President Coolidge's Disarmament Proposal p RESIDENT COOLIDGE'S proposal for a further
conference on the limitation of naval armaments deserves a cordial reception, and, on the whole, has received it. There are very great difficulties in the way, but we ought to make it clear that we are prepared to second his effortS. Instructed opinion in Great Britain and the United States is almost identical, with the reservation that Great Britain, by reason of the geographical situation of the British Commonwealth and its long lines of oversea communications, must necessarily attach special import- ance to cruisers and other light craft. effortS. Instructed opinion in Great Britain and the United States is almost identical, with the reservation that Great Britain, by reason of the geographical situation of the British Commonwealth and its long lines of oversea communications, must necessarily attach special import- ance to cruisers and other light craft.
As was to be expected, opinion in the United States is favourable to President Coolidge's action, and it is generally recognized that Great Britain and Japan will make a genuine attempt to set their seal on the great work of naval armament limitation begun at the Washing- ton Conference when limitation was confined to capital ships over 10,000 tons. On that occasion the policy of the British Government produced a profound impres- sion in America. Great Britain made it clear that she was anxious for the total abolition of submarines, a proposal which failed largely owing to French opposition. The Scylla and Charybdis of the voyage on the uncharted seas of naval accord are the present determination of France and Italy not to apply the Washington ratio to auxiliary craft. Doubtless the reason that prompted President Coolidge to suggest Geneva as the meeting- place for a fresh Naval Conference was his belief that a second invitation to a Washington 'Conference would be declined by France. The correspondent of the Times states that official circles at Washington nevertheless expected the unfavourable answer from France which was sent on Tuesday. It is well that Englishmen should try to appreciate the unvarying French point of view. France, like Britain, is a great colonial Power, with colonies dispersed around three oceans, and, as the Matin points out, she ought consequently " to have a right to as many secondary units as Great Britain."
Fears have been expressed in Paris that in the matter of the ratio France might be treated on the same basis as Italy, a decision which would not be satisfactory to French opinion. Another reason for French lukewarm- ness is the conviction that the disarmament problem should be tackled as a whole, and that the result of the disarmament Conference at Geneva should be waited for before any further step is taken. We agree that we ought to wait till we see what happens at the Conference at Geneva next month. We must in no circumstances put ourselves in the position of seeming to throw over the League at the invitation of a country which is not a member of the League. But American representatives have been serving on the League Disarmament Commis- sion, and there is a reasonable possibility that the spirit of President Coolidge's proposal will have a real influence upon the work yet to be done.
In the present state of European opinion it will pro bably be impossible to agree on the entire problem of military, naval and air armaments: Nevertheless the League is at the moment committed to the attempt. It must be remembered that the League represents nearly the whole world, whereas the Washington Con- ference involved only five Powers, though these were, of course, by far the strongest naval Powers. In brief, we do not want, if this can be avoided, to detach from the policy of disarmament all those countries; including the whole of Latin America, which would be outside President Coolidge's scheme.' A few weeks or months hence it may be necessary to admit that the policy of treating sea, land and air armaments as a whole is impracticable. Then a new and fortuitous -importance would belong to the Coolidge plan. It might become the only means of ending the Geneva deadlock.
No useful purpose is served by under-estimating the difficulties. Apart from the Philippines and Hawaii and her general interest in policing the seas and safeguarding the trade routes, the United States has no such naval obligations as have Great Britain and France. For that reason it appears doubtful whether the five-five-three ratio of Washington can be applied to cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other light craft. At the time of the Washington Conference the United States was considerably behind Great Britain and Japan in cruiser strength and the position in powerful modern cruisers is at present as follows :—British Empire, 14 ; Japan, 12 ; United States, 5. There are proposals now before Congress to build thirteen cruisers, of which three have already been authorized. Although America's present strength in secondary units may be less than that of other nations, no one questions her financial power to outbuild thou should she desire to do so and were she persuaded that they were opposed to agreement. Whatever happens the English-speaking world must keep free of a naval com- petition.
Before the Washington Conference there were many patriotic Englishmen who did not believe agreement was possible because they considered that naval supremacy was the pivot of British policy and that everything else must be jettisoned before we decided to share our supre- macy on the seas. But the miracle happened largely owing to improved relations between the British and American Commonwealths and in principle we shared the trident with the United States.
There is another factor in the situation which has to be remembered. The size of the British shipbuilding programme in secondary units must largely depend on the strength of the next strongest European naval Power. If France and ourselves could agree, the way would be paved to a better understanding all round. If each nation enters the Conference with the determination to make no sacrifices, then the delegates will be only wasting their time. If, on the other hand, each nation sends its delegates to Geneva with instructions that there must be sacrifices all round and that each country must try to understand the point of view of the other participants, there is no reason why Geneva should not be as successful as Washington.
There Must be some means of reconciling the con- flicting interests. With give and take—and the giving must not be all on one side—it should he possible to safeguard the marine communications of the British Commonwealth, which are its life blood ; to satisfy French opinion and to recognize France's special interests over- seas ; to appreciate Italy's unique position in the Mediter- ranean and Japan's special problems in the Far East, and finally the position of the United States with sea- boards on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The ideal solution would be a comprehensive limitation affecting all countries and all branches of armament, but the second-best solution—which we suspect will be necessary—would be something corresponding to regional agreements. President Coolidge's proposal, therefore, should be regarded with great respect as a counter 0.f .
which the value is still uncertain but which may well turn out to be of decisive importance.
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