BRITISH SYMPATHIES IN THE FAR EAST.
IF we are dragged into this war in the Far East, as we may be, we shall have at least one advantage. The country will not be divided in sympathy, as it sometimes has been. The dislike, mingled with dread, which is felt for Russia is as strong among the masses of our population as ever it was in 1855. Russia has done nothing to injure us since that period ; but the belief that her ambition has no limits, that she covets all Asia, including India, China, and the Turkish dominion, and is always moving slowly but irresistibly towards the fulfilment of her dream, is practically immovable, and has been deepened by recent developments in Manchuria and recent menaces to Japan. A certain faithlessness in her policy, which though not perceptible in Europe, where the Czar himself controls diplomacy, is perceptible in Asia, where action is guided by subordinates who are more independent of the central authority and are devoted to the theory of expansion, extends this distrust to the British upper class, and makes all welcome any check which Russia may receive in her glacier-like march towards the East and South. Even those who desire, as we do, a permanent understanding between ourselves and the great Northern Power feel that it is rendered difficult or impossible by repeated shocks to confidence ; while the philanthropists, who are always powerful among us, are disgusted by the tyranny of the Russian bureaucracy, and its apparent refusal to rely for unity upon any weapon except repression. The treatment of the Jews shocks the public conscience, and kills all the force of the argument which other- wise would have such weight, that the Russians, after all, are a white people and a Christian people, and that their rule in Asia, however obtained, must therefore be better for the world than that of either Mahommedans or Buddhists. On the other baud, the Japanese are distinctly popular, partly from sentimental reasons, partly from sheer admiration for a people which has so suddenly shaken off most Asiatic feeblenesses, and partly from a vague im- pression that Japan, being permanently menaced by Russia, must be permanently friendly to Great Britain, and will aid her in maintaining the freedom of the North Pacific and the countries upon its coasts. The general feeling, there- fore, will be that it is an ambitious rival who assails, that it is a friend who resists, and that the cause itself, which is the maintenance of our pledged word, even if imprudently given, is good enough to justify hostilities, great as may be the misery and loss which they may ultimately involve. In other words, we are bound to fight for Japan if attacked by a coalition, and the state of opinion will render it most difficult for any Government not to adhere to its pledge.
Nevertheless, though we fully admit the unanimity of popular feeling, and to a great extent recognise its justice, we would earnestly caution our readers not to lose their heads. There is no reason for wishing for this war, still less for wishing that we should be made parties to it. There is no moral reason for preferring one of the two antagonists to the other, except, indeed, that Japan is the lesser of the two, for if Russia has no right to Manchuria, neither has Japan any right to Korea. Each claims a grand province belonging to a third party on the plea of neces- sary or advisable expansion, and each if it succeeds will rule a large, and presumably an unwilling, population. If Russia is simply conquering Manchuria without a declaration of war, Japan makes no secret of her desire to conquer Korea equally without such a declaration. Nor is it wise to forget that while the victory of either side can bring to this country but uncertain gain, it may bring consequences most serious for us as well as for the rest of the world. The victory of Russia would, of course, be followed by the absorption of Manchuria and Korea; and the statesmen of St. Petersburg, once masters of these two provinces, would also be masters of Northern China,—that is, of a country whose market is desired by all Europe. It would be practically impossible to apply equivalent force at Pekin, and the result would unquestionably be either a Russian protectorate of China, or a partition which would burden all who took part in it, and lay the seeds of innumerable wars. This, be it remembered, is no dream of the future. Even now Russia weighs more heavily at Pekin than the rest of Europe, and with Manchuria and Korea in her hands, and Japan driven from the seas, she would, unless resisted by all Europe, be in practice, and probably also in theory, the protecting Power. That is not a result which even those English statesmen who are friendly to Russia could witness with- out a certain sense of dismay, or at least of agitation. On the other hand, if Japan triumphed, and saved Manchuria and Korea, her influence in Pekin would be irresistible, and she would in no long time control the policy and the resources of both the Mongolian Empires, thus creating a yellow Power which would be in many respects the strongest in Asia, and would strive to secure for Japan an expansion which both Great Britain and Holland might find inconvenient. Japan is at present most friendly, but her rulers will think, like other rulers, first of the interests of their country; and the primary and permanent interest of Japan, if she is to be a Power of importance, is more room. That room they can hardly acquire on the continent, for the Chinese are a swarming people, and under anything like safe government would very speedily fill both Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese, therefore, will desire to be predominant, if not a,ctually masters, through- out the Southern archipelago, to the dismay, among others, of the Australians, some of whom look upon those magnifi- cent islands as their future heritage. The real stake in this war is neither Manchuria nor Korea, nor even the safety of Japan, but the future predominance in China which victory, if at all complete on either side, will secure to the conqueror. We may prefer that the conqueror should be Japanese, but the preference can hardly be so strong as to make us wish that a, new and very great Power should be as formidable to India on the East as Russia now is upon the North. Both Nepal and Burmah were once depen- dencies of Pekin, and both are accessible to Chinese armies should they ever be formed.
We are not pleading, be it observed, for or against either side, still less arguing that our pledged word should be in any way disregarded. If a coalition attacks Japan, we must fight,—that is clear on the face of a very recent Treaty. All that we urge upon our countrymen is that they should not allow themselves to be carried away by emotion, but should regard the situation as a very grave one, and press upon the Government that, if it is still possible by any compromise to prevent war, they should support that compromise. Peace is the British interest. If, as seems probable, it cannot be secured, then the duty of us all is to abstain if possible from joining in the war, or encouraging the prosecution of the war, up to the point when our own obligation of good faith shall plainly commence. That point will be clearly reached when any European Power actively assists Russia in the campaign. We doubt if China came within the contemplation of the diplomatists who framed the Treaty, and certainly Korea did not. Korea cannot be regarded by sensible men as completely free ; and whether the Emperor decides for Russia or Japan, he must be considered a dependant who has obeyed orders from St. Petersburg or from Tokio. The position of China is different; but as matters now stand, the chances are that the Empress-Regent will either remain neutral, or make a great effort to recover Man- churia, which is in a, special degree the home of the ruling race. Her action, in that case, will not tend to peace, for it will justify Russian annexations ; but it will at least tend to delay any just claim for British interference.
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