BOOKS.

THE REFORM IN ARMY TRAINING.* [FIRST NoTicE.] IT has long been questioned how far th.e late war should be regarded as of instructional value for an Army which is primarily trained to meet Continental troops and Continental methods. If fears have been expressed that the- military authorities might refuse to regard our South .African ex- periences as any guide whatever to the conditions of civilised war, it is because of the prevalence of this view among so many officers who have returned from South Africa. We have been told again and again that. the Boer did not fight according to the rules of the game, that kopjes and dongas are peculiar to South Afiica (a statement which is surely quite erroneous), that the climate, the poverty, and the vastness of the country required a style of fighting and made serviceable a stamp of troops which a real European war would find worse than useless.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, to whose prompt recog- nition of altered conditions and fearless adaptation of himself thereto we probably owe our retention of South Africa, has set our doubts at rest- in these two important text-books. While we can trace no tendency to overdo South African experiences, the books at once recognise that the far-reaching changes in the system of training laid down are necessitated by recent improvements in firearms and bi- -the introduc- tion of smokeless powder, and that these phenomena will present themselves in all future wars no less than they did in South Africa.

- In his preface to the Imperial Yeomanry Training Lord Roberts,tells us that—,' "The power of the defence to meet frontal attack has been materially strengthened by the long range of modern guns and • (I.) Infantry Training (Provisional), 1902.—(2.) Imperial Yeomanry Train. jag (Prorislonal). PuDlistieil Officially. . rifles, and by their rapidity of.fiee, while offensive operations have been rendered more complicated and hazardous by the diffieultjr Of locating the position and estimating the nunibers of an entaxiy posted under cover in the. direct.line of Eidyazwe. . . To.aVeid excessive loss, it may be assumed that; except under very apeAial • circumstances,.a much more open formation' will be adstted-in future for the front lines of attacking and defending -forces."

The. result is that the difficultiea of 'cOcarnand'are intenSified. The leader even of small bodies of .men can no longer'contra and., direct his men by word of •moittli3Often not 'even by signal. Hence the increased :demand-a, titiOn- the private soldier. We •aill quote the prefite.td the Infantry Training

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"Modern fighting makes heavy demands on every individual engaged, from the highest to the lowest. Not. only must the superior officer posses the tactical skill conferred by 'practice and professional zeal but the subordinate leader must be so accustomed to responsibility as to' be 'Capahl, tvlien necessaie,-; of using his own judgment to further the general plan ; and the soldier of acting with intelligence and resolution when thrown on

his own resources The backbone of a therough military training is the careful and gradual instruction of the individual, officer or soldier, in every duty he may be called on to fulfil, and the development to the utmost' of his Mental and physical powers. But such development is itnpossible unless free play is given to individual intelligence and initiative the men are not to degenerate into mere machines."

Such is the spirit that anim,ates the first real attempt at a rational training. Drill and discipline, though they have their importance, especially when dealing with the lower class of recruits, are relegated to their proper position of means to an end, and the first place is given to intelligence and resource, and to ,the proper delegation of authority. It has, in fact, been recognised that we hare reached one of those constantly recurring! cycles in the history of the art of war in which drill gives way to manceuvre and the highly organised machine to an aggregate of . thinking individuals. The system of Frederick the Great, which has more 'or less held the field for a century and a half, was- finally overthrown on the battlefields of Natal. It was pure chance that the very tactics which the modern rifle has imposed should have been so singularly suited to the military traditions and. natural instincts of the Boers. But it is greatly to the credit of the British Army that officers and men should in a single cam- paign have been able to free themselves from a faulty system, and so adapt themselves to the changed conditions that, in spite of many very natural reverses, they. should have been able to stand victorious in the end. Indeed, we believe that the South African Campaign is the solitau instance in history of a feat which, while perhaps not a strong testimonial to the thoroughness with which the old system was taught, bears striking testimony to the activity and resourcefulness of our national character.

