THE NAVY AND NATIONAL SERVICE.

[To 71111 EDIT= 011' rims " 9rxerAroa.") SIR,—In your article on " Compulsory Training" in the Spectator of March 13th you refer at some length to the

views which I expressed in the House of Commons in the debate on the Army Estimates. You are far too courteous to suggest, as some other advocates of compulsory service have done, that those who disagree with you are

indifferent to the welfare of their country. It is common ground with us that we wish our country to be not only safe but strong.

My objections to a compulsorily trained home defence army are twofold,—first, that we need very few soldiers for home defence ; and secondly, that even if a large home defence army were needed, it would be unjust to raise it by the method of compulsion.

Let me deal with the second point first. Your argument is

that it is the supreme duty of every man to defend his own country. I agree ; and one of my principal objections to compulsory service is that it relieves the greater part of the manhood of the kingdom from this duty. As one who has passed the age for compulsory service, I object to being, thus divested of my duty. A monetary contribution is the only contribution which I can make to my country's defence, and I do not wish to avoid it by asking Parliament to compel a number of boys to serve for me against their will.

Even in Germany less than half the men who attain the

military age are called up, and in this country it is proposed by the National Service League to ask for a much smaller percentage. As applied to these schemes of military com- pulsion, the phrase "universal service" is so deceptive as to be almost fraudulent. The only service which is really universal is the payment of taxes. And not only is that service universal, but it is also just, or can be made so. Our system of taxation can be so arranged as to impose an approxi- mately equal sacrifice upon all persona, whereas military service, which is hateful to some men, is enjoyed by others. Nobody enjoys paying taxes, but a good many young fellows join the Territorials for the amusement of parading through the streets in uniform, or for the pleasure of obtaining a fortnight's holiday in camp at other people's expense.

If we want a million men in arms for home defence, as you seem to think, the only fair way to get them is to go into the market and offer to pay for their services such a price as will induce them to come forward voluntarily. The sacrifice which national defence involves is then distributed by means of taxation over all the citizens of the country, instead of being borne by a small minority. In military service, as in industrial service, taxation with all its evils is preferable to the cruel injustice of corvge.

The assumption that nobody can serve his country except by actually fighting or learning to fight will not bear examination. It would be impossible to maintain our armies in the field unless the greater part of the male population continued to earn money in civilian occupations. The men who are thus working in counting-house, in factory, or in workshop are as essential to national defence as the men actually in the field. This union of forces, without which the nation would collapse, is best secured by free exchange between those who prefer a civilian life, with its financial liabilities towards the Army, and those who prefer a military life, with its financial compensations from civilian resources.

To pass to our other point of difference, I deny that we require any considerable army for home defence. Even when our military establishments in this country were at their lowest ebb, they were sufficient to repel a large invading force. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 8th, 1906, Mr. Haldane said: "On the hypothesis of the worst possible moment of our military position, and on the calculation of Lord Roberts accepted by other military critics, it would not be possible to attempt an invasion of our island with less than seventy thousand men." That is the military view. The naval view is that no fleet of transports sufficient to convey an invading force of this magnitude can possibly evade our fleets. Thus between the two we are safe. If the enemy sends less than seventy thousand men, or thereabouts, the Army will dispose of them ; if he sends as many FIR seventy thousand men, the Navy will take care that they do nof

land.

In spite of these expressions of opinion, I will assume, if you like, that at the present moment we are not safe against invasion, and the deduction I 'draw is that it is our imperative duty to increase our naval strength until we are safe. You urge the importance of economy. It is just for that reason that I prefer to spend money on ships and sailors rather than on soldiers. Few people realise how extremely cheap the Navy is. In reply to a question in the House of Commons on March 31st, 1908, I obtained from the Admiralty the following estimate of the annual cost of maintaining certain types of vessels with their crews :-

"The annual coat in full commission of the under-mentioned classes of vessels, taking interest at 3 per cent., and allowing for interest, depreciation of capital, wages of officers and crew, and a proportionate charge for pensions, repairs, and renewals, and other necessary items, and also assuming a life of twenty years in the case of the battleships and ten years in the case of the torpedo- boat destroyers and first-class torpedo-boats respectively, is as follows :—First-class battleship, £231,500; torpedo-boat destroyer, £17,500; first-class torpedo-boat, 46,100."

The National Service League estimates that the cost of carrying out its scheme of compulsory training would be £4,000,000 a year. If, instead of spending that money every year on half-trained boys, we spent it on well-equipped ships and fully trained bluejackets and marines, we should be able to maintain an additional fleet of ten first-class battleships, fifty torpedo-boat destroyers, and a hundred and thirty-three first-class torpedo-boats.

This new fleet would not only by itself suffice to make our coasts secure against invasion, unless we had lost the command of the sea, but it would be an appreciable factor in determining our sea supremacy. Moreover, it would provide a protection to our commerce which no land force could possibly afford. You speak lightly of our losing the command of the sea for a week. I do not think you realise the enormous damage which the enemy could do in one week to the trade of our East Coast ports without landing a single soldier.

My last and most serious point is that your article justifies the fear which I expressed in the House of Commons that if the electors of this country are told to look to land forces for safety, they will begin to neglect the Navy, and that will he the end of the British Empire. You, indeed, more than

justify this warning, for you actually argue that it is an evil thing from the moral point of view to "give ourselves absolute security by spending sufficient money on sea power." This can only mean that, in your judgment, we ought to neglect the Navy so that our nerves may be constantly kept on the rack with the fear of an invasion. This seems to me an altogether false view of morals. It is exactly the view of the mediaeval monk who sought holiness by wearing a hair shirt. Instead of regarding security against invasion as a bad thing, I regard it as the greatest boon that this country can desire, for though we may be, in the Elizabethan phrase which you quote, "drowned in security," yet as long as we remain an Imperial and in industrial race there will never be any lack of inspiratien to 'high endeavour or of opportunity for humble

We need not restate our reasons for not agreeing with Mr. Cox. They are already well known to our readers. We can assure him, however, that we did not "speak lightly of our losing the command of the sea for a week." We regard such a temporary loss with the greatest anxiety. Unfortunately, however, owing to physical conditions which are largely out- side our control, that is a possibility which we are bound to consider. We want to feel that even if this tremendous evil occurred we should not be forced to yield to the first shipload of foreign soldiers which reached our shores. In our opinion, universal training will not necessitate neglect of the Navy, and will assure that in the future every youth—we would make the training as universal as in Switzerland, which is the model we desire to follow—shall acquire the knowledge of how to defend his country and his home. With the supposed inalienable right of the subject not to fight for his country we confess ourselves to be wholly out of eympathy.—En. Spectator.]