A RESERVIST COLONY FOR THE TRANS VAAL.
IT is sometimes said by those who take a pessimistic view as to the future of South Africa that after we have settled with the Boers in the field. and the fighting is over we shall have to keep a permanent army of some thirty thousand men encamped in South Africa. Even when it is admitted that the Transvaal will be well able to take care of itself as soon as the British refugees have returned, and when that great influx of British and non- Dutch population has taken place which is sure to take place immediately peace is restored, we are still told that a huge Imperial garrison will be wanted to hold down the Dutch. We do not believe it, because we note that the Cape Dutch, though they may often talk what excitable people call treason' but which we should. prefer to call exaggerated racial patriotism, show no tendency to translate words into deeds. If they do not take up arms now that we are in something of a tight place, they will certainly not take them up later. If the Cape Dutch are not goaded into overt acts, they will be content with words. But though we do not believe in the necessity for a garrison of thirty thousand regular soldiers, we quite admit that for the next few years it would be an exceedingly convenient thing to have in what are now the Transvaal and the Orange Free State a considerable body of men of British birth and sympathies accustomed to the use of the rifle and able to support the cause of self-government within the Empire both with their votes and their guns. Now by a most fortunate chance the opportunity for securing such a body of British Colonists will be open to us at the close of the war, and if the Government are wise they will certainly seize it. When the war is com- pletely over, say this time next year, and the Government are beginning to withdraw our forces from South Africa, they will be face to face with the fact that some thirty thousand or so of the men they are sending back will as soon as they are landed in England pass out of the Army into the Reserve either as old Reservists or as time- expired men. Now in our opinion the Imperial authori- ties, co-operating with the Colonial authorities on the spot, should make use of this fact for the creation of a large body of military Colonists. That is, they should make offers of so tempting a kind to the Reservists and time-expired men that a large number of these will prefer to stop in South Africa as Colonists rather than go back into civil employment at home. It remains to ask what is the sort of offer that would. tempt men to stop, and how far it would be possible for the authorities to make such an offer.
The offer that would be likely to tempt a man in the prime of life who was actually in South Africa would, speaking generally, be a farm and something in cash to stock it with, and for the married man some means of bringing out his wife and family. Now how far would it be possible for the authorities to make an offer of this kind ? To begin with, the Imperial Government would be able to calculate that they would save so much per man in the way of transport charges if a Reservist or time-expired man took his dis- charge in South Africa rather than at home. Probably this amount would not be leas than £20 per man, for, in addition to the saving on transport hire, there would be the man's pay and keep for an extra month. It would not, of course, do to give any and every man who wished. to take his discharge in South Africa £20 down without inquiry or guarantee, for the country would then soon be filled with men who had spent their £20, and. had no settled work or habitation. The discharge bounty should only be given to men who were willing to settle down, and. for whose settling down adequate provision had been made. That is, the bounty, whatever it might be, should only be given to men who would agree to take up a grant of land, or in some other way give proof of their intention to make their homes in South Africa. That land suitable for settlement could. be found, and could be given to the military settlers free of charge, we do not doubt. There are mining and other companies in the Transvaal which own great tracts of country, but whose object in owning them is not to use the surface, but only to secure the mineral rights. Provided the mineral rights were retained, such companies and private owners would probably be glad enough to allow their land to be used for the purpose we are advocating. There would probably be also a good deal of Government land available. And here we may as well say that we trust that no forfeited lands would be used for military settlement. It is to be hoped, indeed, that practically there will be no forfeitures after the war, for forfeitures, as we know from the history of Ireland and the Highlands, leave generations of hate and misery. We do not want to see grow up in South Africa a, class of men who will spend their lives looking over their neighbours' boundaries and saying : 'That land was my father's, but it was unfairly and cruelly taken away from him because they called him a traitor.' We want to beat the Boers as thoroughly as it is possible to beat men— to beat them, that is, till they have "not an ounce of non- sense left in them "—but when the war is over we want no forfeitures and no sowing of seeds that will bring a future crop of hate and misery. The farms offered to the Reservists must be given or bought in the ordinary way. There must be no curses to run with the land. But a piece of land and a bounty of £20 or £40, or whatever the sum maybe madeup to, would not necessarily be enough to secure the settler's future. There are other things which might be done by the Goverment to help make the military settler's lot easy. After the war is over the Government will have an enormous amount of stores, horses, mules, carts, tents, sheds and. a variety of other useful things, from tarpaulins to Chaff- cutters, which, either because they are too heavy or else because they are partly damaged, will be pronounced to be not worth taking home. In the ordinary way these things would be sold off for an old song to the enter- prising dealers who lie in wait for such chances. That is, these useless stores would be practically thrown away. Now our suggestion is that such things as are suitable to settlers shall be given away to the military Colonists who have taken up land grants. A committee would, of course, have to be formed to see that the distribution was bona fide. No doubt there would be a certain amount of waste, but it would be far better to give away a hundred. lean mules with sore backs to fifty military settlers than to sell them for £1 apiece to a Jew or Indian speculator. Again, a damaged transport cart had far better be placed. in the hands of a Reserve Colonist than sold. at the price of firewood. There is yet another way in which the future of the military Colonists could be made attractive. The Imperial Government would of course go on paying them their reserve pay as regularly in South Africa as in England. Why should not the local Government or Governments add an equivalent sum as an extra inducement ? In this way the military Colonist would have something to live upon during the first few years of his plantation,—always the most difficult and trying time in a Colonist's existence. One word more requires to be said as to the scheme. Though we would give extra inducements to men who would take up and settle on the land, we would not absolutely insist upon all the men becoming farmers. Any and every Reservist who knew and would be likely to pursue a useful trade like carpentering, bricklaying, blacksmith's work, or, indeed, any other handicraft suitable to a new country, should be encouraged. to make his home in South Africa. If it should prove possible, by means of the kind we have indicated—our scheme is only meant as the roughest series of hints, and. not as a finished plan—to induce some ten thousand or fifteen thousand Reservists and time-expired men to settle in South Africa, it is obvious that a great many difficult questions would be solved. If the Government had on the spot ten thousand Reserve men, all of whom had had their baptism of fire, who could be called to arms almost at a moment's notice, we should hear much less about the awful difficulties we shall be placed in by having to keep a great military garrison in South Africa. When the only artillery force in what are now the Transvaal and the Free State is in the bands of the Imperial Government, when it can rely upon a force of ten thousand Reservists, and when, also, the local Volunteer force numbers some twenty thousand men, as it will do when the men who once were unarmed Out- landers have become citizens who may carry arms, we cannot see the necessity for keeping a greater force of Regulars in South Africa than we have kept for the last few years. People talk as if the present state of things were going to be permanent, and as if, should a Boer rising take place after the war, the Boers would. rise with a well-equipped artillery force and with millions of reserve cartridges. They forget that after the war the Boers, though not disarmed individually, will be entirely deprived of the plant of war,—of the Maxims, quick-firing guns, field artillery, and heavy ordnance of which they have made such formidable use. We do not want to talk as if there would be no difficulties after the war—there will, of course, be plenty— but we think it is a great pity to exaggerate the military problem. But be that as it may, nothing but good could come of inducing ten thousand. or so of the Reservists to stop in South Africa. We hope sincerely that the attempt to organise such a scheme will be made, for we are certain that if it is well and carefully worked. it will meet with a very large measure of success.
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