We will pass to the manuals in detail. The most far- reaching change in the manual of Infantry Training (it is significant that the old. title Infantry Drill is thus changed) is the substitution of the company for the. battalion as the unit, whether of organisation, instruction,' or manceliVre. ' The Drill 'Book of 1896 had already made considerable progress in - this direction; that now before us emphasises and amplifies the ehange, andhrings out the all-important reason for a reform, the advantages' of which have been 'grasped in the German Army for sotheyeari • "The company front its size and organisation is the best school of instruction in all field duties, and in it both officers and non- counnissioned officers -will be trained to accept responsibility and to use initiative with judgment. It is the largest unit that can be 'directly controlled under fire by one, man, and is the west important link in the chain of co-operation in 'battle. The training of a company exerts an influence on the efficiency of infantry on service which it is impossible to overrate; it is to be carried out.by.its own officers and non-commissioned officers with- out undue interference on the. part of their superiors - and their Advancement in the service will depend upon their sucCess. The battalion commander is responsible that the company com- manders are thoroughly instructed, and he supervises, lnit should not lay down, the methods which they employ to train their com- panies."

In the company itself there is a large delegation' of anthority. It is divided into four sections, or eight squads, or sateen -groups, and each of them is led by a non-commissioned Officer or senior soldier, who may have at any. time to assume the full responsibility, for, his command. Exeltuling the three officers, no fewer than twenty-eight, men are thus exercised in the 'direction and, control of troops in the field.. Thus nit only ir the fullest fighting value. under fire obtained, but there is little fear that any force will, as happened so often in the 'earlier stages of the war, be paralysed for the loss of trained leaders. We would endorse more particularly the reminder . to:comia.ny coininankera as to the grave responsibilitY which rests With them, and no. less the snrely needed warning to the field.officer never to trespass on the proper sphere of action of his subordinates. It is repeated again and again that the company officers and non-cominissioned officers are not to be " mere passive eiecutants of definite orders ," they are have • "a free band and ample opportunities of exerciSing their men." . The battalion oxiimander '! does net lead in the field one unit. His" duty is to direct and supervise the action of eight inde- pendent companies."

The.training of the company is. to be in part theoretical, In part practical,rind• the practical part of the day's work is ".in all cases to be preceded by a short lecture to all ranks by the company commander on the exercises to be carried eut." The battalion commander at the end of the course, is to bola a thorough examination of each company in, turn, and -each examination is to last for a whole day. The syllabus of instruction at the end of the book is entirely of a practical-service nature, and deals only with the war duties of the soldier. In this respect it compares very favourably with the ridiculous Appen- dix B to the 1896 book, which contained a course to be given by the sergeants, and confined almost entirely to barrack and routine duties.

Part IV., which is devoted to "Infantry in Attack and Defence," embodies most of the excellent Part V. of the old boo. lc, and contains comparatively few additions or alterations. It lays down no new principles, but is more in keeping with the elementary parts of the book, a which it is the crown and complement.. Once more the vital importance of an active mind is emphasised "Constant practice of a stereotyped formation inevitably leads to want of elasticity, accustoms all ranks to work by rule rather than by the exercise of their wits, and cramps both initiative and intelligence.", The dangers of manceuvres are admirably brought out :— • ," In peace exercises, where blank cartridges take the place of bullets, the inherent and paralysing defects of a normal system may easily escape notice ; in war they betray themselves in waste of life and failure.", There is nothing new in all this,—it is the emphatic manner in which the truism is formulated that shows how imperfectly the principles already established in 1896. are considered by the Commander-in-Chief to have been assimilated by his Army. There is more condemnation of the Natal Campaign in the quiet .phrases of this staall book than in all the stirring passages in The ." Times" History of the War,—and, we must add, More hope of definite reform..

