LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
THE RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH RUSSIA.
(To TRH EDITOR Or TOR "SPECTATOR:1
am glad that the strongest protest against Lord Lansdowne's • declaration regarding the Persian Gulf has come from so loyal a supporter of the Government as the Spectator. Will you allow one who has read and annotated- . besides other literature on the subject—all the Parliamentary papers published since the year 1850 on the relations between Great Britain and Russia to give some additional reasons in support. of your argument ? I do so in the interest of our common country, and without any other bias whatsoever. Liberals and Tories are equally to blame in this matter, and must • equally bear the responsibility for a policy which has done nothing but unmitigated mischief in the past, and promises nothing but disaster in the future.
(1) Lord Lansdowne's declaration is, as you say, nothing less than the " proclamation of a British Monroe doctrine for the Persian . Gulf." And this on the ground that "a fortified- port in the Persian Gulf " would be " a very grave menace to British interests." Even Persia is by this declaration forbidden to fortify any port . on her own territory, and forbidden by a Power which has no terri- torial or other legal rights on the Gulf. This is a con- siderable extension of the Monroe doctrine.
(2) While making this ominous claim of sovereignty over the Persian Gulf, we are denying to Russia any exclusive rights in Manchuria, which has cost her more in men and money than the Persian Gulf has cost us, and which is also of considerably more importance to her commercially and strategically. What difference is there in moral right or international law between the Foreign Office declaration and the German policy in 1875 (inhibited by Russia and the British Government) to make the increase of the French Army a cases beili ? If there is any difference, it seems to me to be in favour of Germany. A war by France for the recovery of her lost provinces is immeasurably more probable than a war by Russia for the conquest of India.
(3) Is it wise to make a hypothetical declaration of war in the event of a contingency of which the Foreign Secretary ad.
snits there is no evidence ? It will probably be said that the warning will make the event impossible. It is much more likely to stimulate a desire to bring it about. If we had in a friendly way opened negotiations with Russia for an outlet for lief trade on the Persian Gulf, the probability is that she would desire no fortified port. This last declara-
tion will probably convince her that we are her one irrecon- cilable foe among civilised nations, and she will shape her policy accordingly. A few weeks ago we were the only Power which made a fuss about the passage of two or three unarmoured warships through the Dardanelles. We are prominent in harassing her in Manchuria, a province in which her interests and her vietory in repelling a war of aggression surely entitle her to privileges beyond those of other nations. And now we declare that she shall have no outlet for her commerco through the Persian Gulf except on our terms. We claim the right of acting the part of janitors at every door by which Russia can pass into the open sea.
(4) The probable result of this policy will be to force Russia into an alliance most distasteful to that Government and nation,—an alliance with Germany against us. Ever since Bismarck took charge of the foreign policy of Germany the Government of Berlin has had two fundamental articles in its political creed,—(a) always to keep on good terms with Russia(b) to make bad blood between England on the one hand, and Russia and France on the other. With the strange frankness which sometimes characterised the Iron Chancellor, he told the late Lord Dufferin twenty-one years ago that the key to his foreign policy was to ward off danger from Germany by providing occupation for Russia and France in complications with England. Count von Billow has since told the world that at the time of the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger the German Government tried and failed to form an aggressive alliance against us (with France and Russia). Still later we have authentic evidence of an offer from Germany to France of an offensive alliance against us in the Fashoda imbroglio. That offer also was declined after consultation with the Russian Government. Here were two critical occasions on which Russia had an opportunity of crippling us seriously, and thereby enabling herself to gratify some of her alleged ambitions against us. How do the Russophobists reconcile her forbearance with their theory of her consuming desire to conquer India ? Germany, on the other hand, has repeatedly proved her desire to do us a fatal injury. Twice within eight years- -once by the confession of her Chancellor—she has tried in vain to form an offensive alliance against us. We are doing our best to make her third attempt a success.
Have the Russophobists ever asked themselves the question whether Russia would care to occupy India if we volun- tarily evacuated it? I am sure that Russia is far too wise to dream of such folly. Without any opposition from us, she wou Id have to conquer that vast country piecemeal and bring order out of chaos, at an enormous expenditure in men and treasure. To suppose that she would attempt it against our opposition is to suppose Russia to be a nation of lunatics. But she will use her position on the Persian Gulf or on the frontier of Afghanistan to make trouble for us wherever it may suit her ? Undoubtedly, if we persist in thwarting her natural aspirations everywhere; otherwise she has no motive for troubling us anywhere, but every motive for co-operating with us. I judge her purely by the rule of
self-interest. It is Russia's interest to be on friendly terms with us, as it is Germany's, interest to destroy—as she is set on doing—our commercial and naval supremacy. And we are-- blindly helping her by forcing Russia into an alliance with her against us.
(6) Is there to be no end to these "superstitions of an anti- quated diplomacy," as Lord Salisbury aptly characterised our Russophobist policy ? Constantinople, Bokhara, Khiva, Merv, were all regarded in succession as vital to British interests. Constantinople is now pretty generally admitted to be an Austro-German rather than a British interest ; and who will deny that humanity has been a gainer and Crest Britain no loser by the annexation of the Central Asian Khanates to Russia?
(7) It is morally certain that we shall never go to war to pre- vent Russia from having a fortified port on the Persian Gulf. 1 believe that no Government, of whatever party; (5) which proposed such a thing would last a week. And if the electorate were persuaded that the declaration about the Persian Gulf were likely to lead to such a catastrophe, there would be an agitation which would astonish the Russophobists. Russophobia has long been dead among the masses. They treat the Persian Gulf declaration as they treated Lord Beaconsfield's threat of three campaigns against Russia if she made war on Turkey. Russia made war, and the three campaigns ended in rhetoric. Mr. Gladstone was denounced as a "Russian agent." His windows • were broken, and he and his wife were as- saulted by a London mob. But the constituencies sent him back to office with a majority of 118. No Minister could do a more popular thing at this moment than announce a cordial working understanding with Russia all round. No Minister could do a more unpopular thing than announce any kind of alliance with Germany.
Why, do I, wbo am no politician, speak so confidently ? Because experience has taught me more than once that politicians—those Of the official class especially—are bad judges of some of the forces which govern General Elections. Let me give one example out of many. The Tory party and Lord Beaconsfield himself confidently expected a Tory majority in 1880, and so did the official Liberals. Mr. Adam, who was considered a singularly good Whip, asked me at the beginning of Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian campaign what I thought of the electoral chances. I said : "I give the Liberals a minimum majority of sixty and a maximum majority of a hundred." He thought my calculation crazy, and told me that his "most sanguine calculations " did not allow him to hope for more than a reduction of the Tory majority to " thirty, or at most twenty." " We shall make some gains in the boroughs," he said, " but lose all the counties." As it happened, most of the Liberal gains were in the counties. . Why was my calculation more accurate than that of a most astute Whip ? Because I was in touch with a large section of voters of whom the Whips knew nothing : that section which took but a languid interest in ordinary politics, but were roused to energetic action on behalf of the Christians of Turkey. I was in touch with them in my capacity of honorary secretary of a very influential non-political associa- tion. So now, if politicians would only study papers which circulate among the working classes by myriads, but are never seen in West End clubs or drawing-rooms, they would find that the most potent factor at the General Election will be the social ideals and amelioration of the masses, and a hatred of war and rumours of wars, which the working classes regard as fatal to their aspirations.--I am, Sir, &c.,
SCRITTATOE.
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