A Danger to the Peace Pact M ESSAGES from the United
States show the line of criticism which is being brought to bear, apparently with increasing intensity, upon the reception and treatment of the Peace Pact in Europe. The State Department is, of course, gratified by the widespread desire to sign the Pact, but a doubt is arising whether the Senate will ratify it.
By far the most serious criticism concerns the reserva- tions of the British Government. Although no attempt was made by Great Britain to incorporate these reser- vations—which are in the main interpretations—in the text of the Treaty a good many Americans evidently feel that Sir Austen Chamberlain, by ruling out from the operation of the Treaty " certain regions " in which Great Britain has vital interests, has deprived the Pact of nearly all its significance.
Another argument runs something like this. " We Americans were content with the single and simple formula. Naturally we could have put in all kinds of explanations or qualifications to provide against mis- understandings, but we expressly refrained from doing so because we felt that the psychological value of the renunciation of war would thus be spoiled. But now see what has happened ! Great Britain has made a declara- tion in her covering letter about ' certain regions ' of the world which amounts to a Monroe Doctrine. We have our own Monroe Doctrine and we cannot invalidate it. Great Britain has, therefore, put us in a very difficult if not an unfair position. It is too late now for us to mention our Monroe Doctrine in the Treaty, or in any addendum to it. We must remind Great Britain, how- ever, that if she has vital interests in certain regions, so have we. Perhaps the best thing in the circumstances would be not to ratify the Pact."
We want earnestly to call attention to this criticism, not, of course, because we want to increase obstacles by advertising them, but because we greatly dread another failure like that of the Geneva Naval Conference. During the Geneva Naval Conference neither side—we are speak- ing of the people rather than of the Governments— understood the arguments of the other. The Conference was abominably misrepresented. The danger now is that misunderstanding will accumulate and become fatal if it is not dispelled in time.
First of all we would ask Americans to believe—what is the simple truth—that the Peace Pact is extraordinarily popular here. Most people look upon it as a turning point in history. They would be bitterly disappointed if it were wrecked. Nor do their fears extend merely to the loss of the Pact. They think that if there were another failure misunderstanding might give way to bitterness, and the good relations between the English. speaking countries—the one real hope of international progress—might receive a set-back from which they would not recover for a generation.
Secondly, we would ask Americans to believe—what again is the simple truth—that Sir Austen Chamberlain's reservations were the result of a painful anxiety to be honest before the world. As one reads his words one can almost see him at work—scrupulously going through all the conceivable contingencies in which a British policy might be represented as a violation of the Pact. It is generally supposed that when he wrote about the regions in which Great Britain had vital interests and might in certain circumstances have to use force he had in mind Egypt and India. The protection of India—say from Russia,—lzas been an immemorial tradition of British policy. It is not an agreeable burden, but it is one which no British statesman would dare at present to cast off. So again with Egypt ; the British arrangement with the Powers interested in Egypt placed entirely upon British shoulders the responsibility for securing the lives and property of foreign residents. That, too, is a burden which no British statesman would at present dare to cast off. If there are differences in essentials about British policy in India there is none about British policy in Egypt. When Zaghlul made impossible claims they were refused point blank by the Prime Minister of the Labour Government. Sir Austen must have said to himself, " We simply cannot expose ourselves to mis- understanding in these matters. It would be terrible if we signed the Pact without a word of explanation and were subsequently accused of having used war as an instrument of policy."
No doubt, as we have continually pointed out, there is a radical distinction between British and American methods of political action. For historical reasons it is easy for the American mind to adopt a maxim and leave the details of implementing it to the future. A British statesman can hardly be induced to commit himself to a principle unless he has thought out how he can apply it in every imaginable circumstance. This being so, we would ask of Americans what is perhaps a very bald question ; but we are encouraged to ask it by our en- thusiasm for the Pact. If Americans think it only right for us to waive our habits—or if they prefer, prejudices— do they not also think it reasonable that they should themselves make some allowances for our fixed way of thinking ? Cannot we meet half-way ? Is not the cause great enough for the outlawing of misunderstanding ? Is it not a proper occasion for " fifty-fifty " ?
We know perfectly well that every decent American who is in love with the Pact sincerely intends that it shall be the basis of a structure of international arbitration, conciliation and justice. Many Americans may even have faced the last conclusion of logic and made up their minds that the Monroe Doctrine itself must ulti- mately be conditioned by the renunciation of war. But all this must at present be taken on trust. And it is here that we foresee popular difficulties on our own side. The Englishman in the street may be expected to say to the United States, " You object to what you call the British Monroe Doctrine. But why should we not have ours when you have yours ? You imply every kind of peaceful intention, but all that we know at present is that the Monroe Doctrine is mentioned in this Covenant of the League as something that must not be tampered with. If you had come to think differently about it, why did you not mention it in the Peace Pact ? "
This imaginary comment, however, is merely leading us back again to the characteristic political difference between the two nations. The chief point is that, so far as we can see, Mr. Kellogg's acceptance of the inalienable right of self-defence does meet the doubts which are attributed to certain Senators about the safety of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Kellogg's success in getting a simple formula accepted without qualification in the text is a tremendous one. We hope with all our hearts that one of the most promising schemes ever presented to a harassed world will not be ruined by the over- emphasizing of difficulties. It is certain that if the Senate ratifies the Pact, no country will be more zealous and scrupulous than Great Britain in making it effective. Public opinion will see to that.
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