LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
[Correspondents are requested to keep their letters as brief as is reasonably possible. Signed letters are given a preference over those bearing a pseudonym, and the latter must be accompanied by the name and address of the author, which will be treated as confidential.—Ed. THE SPECTATOR]
AS OTHERS SEE US
SIR,—I read with interest Mr. Lias's evidence, in last week's Spectator, that British prestige stands lower today in the Balkans than it has ever done. It confirms the remarkable article in your issue of July 28th over the signature of " Viator." That article was the fast thing I read when I arrived at Hull on July 31st from a month's tour in Latvia and Estonia ; I found it reproduced in full in the Yorkshire Post. I had been cut off from The Spectator itself for several weeks. But I felt that the Yorkshire Post was fully justified in giving such publicity to the article, because it coincided so largely with our own impressions, derived from conversations with business and professional people, who in those countries mostly speak either German or English.
The Baltic peoples look with suspicion on both the Germans and the Russians. They only achieved their independence by getting rid of both their oppressors. Last year I found that they definitely feared the Germans more than the Russians. This year the way in which the negotiations with Russia were handled had called out the latent fear of that country. It should not have been difficult (one would have thought) to forestall this alarm if from the first the British Government had taken them into its confidence. What they feared was being used as pawns by Great Powers making arrangements over their heads.
At bottom this state of affairs was due to the suspicion that the British Government is not attempting to create a Peace Front to uphold international order and to protect the weak, but merely playing power-politics in defence of " British interests." The events of last year have produced a deep- seated distrust among all these :mailer peoples who formerly were strong supporters of the League of Nations. Now they are all for neutrality, even though they admit that it is a gesture of despair.
The argument that was used time and again was as follows: How is it possible that a Government whose policy of " appeasement " resulted in the complete destruction of the friendly State of Czecho-Slovakia, is still in power? How can we believe that they are sincere ia their sudden adoption of a policy of resistance when they steadily refuse the co-opera- tion of men like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, who have always warned them against Hitler's real designs? The testimony of a particularly able business man who had been through all these lands was significant. In Poland, he said, he was astonished to find how eager they were for war, because only a war, and one that came quickly, could deliver them from the fate of Czecho-Slovakia, which they believed the forces of " appeasement " were preparing for them. A Warsaw paper spoke of the fog of " appeasement " which still hung about the Thames.
What makes all this so pathetic is the strong desire in all these countries for closer connexions with England. English is now the first language in the school; of Latvia and Estonia. But what help, they asked, is England prepared to give us either in its diplomacy or in its trade policy? Propaganda visits of German naval units to Riga and Tallinn during our visit served to bring out the dislike of the Letts and Estonians for German mentality and ambitions. But in each land there is a German minority longing to return to its old sovereignty, and Hitler's successive victories make it confident that he will repeat them. When the Germans pour scorn on the genuineness of the Peace Front, our friends begin to wonder whether they, too, are not to be numbered among those little countries far away, about whom Mr. Chamberlain knows nothing. If the would-be friends of order and peace are doubt- ful, the outspoken advocates of violence are comforted by the general atmosphere of distrust which the failure of the British Government to give a clear lead based on broad principles has created. Here lies Europe's danger.—Yours faithfully, SIR,—In your issue of July 28th you were kind enough to publish a communication from me. This was written before the development of the British-Japanese negotiations, the " affaire Wohltat-Hudson," and the speeches in and out of Parliament at the date of rising of the House of Commons. I have just returned from a several weeks' business trip in Northern Europe (where I was when the above events took place), and would like to give a few impressions.
In the first pace, the Northern European countries have an admirably sane and balanced outlook—neither prejudiced by preconceived theories, nor clouded by vague generalities. They realise that they have to adopt a cautious attitude towards their powerful neighbours, but they equally clearly understand that their survival depends on the ultimate victory of law and order and non-totalitarian principles. It is to victory, there- fore, that they look, and any suspicion of a compromise which, in effect, means reward of aggression or strengthening of the warlike systems fills them with alarm, because they are convinced that it only postpones and does not avoid an ultimate assault on the liberties of the still free world.
They quite soberly appreciate thc difficulties which the democratic Great Powers have—e.g., in the Far East—but they ruthlessly analyse the causes anti possible consequences, and are emphatic that the wrong reasons should not be advanced for this or that seeming surrender or tactical move. Thus, they point out that to justify Munich because it avoided a war is wrong : you can always avoid a war for the time being, provided a victim is available. If that is the true reason, then the anti-aggression front is meaningless ; if it is not, then why deceive oneself and others?
Or again, if, for instance, the " loss of face " in the Far East is a tactical move, and the aim is, ultimately, to inflict a much greater " loss of face " on the other side, whose methods and ideas are condemned—then well and good ; but let us our- selves clearly understand that the issue is not to avoid a decision, but to postpone it until it can be settled definitely in our favour.
Finally, in the politico-economic field, they are beginning to be convinced that the democracies are winning the war, and that the totalitarian Powers will suffer the consequences of their policies. This they desire earnestly, because they realise that a clear demonstration to the world that totalitarian theories spell defeat will be the strongest factor for peace and economic progress. The reasons for this optimistic view are not only the obvious military progress of the democracies, but also that in quality, deliveries and price in the trade field Germany is losing ground to Great Britain. Therefore, they cannot under- stand why, with victory coming within our grasp, we should entertain any ideas of compromise Of be willing to initiate any " settlement " schemes.
The main lesson, I feel, which one learns is that in these countries the defeat of the totalitarian principles is regarded as the main issue today, based on the conviction that only on this condition will the smaller nations be able to live, and that, inasmuch as nothing succeeds like success, a clear defeat of the totalitarian principles will not only rally many new forces to the freer nations, but will show the other side to be much weaker in morale—as well as in material resources—than it is
wont to be credited with.—Yours faithfully, VIATOR.
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