TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA IN MANCHURIA.
For this reason we hold that if we are wise we shall entirely separate the territorial from the commercial question in Manchuria, shall let the territorial go, and shall concentrate our efforts entirely on the commercial. That is what the Americans are doing. Mr. Hay, than whom the world does not contain a wiser statesman and more accomplished diplomatist, has realised the need for such a distinction. He and the newspapers who support the policy of the State Department do not worry the Russians with niggling protests about this or that movement of troops in Manchuria, but go straight to the main point of the " open door." They concentrate their efforts on preventing Russia interfering with the commercial privileges accorded to' trade before the occupation of Manchuria. Why should we not adopt a similar, or rather an identical, policy ? No doubt we have already declared that we cannot allow the commercial status quo in Manchuria to be interfered with, but it is to be regretted that we have not strengthened our protest in this respect by boldly abandoning the dead-weight of our objections on territorial grounds. If we concentrate our efforts on the commercial points alone, such efforts are bound to be more effective than if they are mixed up with a hopelessly unreal territorial protest. If, either jointly with the Americans or acting on parallel lines, we insist on the "open door," it is impossible to doubt that we shall be successful. The sympathies of all the rest of the world are sure to be with those who support the policy of the " open door." Again, though the Russians may for the moment be very anxious to secure themselves a privileged position in regard to Manchurian trade, there is. no reason to suppose that they will fight the battle very fiercely. If they see that by yielding in regard to the • " open door" they can in effect secure themselves from any further protests in regard to evacuation, they'will probably consider that they have achieved enough. After all,• the essential thing to them is to consolidate their political position in North China, and this they can do by political possession and by the railway far more than by rejecting NOW that the excitement caused by a series of hazy and sensational telegrams from China as to aggressive Russian action in Manchuria is quieting down, and it is becoming recognised that if any movement of Russian troops did take place at Newchwang it was of an unimportant kind, it will be well for our statesmen and leaders of public opinion to consider carefully and coolly the exact nature of our interests in Manchuria, and the best way of maintaining them. The first thing to do, in our opinion, is to distinguish between the territorial and the commercial situation. In our view, these can, and ought to be, separated and dealt with on different principles. As far as the territorial situation is concerned, it is evident 'that Russia is steadily attempting to alter it to her advantage. She is in possession in Manchuria, and we may feel certain, not only that she will not evacuate it unless forced to do so by the strong hand, but that she will gradually develop and consolidate her position there until her hold on it is equivalent to the hold she would obtain by actual annexation. She will not annex any more than we shall annex in Egypt or France in Tunis ; but partly owing to conscious effort and partly owing to the effect of .time, her occupation will become, as in the .cases just named, equivalent to annexation,—unless, of course, we or some other Power or combination of Powers undertake, and undertake successfully, the work of turning her out. But is it likely that this can or will be done ? Most assuredly it is not. Neither alone nor with any other Power will we force Russia to evacuate Manchuria. But if we cannot, in fact, obtain the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia, it is obviously bad policy to make any show of in- sisting on evacuation. Nevertheless, though we cannot get 'Russia to leave Manchuria, we may still be able to induce her to observe the conditions under which she took over that province. When a man acquires a property his buying is often, subject to conditions which run with the land and can be enforced against him. So Russia may be expected and required to carry out the commercial obligations which attach to Manchuria. the American demand far the "open door," and so pro- ducing distrust and enmity among all traders. - We shall, perhaps, be told that we are making a great mistake in thus acquiescing without a struggle in Russia's acquisition of territorial and political power in North China, and that even though we may not be able actually to turn Russia out of Manchuria, we ought to fight her aggression inch by inch, and make her process of absorption in that region as slow as possible. We cannot agree. Such a policy is in the last resort based 'upon the fear that if Russia is allowed too free a hand she will swallow China whole; and that Russia once master-of China, with her myriad population and her incalculable wealth, will become irresistible in strength and a menace to -every other State. Possibly Russia might become such a menace if she could acquire possession of China as easily as is suggested. But what grounds have we for believing that Russia could succeed in conquering China so easily? What are the facts upon which the answer to the question of whether China can or cannot be easily conquered depends, and what answer do they suggest P. The facts are to be found in the history of the last war in China. Then a picked and fully equipped European force of some seventy thousand men, supported by a naval force of tremendous strength, was just able to penetrate about a hundred miles inland and to occupy Pekin. When that was accom- plished, the Powers found they could do nothing more. They would have liked to follow the Dowager-Empress to her new capital, and to have inflicted some signal punishment on her and her entourage for the unparalleled outrage she had inflicted on their representatives at the siege of the Legations. Yet so great was the resisting power of China that they had to abandon all thought of penetrating any further inland or of pursuing the Empress to Sian-fu, and had to be content with a treaty which, though no doubt it humiliated the Court, did not exact any real reparation. Now with these facts staring us in the face, and in view of the impasse with which the military commanders found them- selves confronted after they had taken Pekin, have we any right to assume that the complete conquest of China by Russia would be an easy task ? Possibly if Russia, had unlimited men and unlimited ships she might perform the work ; but she has neither. In spite of her vast population, she would find the provision of an army of occupation for China a very serious matter. " Russia could do without occupation by getting control of ,the central Government ? " The idea is ingenious, but not sound. The Chinese Government does not like being controlled, and it has learnt by its 'flight to Sian-fu that if the worst comes to the worst it can always retreat inland, and so escape control.
For these reasons we do not believe in the alleged ability of Russia to absorb all China whenever she chooses unless she is prevented by external force. We should await with equanimity the attempted conquest of China. If the Chinese population have the great physical and moral powers that many competent observers think, Russia will find the task an impossible one. If, on the other hand, the Chinese prove incapable of offering any real resistance to Russia, then at any rate we must not assume that Russia will have obtained mastery over a population which can be drilled for the conquest of the rest of the world. Those who fear Russia's policy in China cannot, after all, have it both ways. The mastery of the Chinese cannot at one and the same time be a menace to the whole globe and a matter that can be accomplished with the greatest possible ease. Fear and suspicion are the worst possible guides in public as in private affairs. But are not we lapsing into the habit of basing our whole Asian policy, nay, our whole foreign policy, on fear and suspicion of Russia ?
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