FRENCH FEELING TOWARDS ENGLAND. T HE French Exhibition opens to-day, and
fortunately, as far as France and England are concerned, under favourable omens. There are signs that the ill-feeling which has lately been shown on both sides of the Channel is to some extent abating, that the newspapers on the French side are getting tired of their campaign of insult and abuse, and on ours of suspicion and distrust. We do not, of course, mean to assert that there was no reality in the feeling against us displayed by a portion of the French people, or that it may not crop up again in a more dangerous form ; but we hold that it was never so important as was believed here, and that for the present, at any rate, the tendency is on the whole towards better relations. In any case, there is not the slightest reason for Englishmen and English- women to dread any personal expression of ill-feeling being shown towards them in France. As two of our correspondents testify, there is no more risk of things being made unpleasant for English visitors to Paris than of rudeness being shown here to French tourists. The man in the street from whom you buy a Patrie, a Libre Parole, or an Intransigeant reeking with abuse of England will treat you with as much courtesy as he would a Frenchman or a Russian. Englishmen need not, therefore, avoid the Exhibition. On the contrary, if they like exhibitions they should certainly visit the one at Paris, for undoubtedly it will be when it is really finished—that will not be for another month or six weeks—one of the most magnificent spectacles of the kind ever seen. Many of the buildings are architec- turally very striking in their grandiose and affected style, while the line of national Pavilions on one side of the river and of old Paris on the other form a telling picture, —not beautiful, but interesting and attractive.
It is worth while to consider for a moment the causes which have produced the recent outbreak of journalistic violence and animosity in France towards this country. To begin with, we are unpopular in France because of Fashoda, of colonial rivalry generally, and also be- cause we are supposed to be the enemies of France's ally, Russia. When, then, the war broke out and the agents of the Transvaal Government began to influence the lower and less reputable portion of the French Press, the anti- English writers found very little difficulty in obtaining a sympathetic audience. The thing grew until practically the whole French Press was carried away, and papers quite free from the influence of Dr. Leyds, as well as those directly inspired by Dr. Leyds, joined in the attack. Probably this enthusiasm would have soon worked itself out but for the fact that the so-called Nationalist party saw in the attacks on England an excel- lent opportunity for making political capital. They desired to weaken and discredit the present French Government anyhow and anywhere, and they found in the pro-Boer propaganda the very instrument they needed. The Government were, and are, represented as truck- ling to England, and as enemies of the Boers, who are the • greatest of patriots. In a word, the Nationalists and Anti-Dreyfusards, and all the men whom Mr. Markham in the Daily Mail so well describes as Catiline conspirators, who have not yet got a Catiline to lead them, have been lately exploiting the anti-British and pro-Boer feeling for all it is worth. In the Nationalist Press, indeed, M. Loubet and M. Waldeck-Rousseau and his colleagues have almost come to be regarded as the accomplices of the infamous British Government. At first sight this may seem a very dangerous feature of the situation, and as if the risk of war with France were brought very near thereby. It may be argued, for example, that if the present Ministry were to fall and a Nationalist Ministry were to come in, or at any rate a Ministry under Nationalist influences, an attack on this country would be sure to be attempted. We admit the apparent danger, but in reality the violence of the Nationalists against England has weakened, not strengthened, their position. The present Ministry has been greatly supported by the feeling that if it goes out France may fall into the bands of men who will plunge her into war, for, in spite of the Press, the majority of Frenchmen do not want war. The Nationalists may ex- cite a good deal of attention and of Boulevard applause by posing as a. war party, but they will never reach power by letting it be known that their advent to power will mean an attack on England. In France those who wish to win general support do not talk about war even if they mean it in their hearts,—witness Napoleon IIL and his." L'Enspire c'est in pair.." As long, then, as the Nationalists let people imagine that they mean to precipitate war with England, we have no great fear of their return to power. They will be most dangerous when and if they change their tactics, and try to persuade people that the only way to save the country from a dangerous war will be to entrust them with the work of government. We hope and trust that they will not be able so to delude their countrymen, but we cannot disguise from ourselves that this is a possibility. France is always liable to be ruled by terror ; and suppose a Nationalist clever enough to be able to excite deeply the fears of France, it is conceivable that she might throw herself into his arms. Suppose, for example, that the demagogue or demagogues of our thought should get his or their compatriots to believe that we meant to attack France suddenly, and that the only chance of escaping a great disaster was for France to put herself under the protection of a Nationalist Dictator and attack us. It is possible; though we admit not likely, that in this way she might plunge, in an agony of panic, into the very war she wanted to avoid.
It might perhaps be concluded from these premises that we ought to be most careful not to do anything that would give the French Nationalists any excuse for representing us as aggressors, and that we should therefore abstain from even defensive measures. We do not agree. The Nationalists, if they want to raise the cry that Britain is going to attack France, will not wait for any real grounds for their outcry. They will not, that is, be in the least deterred by want of facts to go upon. Whether we have plenty of cruisers at the close of the Exhibition—for all sides agree that there must be a truce till then—or whether we are then as short of them as the Channel Squadron is at present, will make no difference to designs imputed to perfidious Albion. We believe, indeed, that the attempt to capture France by means of a panic, which we regard as the chief danger, is far more likely to be made and to be successful if we are weak than if we are strong. If we have plenty of men under arms in this country, and if our Fleet has been made strong and ready, the political gamblers of all kinds who are at the back of the Nationalists will be daunted, and will not attempt a game which they will see is too dangerous. If, however, we are really weak and yet can be represented as strong, and if while we are, in fact, open to French attack it can be asserted that we are going to hurl two hundred thousand veterans of the Boer War upon the shores of France, we may be in no small danger. We must, of course, make no provocative preparations, and do nothing which can seem like threatening the colonial possessions of France ; but we must never forget that nothing leads so surely to crime as leaving valuable property about unprotected. When men see doors fast shut and the householder armed and ready, they do not batch plans for his overthrow. When the doors are left wide open and the house undefended, people begin to ask questions as to whether so much property really ought to be left in possession of " that careless fool." We must not, then, invite an attack by leaving our shores unguarded. Instead, we must give every Chauvinist Frenchman a good excuse for saying that, even if our crimes deserve punishment, we are, unfortunately, so strong as to be above the reach of just retribution. Of course, we must not expect French statesmen to tell us so ; but if the chief men of France on all sides could at this moment be made to bare the secrets' of their bosoms we believe that they would admit that they would like to see England so strongly armed for defence that they would be able, in case of a demand for war, to say to France, "England is too powerful to be attacked with any prospect of success." It is our business to give the rulers of France that excuse for leaving us alone, but to give it in such a way that our actions cannot be held aggressive or provocative by reason- able men, but shall be evidently only defensive. At the same time, let all Englishmen, and especially all English newspapers, show that they bear no animosity to France, and that they are willing, nay eager, to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Exhibi- tion to forget all the spites and the follies—on both sides —of the last few months. Englishmen do not want to hold a whole nation responsible for the bad taste of a few gutter papers, and Frenchmen must not fancy they find the authentic voice of England in the arrogant and self- righteous sermons in which some of our newspapers are apt to convey their criticism of French doings.
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