THE NATIONAL RESERVE.
ANT -E desire to thank the Press of all shades of opinion for the public-spirited way in which it has inserted and endorsed the appeal of the Spectator to those men who are eligible for, but have not yet joined the National Reserve, and so have helped to strengthen the claim of the Reserve to further and better recoguition by the Government. But though we feel our thanks are due to the Press, we should be guilty of a want of sense of proportion, and indeed of unpardonable self-consciousness, if we imagined that the Press was furthering our suggestion out of courtesy or friendliness to the Spectator and its editor. Such a sup- position would be supremely ridiculous. We, of course, fully recognize that the Press has acted solely from patriotic and public considerations, and on no other grounds. To thank them for a patriotism which we never doubted would, indeed, be an impertinence.
But though the Press has done its part so well, and though the response which we have received and are daily receiving from men eligible to join the Reserve is so encouraging, we should be guilty of what would be tanta- mount to a deception of the public if we pretended that the attitude of the country generally towards the National Reserve is in any sense adequate or commensurate with the importance of the issues involved. Not merely the man in the street, but the men in the House of Commons and House of Lords and our statesmen generally have shown themselves very little able to realize what is involved in the sorting out and getting in touch with all the trained men in the country. That, of course, is what the National Reserve movement means. Our rulers—using the word in the widest sense, for what we say is applicable to both parties—are only very mildly interested in the National Reserve. If they were asked they would no doubt say that they thought the notion a capital one, that it can do no harm, and that it is exceedingly patriotic of the newspapers to take up the subject and to stimulate patriotic feeling among the old soldiers, &c., &c., &c. That the movement has a practical side they seem to be quite unaware. Public men are quite prepared to make speeches about the need for action, and about the time for doing something having come, or to declare that talking is useless and words vain, and that what are wanted are deeds ; but beyond these conventions they do not dream of going. The notion of helping a movement like that in favour of the National Reserve—of doing something, in fact, rather than talking about doing it—never seems to occur to them. They have not even imagination enough to see that for the moment almost the only thing which we can do is to get in touch with the trained men of the country, and that the only way to do this quickly and effectively is the way in which the Press is now attempting it.
Although this is the situation, and although, as we have said, our ruling men have not imagination enough to see the present importance of the National Reserve, we venture to say that if, as is of course quite possible, a European war involving this country were to break out in the course of the next few days or weeks and an expeditionary force were despatched, as it certainly would have to be despatched, to the Continent, our statesmen on both sides would at once turn to the National Reserve to help the nation in its need. No gift of prophecy is required to make this statement, for the very good reason that they would literally have nothing else to turn to. We speak with a full sense of responsibility when we say that after the Regular Reserve had been called up, as they would be in the case of sending out an expeditionary force, and the Territorials had been embodied, it would be from the National Reserve, and the National Reserve alone, that any extra military strength could be promptly drawn for purposes of national defence. It, and it alone, would be our sole resource for rapid military expansion. Though no doubt there would be a great boom in recruiting, the recruit would not be available for many months, and by then the war would most likely be over.
If we use our imaginations to project ourselves a little more into the future, it will be easy to see how things would go. The expeditionary force as it stands would probably be the best fighting force on the Continent, and it would certainly get the reward of its splendid material. It would be heavily engaged almost at once, with the result of a large number of casualties due to death, wounds, and the usual wastage of war. Translated into plain terms, this means that probably in a fortnight after the troops had landed there would be an urgent demand for 70,000 more men. Naturally the Government and the country would be extraordinarily keen to send those reinforcements and to let them be of the best material. But this would mean that the country would almost at once be emptied of Regular troops. There would therefore be no Regulars left at home but the boys and the invalids at the depots. At the same time by various improvised measures, and under some such title as "Imperial Yeomanry," or "Imperial Volunteers," or " ' we may be sure that the cream of our Territorial force would be skimmed. (Possibly also a skimming of volunteers for oversea service would be accepted from the National Reserve.) This would mean, very likely, with a naval war still undecided, that the country would be left guarded solely by Territorials and recruits. What would happen next ? We have no sort of doubt as to the answer. We should one and all of us be thanking God for the existence of the National Reserve, and making plans for using it to the best possible advantage for creating a steady field army for home defence. In these circumstances we would ask our readers whether it does not seem to them a matter of vital interest that the force on which so much would depend should be as large as possible—should be 340,000 rather than 170,000? There can only be one answer. If the efforts of the Press succeed in the course of the next few weeks, and if the National Reserve is brought up to its full size, there would, in the circumstances we have imagined, be a sense of profound relief. On the other hand, if these efforts prove a failure owing to the neglect of our ruling people and the public generally, there would be a deep sense that a great opportunity of getting into touch with the trained men in the country had been missed. In one case we shall all say, "Heaven be praised the National Reserve is up to 340,000." In the other we shall all be saying, "Oh what idiots we have been to neglect such a force, and only to be in touch with 170,000 when we might have had double the number on the register." Remember that if war breaks out it will be too late to complete the National Reserve. The distractions of a general mobilization and of the embodiment of the Territorials will make it impossible for the Territorial Associations to do the work of registering the National Reserve.
We expect that most of our readers who pride them- selves on being "men of affairs" will smile at all this, and say that it is only our enthusiasm, and that the National Reserve, which is a thing so new and untried that most of them only heard of it quite recently, could not possibly be so important as we have suggested. Never- theless we must persist in our statement that such a view is due to that incurable want of imagination which belongs to British public men. If we get into military difficulties this winter it will be to the National Reserve, i.e., to the trained men, of the country, that we shall look for kelp, and, as we have said, for the very good reason that we have nothing else to depend on, outside the Regular Forces and the Territorials—forces on whom we already place a dependence beyond their strength. If trouble comes the National Reserve and its virtues will be in every man's mouth. Let us see to it, then, that it is as big as encouragement can make it, while encouragement is not yet too late. What fools we shall look if we have just missed getting in touch with all the trained men in the nation !
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