THE NEWS FROM RHODESIA.
IT is a curious illustration of the English way of doing things that our countrymen, with so many wild ter- ritories to govern and so many fighting tribes to keep in some sort of order, have never thought out any plan for the effective garrisoning of their vast possessions. They have never made a Colonial army, never so stationed their marines as to be able to use them on land at a moment's notice, never organised a small corps d'armise or two to be ready for Colonial service whenever a telegram warned the Government of coming trouble. They have " got along" by applying different systems in each place, some- times even applying different principles of action. In the old American provinces they practically maintained a conscription, for though they never employed that de- tested term, yet the governors of the provinces so organised a militia that if the Indians rose, as at one time happened constantly, the youth of the neighbour- hood could be turned out under well-known officers, and in a formation which, rough as it was, was thoroughly understood. In the West Indies the Government have founded regular black regiments. On the West Coast of Africa they have hired the men of a warlike tribe, trained them to fight as armed police, and made most valuable soldiers of them, as it were by accident. With an army of Houssas one might conquer Africa. In Canada the Government have built up a force which in theory is an army, and in practice an excellent and very numerous militia, while in South Africa they have tried many schemes, the favourite one being minute regiments of highly paid European cavalry, usually called " police," in which the men are most of them educated, and all are in the strictest sense volunteers. They have, too, auxiliaries of all sorts, Griquas, Zulus, Ba,sutos, and lately Matabeles, all raised on different terms, with no legal nexus between them, and we believe, though we are not quite sure of this, with no obligation to serve anywhere outside their districts, even in South Africa. Then if anything goes wrong, or local force is insufficient, they send out an " expedition " at an expense which other countries would think unendurable, fight a. little war, and generally, though not always, emerge from the imbroglio with more wild territories to govern, more savage tribes to control, and more necessity for raising what the regular officers, half m approval, half in scorn, describe in a single word as "Locals."
It seems a happy-go-lucky kind of method, and would drive a German Staff officer frantic, but we are by no means prepared to condemn or even to criticise it. It gets us out of many of the difficulties produced by British reluctance to be placed under anything like a con- scription ; it enables us to utilise races differing widely from each other in language, religions, and habits of life ; and, above all, it has worked on the whole fairly well. Sufficient order is maintained as a rule, we are not greatly or frequently worried by insur- rections, the nondescript troops grow obedient and faithful —that mutiny of the Matabele police is quite exceptional, and requires explanation—and if there are white colonists they develop themselves into a most energetic ruling caste. Nothing is more singular than to see the confidence with which a half educated or uneducated Scotch or English peasant or artisan will plant himself among hundreds of dark men as brave as himself, rule them, utilise them, sometimes even improve them, without ever looking for official help, or caring for any sort of official guidance, and then, if caught by an insurrection, will fight on till he is beaten or reconquers his position. The great drawback, perhaps the only one, to the method is that occasionally, and for a limited time, it involves the risk of massacre. It did so in New England, it did so in New Zealand, and for a minute even in Australia, and it does so now in South Africa. There is nothing like central• organisation, there is no system of " commandeering " such as the Boers keep up, there is not even the habit of communication such as was, perhaps is, maintained by the whites in any dangerous district of the Southern States the individual is left to do the best for himself that circumstances may suggest. The consequence is that when natives "rise," the white men are for the moment in frightful danger, and get murdered in scores. They are widely scattered, they have no system of communica- tion, they have lost their forefathers' art of building forts over all the country, and they retreat to the towns, which are rarely defensible, which may have stores of food or may not, and which in two cases out of three have no considerable reserve of munitions. Gradually, of course, as the settlers who are left alive concentrate, things get. better. Volunteer companies come to the rescue, com- posed of men much better suited for such warfare than regular soldiers, an irregular but most effective cavalry is organised, fortresses are improvised either by using waggons or erecting stockades, light artillery is obtained: from the few military depots, and at last the settlers aro ready to take the offensive. There is a campaign of &- month or two, the natives are beaten in some sharp skirmishes, they yield—we have never yet been able to• explain or even to