. It is when we come to the drill proper that the difference between the old system and the new is most evident. The old familiar figure of the drill-sergeant, with his rasping "As you were :" his patter of cautions, and his insistence upon word-perfection and quadrille-like exactitude of movements, is definitely. banished :— " A word-perfect knowledge of the drills is valueless unless it is combined with a facility in imparting that knowledge, and in rapidly detecting and correcting faults. It is to this that in- structers must be specially trained. Simultaneous action is on no nccount to be specially aimed at in the early drills—and the coin- Mend As you Were' is not to be given for the purpose of estab- lishing this. Perfection in the actions of each individual • soldier is the point to aim at ; when this is attained, uniformity follows of itself:"

Or again :— " Instructors should he encouraged, in giving the details of the different movements, to use their own words. So long as the instruction is clearly understoOd by the men, it is quite lin- nuttetial whether the phrading of :the menual is adhered to."

We fear that with the tradition -of centuries upon him, the drill-instruator will find his .new task a hard one. What will he think, for instance, of the eminently practical commands : "Line that hedge; scatter!" or, "Down George Street; quick march !"--both of them absolutely correct in the view of the new book ? 'But we have no fault to find with that book for attempting his conversion. When the victorious German Army returned in 1871, the drill-instructors are reported • to have told their men that, having done with fooling, they could now turn to a little real drill. Infantry Training, 1902, cOmei3 as a timely warning to our returning Army.

• Further points about the new book are the incorporation of the new rifle and firing exercises, with special sections on firing at moving objects, and snapshooting ; the reduction of the manual exercises to a minimum ; and the curtailment of the amount of ceremonial drill required from the bulk of regiments. At the same time, we regret the omission of the admirable tactical chapters of the old boak on advanced and rear guards and outposts, which were excellent reading in themselves and probably formed the best treatise on the subject that has ever been written in forty-two pages of duodecimo. A separate volume dealing with the tactics of all arms is in print, but this will be far less accessible to all ranks than a short chapter incorporated into the Drill Book itself.

We note that the formation now adopted for the infantry attack is that tried, we believe, for the first time at Elands- laagte, and used with success by Lord Roberts throughout his campaign. The men are to be in lines of skirmishers extended at "effective" range (for the rifle from fourteen hundred to six hundred yards) at from six to twenty paces interval, while reinforcements are to be continually sent for- ward until superiority of fire is attained at decisive ranges (under six hundred yards). We can hardly challenge the matured opinion of experienced soldiers, but we question whether against a determined and numerous enemy such a system of attack would succeed. It has at least been known to fail more than once even in South Africa. The disadvantages are obvious. Only the first line can fire at all, whilst all the lines in rear are simultaneously targets for the enemy's fire. With the flat trajectory of the modern rifle this is a serious matter, and as the tendency of all shooting is to be high, depth would appear to be more vulnerable than want of interval. We speak with deference, but are nevertheless inclined to hold that the days of the old line are not over. In South Africa Lord Roberts's frontal attacks were hardly ever more than demonstrations,—while the Boers recoiled before his turning movements. The British could not afford the heavy losses that a successful frontal attack has long been known to cost. Nor did the tactics of the Boer riflemen ever contemplate resisting such an attack to the end. In a European war, however, there must be a limit to indefinite flanking movements, and the victory will rest with the army that is able to succeed in a frontal attack, which on one part of the battlefield or another will sooner or later become inevitable, in a struggle for some point which outflanks and jeopardises the whole of one of the opposing forces We question whether the new formation would develop the vigour of the fire effect necessary to bring such an attack to a triumphant issue. Moreover, it overlooks the revolution wrought by smokeless powder. Increased rapidity and range of fire tell for the attack as much as for the defence. It is the invisibility of the defence that works the real change. Your enemy strikes you, and you cannot tell the spot from which his bullets are coming. To what purpose, then, is the employment of successive lines P The fire of the leading line, being mere guesswork, cannot shake the defence (witness Colen.so), and is therefore of no assistance in covering the advance of the supports.