EVOLUTION AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.*

ALTHOUGH really written in a moderate and unpretending style, this book is nevertheless one of supreme pretensions. It aims at nothing less than the establishment of a synthesis between the modern doctrines of evolution and revealed religion. Thus, Professor Le Conte divides his book into two parts,—the first deals with the nature and proofs of evolution ; the other, with the relation of evolution to religious thought. The first part is intended to be a popular exposition of the arguments drawn from the various departments of physical and natural science in favour of evolution, and whenever the author proposes arguments of a special nature—such as, for instance, the arguments from analogy and homology in the vertebrate skeleton, the proofs from embryology, from the geographical distribution of organisms, or the artificial production of varieties and races—he generally does so with great clearness and simplicity. If anything, his ex- position is rather too clear and simple; it tends to mislead the popular reader, for whom he appears to be writing, by making him believe the whole thing to be really not so very difficult after all. In dealing with the principles of the doctrine, the Professor is not always so satisfactory. We • &elution, and its Relation to Religious Thought. By Joseph Le Conte, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. London c Chapman and Hall. 1588.

turn naturally with eagerness to his definition of evolution (p. 8). It runs thus :—" Evolution is continuous progressive change, according to certain laws, and by means of resident forces." We are not sure how far strict logicians would declare themselves satisfied with this definition. It does not seem to take into account those phenomena of atavism, retrogression, and degeneration which are certainly due to the operation of the same "certain laws," and yet can hardly be described, strictly speaking, as progressive changes. From other passages in the book, it is very probable that the author meant only " progress on the whole," leaving out all minor deviations ; but surely the definition itself ought to express that. The "resident forces " mentioned in the definition also appear to be rather too vaguely indicated. The author, as we know, does not exclude other factors in the process of evolu- tion,—such as physical environment, natural selection, and Dr. Romanes' physiological selection. Evolution is not, there- fore, altogether the effect of " resident " forces. What we should have wished to understand was, whether those resident forces were of their own nature specially directive in the phenomena of evolution, or merely the expression of the vitality of the organism as it becomes modified by the various known and unknown factors which act upon it. However, we are unwilling to pursue our criticism, for a good definition is, by all accounts, a difficult article to produce, especially when dealing with matters not well understood either a priori or a posteriori.

We prefer to raise an objection against a view not peculiar to the author, but proposed by him with perhaps too much assurance. Speaking of the supposed relation between the doctrine of evolution and the truth of spontaneous generation, he says :-

" If life did once arise spontaneously from any lower form, phy- sical or chemical, by natural powers, the conditions necessary for so extraordinary a change could hardly be expected to occur but once in the history of the earth. They are therefore now, not only unreproducible, but unimaginable. Such golden opportunities do not recur. Evolution goes only onward. Therefore the im- possibility of the derivation of life from non-life now, is no more an argument against such a derivation once, than is the hope- lessness of a worm ever becoming a vertebrate now, an argument against the derivative origin of vertebrates."

We believe this comparison to be a striking example of the truth of the scholastic dictum that omnis comparatio claudicat. We have no difficulty in understanding why an earthworm cannot now hope ever to become a vertebrate. Most probably,

no worm fully constituted as we know worms at present to be, ever had any such chance. It is not in the power of any living type to go back to those original forms, long lost in the course of geological ages, from which a special start occurred, leading to the production of what was ultimately to become a new fully constituted type. We say it is impossible, because of the probably immense number of steps which separate this type from its origins. Our earthworm represents a line of divergence, and therefore can never hope to go back to the point of divergence, and thence to ascend along the main trunk-line.

Now, can the same be so clearly asserted in speaking of the physico-chemical forces which the author, with many others of the same school of thought, supposes to have been able once, by natural process, to produce living matter out of purely inorganic elements ? Are we to understand from his com- parison that matter, in the course of its own evolution, saw some of its more privileged elements branch off into the direction of certain quaternary compounds which, under favourable circumstances, led to the production of living matter; that all actually living matter has been derived from that same fortunate speck of living matter; and that all the rest of the inorganic elements, ever since that momentous hour, have been evolving in various directions, so that it is now unimaginable, as our author says, how "such an extra- ordinary change " could be expected to occur again ?