suggest why, for they could go on, as the Maroons did, for generations—and everything is-_ restored to its normal condition, whites uppermost and directing, dark people lowermost and obeying, with. squabbles about rations and pay. That is the way the. Matabele rising is just now going, with certain aggrava- tions due to the locality and the character of the natives.. Spaces in South Africa are even worse than spaces were in America, for there, if you read the history of the early Indian wars, the settlers benefited amazingly by the- wonderful multitude of the lakes and streams, which are- almost wholly absent in South Africa. The natives, too,. are more formidable, for if they are not braver than the Red Indians, they are much better armed, they know more of military tactics, and if not more numerous—it ill astonishingly difficult to discover the number of the Eel Indians—they at least act more together and in much larger bodies. The settlers, however, are more numerous- also, they also are better armed, and they turn themselves into cavalry with a readiness which the settlers in America. —probably from the nature of their forests—were much: slower to acquire. They have won the struggle a dozen times, and we have little doubt will win it again, though there may be a bad " catastrophe" or two first. The news from Rhodesia is not good. The whole native population is evidently " up " for a great struggle, Bulawayo is an essentially bad position standing as it does at the bottom of a cup of hills, and though there are brave men to defend it, they are powerless to take the offensive against savages armed and posted like the Matabeles, and if the latter dare try a night attack, or aro sufficiently in earnest to lose a thousand men in an attack by day, there may be a bad telegram to receive yet. Everything, however, depends on time. Reinforcements are advancing, though the distances make everything seem. slow, regular cavalry have been despatched from Natal, and unless the whole native population sees its chance, the problem is reduced to one of holding out. In six weeks the whites will again be ready for offensive operations.
We can easily understand wby the Government at. home seems slow in sending reinforcements. The colonists know the distances, they have not much belief in regulars when wild enemies have to be fought among wild hills, and, like the American settlers, they have an invincible and most creditable confidence in themselves. They do not ask for help as yet, and of course Sir Hercules Robinson in the main represents their opinion. The home Government, therefore, delays sending reinforce- ments, and as they could not reach Rhodesia in time to avert the local catastrophe, if one is to occur there, we believe the Government is in the right. We must make, however, two reserves. If Mr. Chamberlain thinks, or if those soldiers familiar with the country whom he consults think, that there is any chance of a general native rising following on a defeat, then the responsibility of the Government in not sending troops becomes one heavier than ought to be borne. Granting that settlers must do most of the work in the hills, regulars may be needed in order to set them free, as well as to maintain order in the towns and more thickly settled districts, which, it must not be forgotten, are full of dark men who, on the hypothesis, may become untrustworthy, or at least may give occasion for a disastrous panic. We trust, and believe, that no such misfortune is in store for us, but we do not like some of the symptoms, especially the reports from the Northern Transvaal, and the possibility ought to be most carefully considered. It may be that the presence of ten thousand regular troops would prevent a necessity for the reconquest of South Africa. And we confess we have a suspicion as to the motive for delaying the re- inforcements which gives us a sense of pain. We have maintained all along that forbearance in our treatment of the Dutch Republics was just and wise, both because of their treaty rights and because the co-operation of the two races is essential to the future of South Africa. We can- not, however, admit for a moment that either justice or wisdom compel us to defer to the susceptibilities of the Republics in regard to the movement of her Majesty's troops within her own dominion. Mr. Kruger and Mr. Steyn have no more to do with that than the German Emperor has, and we would pay no attention whatever to any remonstrances from either of the three or all three together. It is ridiculous for us to make efforts to keep Colonies which, when preserved, are not parts of our own dominion, or to pretend to independence while we allow foreigners to regulate the movement of troops within the limits of the Empire. If troops are needed at Mafeking they should be sent to Mafeking, even if President Kruger declares their presence a menace or the German Emperor asserts that their march "excites opinion" within the Cameroons. Something is due to the dignity of the Empire as well as to the success of our diplomacy, and that dignity is sacrificed when internal affairs are regulated in any degree out of fear of representations from foreign Powers. Whoever is owner of the Transvaal, Rhodesia is as much ours as the Orkney Islands.
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