M. CAILLAUX'S RETURN
IlIME indeed brings its revenges. There were occasions not only during the War but before it when it seemed impossible that M. Caillaux should ever return to public life. Yet he has returned, or perhaps we should rather say, is in process of returning. He is not., of course, a Member of Parliament, but a great banquet given in Paris in commemoration of the act of amnesty which he is enjoying was attended by many well-known politicians, and there is no doubt that he has been consulted in financial affairs by both M. Herriot and M. Clementel.
The banquet, which was presided over by the President of the Chamber, was given at the Magic City, which is to Paris very much what Earl's Court is to London.
Let us hope that the name is an omen ; for whatever else M. Caillaux may be, he is something of a magician in finance. Finance is the ground on which his country- men may be willing to follow him. In finance there is more room for psychological effects than in any other human activity. Confidence plays a great part. If men believe that a particular leader can bring order out of muddle or turn diminishing values into dividend-paying shares, they will trust him—they will put their money on him. It is strange that many Frenchmen should be thinking of M. Caillaux as their possible leader, but the fact that they are doing so is a measure of their distress. They feel that something must be done to balance the national budget, to restore the franc which has taken wings to itself, and to rebuild the credit of the nation.
For these purposes a strong man is necessary, and all Frenchmen recognize that in M. Caillaux they have a strong man, even though they may feel some, though by no means all, of their former hatred for him, and even though in their secret hearts they may never forgive him financially for having introduced an Income Tax. The dislike of the average Frenchman for the Income Tax is only another of the many proofs that psychology frequents the whole field of finance. The argument that investigation into a man's banking account is contrary to the personal if not the constitutional rights of man—though that argument is worked extremely hard—is probably not so potent as the vaguer feeling that indirect taxation is much easier to bear. The Frenchman hates putting his hand into his pocket for a definite sum to be paid to the State. He greatly prefers to pay much higher sums in indirect taxation so long as he feels that he need not pay unless he pleases— that he need not buy the thing that involves a tax, and that if he does buy it he is still acting as that proud and noble creature, a free agent. Great changes must have taken place in French feeling before it became possible for the ordinary man to regard with comparative calmness the return to politics of the apostle of direct taxation. It is fair to say com- parative calmness. Of course, there were rumours that at the banquet at .the Magic City Royalist extremists would be present disguised as waiters and would insult, suppress or physically injure M. Caillaux. Nothing so interesting happened. M. Caillaux was listened to without interruption, and was applauded. There is excitement, of course, in Paris, but it is by no means dangerous excitement. All this is very significant.
From a British point of view the chief matter of concern is what M. Caillaux stands for. To ascertain this we must look at his record. And here we come to incidents which require a much higher power of forgiveness in the French people than is required by any such trifle as the imposition of an Income Tax. The secret of M. Caillaux's political character is that he is first, last and all the time gi financier. It is perhaps natural for a financier to be at heart something of a_ cosmopolitan. He thinks of the people of other nations less as men who can fight against his own country than as men who can deal with it.
Extreme type of financier as he was, M. Caillaux long before the War allowed the emotions which were provoked in nearly all other Frenchmen by the threats of Germany to pass over his head as though they had no meaning. For him finance was mightier than the sword. He believedand it is surely conceivable that he was sincere though none of his political opponents suspected him of sincerity—that Germany could be brought to live in peace with her neighbours by the compelling interests of commerce but not by a policy of answering threat with threat. He thought that if threats were the only way, France must lose the game in the long run as she was a country of dwindling man-power.
Now apply his principles to French policy and sec what happened. In 1911, the year of the German demonstration at Agadir, M. Caillaux was Prime Minister.
His Foreign Minister, M. de Selves, was conducting the negotiations with Germany about Morocco when it was revealed that M. Caillaux, without the knowledge of his Foreign Minister, had been carrying on private negotiations with Germany. Certain documents which had been seized by French secret agents were not revealed at the time, but their contents were known, and in a memorable scene in the Senate M. Clemenceau accused M. Caillaux of secret diplomacy and forced his resigna- tion. From that time onwards M. Caillaux was an object of public hatred. He was satirized, denounced and insulted whatever he did and wherever he went. A man more sensitive, a man with wavering resolution— but M. Caillaux had a will of iron—would have gone under and disappeared. Not so M. Caillaux. In three years he was back in office as Foreign Minister, and it was then that the denunciations of the Figaro ended in one of the most extraordinary tragedies of modern times. M. Caillaux's wife shot dead M. Calmette, the editor of the Figaro. After a remarkable trial she was acquitted. That affair alone would have kept any other man finally out of public life.
Yet in the War M. Caillaux was still the stormy petrel that he had always been. When he was appointed a Colonel in the Pay Department it seemed that he had no opportunity for political enterprise ; but he found or made one. He communicated with the enemy. Whatever good motives we may attribute to him (he was still the financier following the old road of finance), he was, of course, profoundly misguided and unwise. In such times his action could only be called treachery ; and it was so called. He was tried and condemned by the Senate. He was sent to prison and forfeited all civic rights. Now the amnesty restores him.
It may be that if he gradually gets back into power he will face those problems of taxation which M. Herriot certainly has not faced, and the solution of which will ultimately be the only salvation of the French people.
From the British standpoint there is nothing to regret in M. Caillaux's restoration. He. used to say that he was against the Entente with Great Britain, but that was because before the War he regarded Great Britain as an impediment to conciliation with Germany. 112 is a European, not a French Nationalist. Therefore he includes Great Britain in his vision of conciliation. For his own purposes—to put it on the lowest grounds— he is invariably for peace. And so are we.
What may trip him up is not his principal motive but his arrogance, his personal animosities, and his ambition. M. Clemenceau said of him, " Il se croft NapoleOn."_ But on the whole we see in his return more chance of safety than of danger for Europe.
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