan embodied in the Treaty of Berlin, a plan which as yet the other Powers will do nothing to bring into operation. Tile sooner Sir Edward Grey shows his opinion of the real character of the Concert by putting an end to our participation in it, the better for all parties. But Dr. Evans g His much further than this. The only thing, he holds, that the Sultan fears is the British Fleet. In Crete a British Admiral " put an end to Turkish rule for ever in about ten minutes by the clock," and when the British Fleet lay at Phalerum "with its steam up" the whole of the Nearer East was in alarm. Why, then, asks Dr. Evans, should the possessor of this power hesitate to use it ? If the question could be answered with exclusive reference to Great Britain, our own reply would be identical with his. When we recall the part that the English Government played in reference to the Treaty of Berlin, and the means they possess of enforcing it, we do not think that the Cabinet ought to abstain from bringing pressure to bear upon the Sultan merely because effective naval action would add something to next year's Estimates. Where is the use of keeping a great Fleet afloat if our ships may not be employed in protecting those whose cause we have made our own by the Berlin Treaty ? But this view of the situation leaves a most important element out of account. Austria- Hungary and Russia have the direct interest in Turkey which belongs to near neighbours and to possible heirs. It cannot be supposed that they would remain indifferent while British ships were bombarding Turkish ports, and , encouraging all the factors of discontent that grow up in a misgoverned country. They would be compelled to take , action in some direction. What that direction is likely to be Sir Edward Grey may be able to infer from the informa- tion which readies him from various sources. But no one else can be in that position. Nor is this all that would have to be known before we could safely move in the matter. The attitude of France is equally uncertain. She is our very good friend, but she is still more closely allied. to Russia, and her action in the Near East would probably be mainly determined by this consideration. Of Germany it can be predicted with some confidence that she would be on the side of the Sultan, and would not be deterred from giving effect to this feeling by any tenderness for English sentiment. Italy, again, has more than one reason for not quarrelling with Austria-Hungary, and her abstention
frem co-operation in any action on our part likely to be unfavourably viewed at Vienna might fairly be counted on These considerations do not justify us in taking it for granted that Great Britain would be left to carry out her beneficent work unhindered. Isolated intervention in Turkey might have consequences which would change the face of Europe. If Dr. Evans has solid reasons for thinking otherwise, we shall be willing converts ; but we have little hope that he is thus equipped.
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