There is something truly fantastic in such an assertion. He must indeed know a great deal about matter which we, poor people, ignore, who can establish such a proposition. When

certain biologists assume that certain conditions required for inorganic elements to become combined into a living sub- stance, once presented themselves in the history of our planet, but are, of course, not likely to recur again, so that spon-

taneous generation, once possible, is now found in no case to take place, they are merely assuming what they can never hope to prove ; but at least they go no further. Our author appears to think that the evolution of matter itself, no less than the absence of former cosmic conditions, makes now spontaneous generation impossible. At least, his comparison with animals seems to mean that. We confess we have always considered as rather bold the assertion so fre- quently made that it is impossible now for spontaneous generation to take place, but that it must once have taken place. That spontaneous generation may not find proper conditions for its manifestation in Professor Tyndall's test-tubes, or Professor Huxley's laboratory, we will fully admit; but, after all, the phenomena presented by Nature even now, in all parts of the world, are very various ; moisture is found occasionally combined with great heat, and many soils exist some of which must present matter very much in those conditions it enjoyed at the beginning. Why, then, should the production of a little fresh living matter, at least occa- sionally, be reputed absolutely impossible P Doctrine may be against it, but where are the facts P Our own belief is that spontaneous generation does not take place now, because it never did take place at any period of the earth's history; but if we believed it had once taken place, we confess we should hesitate, at least on logical grounds, to assert the impossibility now and then of the same phenomenon repeating itself. But we must at once pass on to the second part of Professor Le Conte's book, which deals more particularly with evolution in its relation to religious thought. The American naturalist does not attempt to minimise the importance of the subject If evolution, as a law, be certain what will be its effect on religious belief, and therefore on moral conduct?

This is a question of gravest import. To answer it, however imperfectly, is the chief object of this work." We fear the answer here given will scarcely satisfy those who by " religious thought," understand something at all definite and established upon facts. The author gives us his view of the proposed harmony in a nutshell. "It is evident," he says, "that a yielding here implies not a mere shifting of line, but a change

of base ; not a readjustment of details only, but a recon-

struction of Christian theology. This I believe is indeed necessary But let no one be greatly disturbed thereby."

Yet we fear some at least will feel disturbed, and greatly, when they learn what are the leading points of this "readjusted" Christian theology. First, we are to reject, "with Berkeley and Swedenborg, the independent existence of matter, and the real efficient agency of natural forces." We are to make "a frank return to the old idea of direct divine agency," and admit " a God immanent, a God resident in Nature."

Secondly, we are to believe " that the spirit of man was developed out of the anima or conscious principle of animals, and that this, again, was developed out of the lower forms of life-force, and this, in turn, out of the chemical and physical forces of Nature." Here, however, the author modestly adds : " The reader must understand that this is my own view only,"—

a remark which some of our readers may perhaps hear with -devout satisfaction. In his sixth chapter (Part U), the Pro.

fessor shows himself particularly anxious to escape the charge of teaching Pantheism. His mode of escape is, to say the least, ingenious. " Science," he says, " following one line of thought, uncorrected by a wider philosophy, is naturally led towards one extreme,—Pantheistic immanence. The devout worshipper, following the wants of his religious nature, is naturally led towards another extreme of anthropomorphic personality. The only rational view is to accept both im- manence and personality, even though we cannot clearly reconcile them." A little before this he had said on the same subject,—" We must accept both sides, even though we -cannot clearly perceive the nature of their relation."

We will quote no more. Enough has been given to show the real nature of the synthesis proposed by Professor Le -Conte. This book is another proof of the difficulty and danger for one who has received only a scientific training, in presuming to deal with abstruse philosophical questions. There is something almost painfully ludicrous in the way in which this author treats of a matter which he him- - self admits " affects religions belief, and therefore also moral conduct." We must only hope that in his system - of ethics, he does not favour the heroic practice of compromise which characterises his metaphysics. Of the elasticity of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity he evidently entertains no doubt, deceived, perhaps, on this point by the sad human -aberrations which have from time to time cloaked themselves under that sacred name. There is but one lesson to be derived from such a failure as this evidently honest attempt must be pronounced to be. In the words of the great American poet, we must learn " to labour and to wait." Hasty attempts at generalisation can only frighten away from the Truth many valuable workers, many generous and high-minded souls, or destroy in some a faith for which neither science nor philo- sophy can profess to offer a substitute. To attempt forcibly to reconcile things which appear to our reason contradictory, would be not merely imprudent, but dishonest. To labour courageously, to consider humbly, and to wait manfully, is the duty of the truly wise.