THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
AN arch with a movable keystone is hardly a con- ceivable structure, yet that is what the statesmen are engaged in building up. The Kings of Central Europe, with their Foreign Ministers, and their record- keepers, and their trusted private secretaries, are all in motion at once, visiting each other, " conferring " together for hours on end, distributing with thoughtful frugality those few decorations which really mean that the dynasts are greatly pleased by something the recipients have done, and, in fact, visibly transacting in the modern method very serious business. It is odd that it should be the modern method, for fifty years ago it was supposed that the personal authority of Kings was dying away, but the introduction of universal military service has rebuilt that authority, and at this moment a little note from King Humbert to Emperor William, or from Emperor William to Emperor Francis Joseph, may affect the fate of great nations most materially. It is assumed, of course, that the object of all this activity is to renew the Triple Alliance which expires next year, and there is no reason for doubting either that the assumption is correct, or that the negotiations will be successful. The three Powers, in truth, have very little option. If Germany stood alone she would be attacked by France and Russia, if Austria stood alone she would be paralysed by Russian menaces, while if Italy stood alone she would become a mere dependency of France. The three Powers are, therefore, compelled by external circumstances to draw together, and once drawn there is supposed to be almost a certainty of peace. England, it is alleged, is sure to regard the Alliance with general favour, and to accord a special protection to Italy, and under those circumstances peace appears to diplomatists to be almost certainly secured. The arch is reconstructed, and is so strong that no storm, even if it blow from the west and east at once, is likely to overthrow it. The three Powers cannot be assailed except through invasion, and the risk of invading States which occupy the whole centre of the great circle, which are connected together by a perfect system of railways, and which can in twenty- one days place a million and a half of drilled soldiers in the field, yet keep in reserve another million and a half of men better drilled even than they, is too great for any Generals who are sane willingly to encounter. If beaten, the invading States might find that their histories had finished. There must, it is said, be peace, and diplo- matists shake bands and grow almost garrulous over what they agree to regard as a genuine and first-class triumph of their art. It is a triumph in a way. We have no objection to offer on behalf of this country, for our permanent interest is peace, and a peace secured by defensive alliances is a peace that should last, but we have nevertheless one humble criticism to make. The arch is very firm while the keystone remains stationary in its place ' • but is that essential condition in any way guaranteed? The Triple Alliance really rests, and must continue to rest, upon the German Emperor as its keystone, and the German Emperor is not fitted by nature to be a keystone of any sort. He wishes, no doubt, to keep the arch together, and to do his best for Europe and the world as well as for his own country. But he cannot keep quiet. Unlike most monarchs, whose temptation in the West as well as in the East is to a sell-indulgent ease, he is possessed of an abnormal activity, which impels him to incessant jour- neyings, frequent interviews, perpetual interferences with his Ministers and the Princes of his house, and a constant rumination over new policies, some of which he endeavours to carry out. Europe is too small for him, and he revolves, forms, changes, and tries to execute plans for making Germany "a world-wide Power." Now he thinks it pos- sible to acquire Holland, and with her the Far East ; then he convinces himself that Germany must have a share of Southern America, where there is still room for millions ; again he wonders whether the United States would fight if he bought Cuba ; by-and-by he thinks that Morocco would be an easier and larger acquisition; and then he remembers as it were with a start that half the white population of South Africa, is Dutch by origin, and that Dutchmen are ethnologically Low Germans. And, finally, it is borne in upon him that every one of these ideas presupposes a great fleet, and that he ought to bring his fleet up to a much higher standard, so that he could contend at sea with France or America, or even Great Britain. If these ponderings ended in reverie they would do no harm, rather they would do good, for they would induce the dreamer to store his mind with knowledge, or l-eep up a close supervision over the affairs of the world ; but they do not so end. The German Emperor is no ordinary dreamer, but a Hohenzollern who believes that God wears uniform, and who, even when dreaming, has a longing to do some practical thing which would bring his dreams nearer to realisation. Men of that type are somewhat rare, but they exist, and when the