DID WE HIT ON THE RIGHT METHOD?
• [TO THE EDTTOE OP THE " SPECTATOR:1
SIE,—I enclose a communication I have just received from a non-commissioned officer of much experience and judgment at present stationed in the Orange River Colony. As.an independent communication, it coal-ma the editorial articles in the Spectator on the reasons for non-success in the war.—
"The desperate attempts we have made and the enormous tumbers put into the field having proved inadequate to subjugate the Boers in their guerilla warfare, the above question is forced upon us in the baldest manner. I contend we were over-cautious, and made most elaborate preparations for contingencies which never even nearly occurred. We were too particular about advanced bases, and the danger of running short of supplies; and were fearful of allowing small bodies of troops to operate, lest they should be captured. A multiplicity of supererogations sapped our energies on the one hand, while excessive caution oduced apathy on the other.
Food and ammunition, the two great indispensables, could have been supplied with less than half the trouble our lumbering system entailed. A man can carry sufficient coffee, sugar, and a4..ur with two horses to last him a month, while the country at the initial stage of the guerilla warfare was literally bursting With grain and cattle. A month's ball cartridges can be carried by the man similarly to his food. Guns and waggons, almost without an exception, could have been dispensed with.
Our plan of work should have hem guided by the motto, 'Beat them at their own game.' The situation should have been viewed from the point of view of the individual and his horse or horses, and measures taken for a bountiful supply of remounts. The right personnel was on the spot. Many thou- sands of our infantry are, used to horses and can ride, and there is no lack of budding Buffalo Bills who would have jumped at the offer of a lively bout of Boer-chasing with its attendant dangers. The enlistment of the new Yeomanry was not required. Hunger would not have proved a deterrent. Hunger ? Why there is no danger of that even now if your convoy runs dry, after a year of the guerilla business, during which time we have had a hundred times the strength of Elickforde carting food out of the theatre of operations. A reward of .21 per head for captured guerillas would have very largely discounted any hardship in this .direction, and would have proved an excellent inducement to keen hunting. The men could have been picked from volunteers from all the forces in South Africa, given three - horses each, and formed into columns varying in strength from 30 to 300. Just such a roving life, sparkling with dangerous incident, would have suited our troops Al, and the end of the war would have been attained cheaper and more quickly. Leaders of the Le Gallaisand Rimington type should have been given commands. Speed has been the quality we lacked. What only speed could accomplish has been. left .to superior numbers and strategy. to effect, and the result has spelt failure. How is it we failed to devise some such plan ? It looks as though we trusted to fortune smiling on us. Shall we never' get rid of the stereo- - typed divisional and brigade organisations, even for such ab- normal situations as guerilla warfare brings ? Are we always to be full of the idea of Waggon Establishment," Spare Stores Establishment,' 14 men to a kettle," 16 men to a tent," so many - steps a minute," distance from front to rear of column so much' ? Do let us relax a little. Leave the Drill-Books behind and try to forget them. Give men's common-sense and natural aptitude a chance. Yet All these things have been said before; nay, are now being complacently spoken of as actually in effect ; but are they ? No! The chains of custom and of antiquated, inflexible, inelastic formulas of war were forged around us too tightly, and instead of snapping them with a violent severance, we contented ourselves by a simple slackening of our bonds, placidly imagining that would produce the desired effect. We are still bound. Strike, in pity's name, some lusty wielder of the axe, and set us free from deadening conventionalisms.
We don't want a Moltke, but we do want some cowboys of the Wild West and their like. We hear of a great gallop with a capture at the end of it about once a month; we should hear of ten such every day. Gallop ! of course we must gallop ! Do we imagine the Boers are to be caught with the four-miles-an-hour walk, six-miles-an-hour trot, eight- miles-an-hour canter, ten-miles-an-hour gallop, of the peace- time riding school ? We must not be afraid of giving a horse colic in Boer-chasing. Let us even dispense with the great scientific, strategic, full-of-technique commanders if they cannot cast off their technicalities, and appear as natural, clear-thinking men.. If you'll let us have an Old Noll,' an Abe Lincoln,' a ` and a 'De Wet,' we'll send you an Iron Hand,' a 21—st—r of Ind—n Fr—nt—r W—rf—re, a Or—t C—v—lry L—d—r, and a D—sh—ng G—rdsm—n by immediate return at . Bender's risk. . That column commander there who so carefully ' eilculates how much whisky he can put on his • mobile' waggons, and who carries Complete bed and toilette requisites, how many
Boers is be going to bag ? That other one there who has a hundred horses unfit for work in his column, and is expected to drag them into a garrison fifty to eighty miles away, what splendid gallops in chase will he execute ?
Our garrison towns represent a state of things utterly Opposed to the idea of a vigorous prosecution of the war. Numerous officers in possession of Staff billets are snugly ensconcing themselves in comfortable bungalows, obtaining lodgIng, instead of ' field' allowance, and drawing ration allowance. In fact, the liberal allowances to officers in South Africa seem to counterbalance their desire for the end of the War. Sport is all very well in its way, but on active service the care of golf-links and tennis-courts should not exercise officers' ability and attention, while the thousands of polo and racing ponies kept by officers throughout South Africa (fed on Govern- ment rations) might profitably be used to augment the parsi- monious supply of remounts to the mobile columns. The manliest, hardiest, most go-ahead men with the keenest fighting instincts were required to prosecute the hardest physical fight falling to man's lot. No smooth, insouciant 1899 British militarism will suffice for this deadly earnest game. Man to man the advantage should have lain with the pursuers (with the possibilities open to our side) in 95 per cent of instances. Frequently the dashing spirit of officers and men has been damped by over-anxiety to save life on the part of general officers, and their desire to do the work with a low casualty list."
[We have always refused, and shall continue to refuse, to publish anything written by private soldiers in the nature of mere grumblings ; but we print this voice from the ranks with great pleasure because of its good sense and its eagerness for action. Search where you will you find no man braves than the British officer, but we agree with our correspondent in wishing that he and those above him would spend other men's lives as willingly as they spend their own. Indifference to waste of life, paradoxical as it sounds, often makes the total bills of mortality in war smaller, not greater.--• ED. Spectator.]
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