Emperor's ancestor, Carlyle's favourite, dreamed of treasure he accumulated it, or of an army he collected sixty thousand men. Frederick William never used, pro- bably never intended to use, either his hoards or his regiments, but he gathered them together, and when the hour for action arrived they were found very formidable. When the Emperor dreams of Holland, he " cultivates " Dutch opinion ; when he thinks of Brazil, he converses with insurgent leaders of Parana ; when he meditates on Cuba, he asks the American Minister whether Washing- ton would object if Cuba became German ; when Morocco crosses his mental field of vision, he sends cruisers to Tangier ; when he awakes to the Dutch descent of the Afrikanders, he makes offers to the Transvaal and threatens the Portuguese ; and when he decides on more ships, he encourages societies which profess as their first aim a vast maritime development. Not one of these ideas tends to make the Alliance any stronger, while some of them are directly opposed to its central thought, which is to maintain in Central Europe such a mass of easily mobilised military force that all external enemies behold- ing it shall shrink back and remain at peace. A war between Germany and the United States would delight France and Russia ; an attempt to seize Morocco would add Spain at once to the Franco-Russian Alliance ; the intrigue with the Boers made England at once unfriendly to the Triple Alliance ; while the grand scheme for the increase of the Navy might, and probably would, end in a quarrel between the Prussian people and the Hobenzollerns. Any one of the Emperor's dreams might, in fact, either render the Alliance impossible or weaken it so greatly that it would be no longer beyond attack, and the European peoples per- ceiving that, no longer consider it an inevitable guarantee for peace. They do not accuse the German Emperor of rashness, for he has as yet done nothing, except his escapade in South Africa, which can be finally described as rash ; but they think him too mobile to be the trust- worthy centre of a system which is intended to support a mighty weight. The keystone does not slip out, but it shakes and groans and quivers till experienced architects doubt whether, vast as the strength of the arch at any given moment may be, it can be considered a durable structure. If the keystone slips the arch may crumble in an hour, and to anxious eyes the keystone seems as if it were always slipping. No one can ever quite say that it will not slip, that is, to quit metaphor, that the German Emperor will not suddenly enter upon some course in which his allies cannot follow him, and which, therefore, will of itself bring the great Alliance to an end. It may be said that we make too much of the single foible of an otherwise powerful character, and we wish we could think so ; but the foible seems to us not so much a flaw in the character as a weak element in its very con- stitution. There is salt in the substance of the keystone. Let those who think or hope that we exaggerate reflect for a moment on what would be the position of Europe if the German Emperor were completely solid, a man certain to be impervious to viewy ideas, intent at all times, and to any necessary extent, on maintaining the Alliance as a foundation of peace. Europe would be as tranquil as if it were not armed. It would be heavily taxed, no doubt, and much overdrilled, and with much of its energy exhausted in bearing the weight of its armour of proof, but still it would be at peace, could labour quietly, could address itself with some confidence to plans requiring years for their development—for in- stance, the utilisation of Africa—could even try by experi- ment whether it was or was not possible to remove some of the grievances or inequalities which give rise to Socialism. It could work as an artisan in a coat can work, not so well, indeed, or so pleasantly as if he were in shirt-sleeves, but still without stoppage or exhaustion. At present Europe works only like an Afghan peasant, who slips on his armour, buckles on his sword, and takes up his musket whenever he sees a new face or heats an unaccustomed sound. There is always fear abroad, and the cause of that fear, almost the only irremovable cause, is the character of the German Emperor, who is now re- newing the Triple Alliance, but who may to-morrow throw his whole heart into some project, practicable or imprac- ticable, with which the interests of the Alliance are hopelessly inconsistent. Quarrelling with Great Britain, for instance, is almost fatal to the Alliance ; yet where is the guarantee that the Emperor will not within a montla after he has signed the new agreements declare that South Africa belongs to him by ethnological kinship, or that he has claims on Australia because it was originally peopled from German New Guinea, or that he has a, right to a voice in all British affairs because the Saxons came from Holstein, and Holstein has been restored to its old Teutonic allegiance ? Until there is certainty as to his policy Europe can have no true peace ; and certainty appears year by year to be further off than ever.
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