BOOKS.
GONIMECOURT..
ONE of the most heroic, though one of the most disappointing, episodes of the first day of the battle of the SO1 lllll o on July lst, 1910, was the attack delivered by troops from General Allenby's Army on Gomrnecourt. Sir Douglas Haig stated in his despatch of December 29th last that this operation on the extreme loft or northern flank of the battle was "a subsidiary attack," that it " forced its way into the enemy's positions, but there met with such vigorous opposition that as soon as it was considered that the attack had fulfilled its object our troops were withdrawn." At the time, of course, we only know that Gommecourt was an extremely strong position, a salient on a hill rising steeply front the Ancre Valley, and that our troops by a miracle of bravery got into the heart of the place, the Kern Redoubt, but could not hold it. The Commander-in-Chiefs statement put a somewhat different com- plexion on the matter, in suggesting that the attack was a elemen• stration, perhaps event a " forlorn hope " in the old military souse of a term familiar in the Peninsular sieges, rather than a resolute effort to take the position at all costs. It is highly interesting to find in the new issue of the Royal United Service I»stitution's Journal the German official account of Gonunecourt, in the ahapeof the "War Diary" of the 55th Prussian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division, for the eight days from June 24th to July 1st, 1916, with the remarks of the divisional commander, Freiherr von Sesskind, and several trench-maps illustrating the effect of our bombardment and the course of tho attack. NN'e are not told how this document was obtained, but it was obviously not intended for Allied eyes, as it does justice, on the whole, to the skill and courage of the attackers and reveals the enemy's sense of keen relief at having been able to hold Gommecourt.
The diary begins with notes on the intense bombardment which began on June 24th and continued till the morning of the battle. The enemy expected an attack on June 27th, but on June 30th began to have doubt. net to the imminence of danger. Our guns and trench-mortars played havoc with the onmny's treacles, but did not cause many casualties. The men of the 55th must have kept very close in their dug-outs all the week, for they only Mit six killed and forty-four wounded. The trench-map marking in rod the trenches that were wholly or partly destroyed does credit to our artillery. Kern Redoubt was knocked to pieces, only one dug-out remaining habitable ; the northern sector of the defences, opposite Fonquovillers, was shattered as far back as the third lino, and the most southerly sector, north-east of Hobuterne, had " all trenches and wire completely open to assault." The hurricane fire of July lot swept away all the wire, fifty metres wide, along the southern sector, and the " heavies " wrecked the dug-outs twenty feet below the surface. When the attack began on them, at 6.30 a.m., the enemy in the northern sector offered a strenuous resistance in the trenches that still remained practicable, and our men did not, according to the diary, effect a lodgment in the front lino. But in the southern sector, the final bombardment cleared the enemy out of their front trenches, especially by accurate enfilade fire from the north, and our troops by 7.30 a.m. had overrun two sectors and " pushed forward between Sad Trench and Roth Trench beyond Gommecourt Cemetery as far as the beginning of the let Guard line and the Kern Redoubt." Two enemy platoons were cut off in their dug-outs by the rapid advance, and thirty-six of these nose afterwards recorded as missing. Our men dug themselves in a hundred yards from the Kern Redoubt, brought up two machine-guns, and " offered a strenuous resistance." The enemy brought up their third battalion, which was in reserve, and called on the 170th Regiment in the adjacent sector for help; but not until 10.45 p.m., " after a hard struggle," did they succeed in recovering their lost trenches, front which General Allenby had withdrawn his men. " It must be acknowledged," says the diary, " that the equipment and preparation of the English attack were magnificent. The . assaulting troops were amply provided with numerous machine-guns, Lewis guns, trench-mortars, and storming ladders. The officers were provided with excellent maps which showed every German trench eyntematically named and gave every detail of our positions. The sketches had been brought up to date with all our latest work, and the sisters of attack were shown on a very large scale." Again, " the infantry assault was perceived only when the enfilade fire on the trench was lifted beyond the pan•ados, and simultaneously the English bombers appeared on the parapet." The diary states that the • P.spott on the Defenee of Contmecourt an July Mr 1st, 1914. Jourual of Chi Chafed 8wvite .fssfnatiou for August, 1910. 100.1 enemy captured 16 officers and 251 mon, but two-thirds of these seem to have been wounded, as a note to the medical report refers to 137 -English wounded who were treated at Coureellea. The 55th Regiment, with a total strength of about 2,000 in its twelve companies and a pioneer company, had 397 casual) it's in the course of the day, awl the reinforcing troops lost 194 men beside, "Though our looses are regrettable," the diary notes, "they mutt Ito regarded as small when one coneiders the severity of the fighting." The enemy, of coarse, had every advantage of position, and could stay in his dug-outs on the hilltop till the last moment, while our men had to climb up under heavy fire from batteries which con-mutinied every foot of the ascent.
The experience gained on the Somme, and put to the test at View, at Simonton, at Hill 70, and elsewhere, has, of course, clown up the tactical faults that accounted fur this cheek at 001111110e0Ert. 0E0 was, doubtless, the choice of too narrow a front, for only the attack on the southern sector, about half.a.teile in width, wee pressed home. Another was the incompleteness of our barrage fire. General von Sestkind in his critical notes remarked 0 at " t'ne replenishment of ammunition and grenades took place, even on July 1st, without interruption":— "Taking advantage of the feet that daring the morning the enemy's batteries paid little attention to the ground in the rem, the ropleniehrnent of ammunition was begun as early as 10.30 a.m.. and in spite of being in full view, wan carried out without casualties mid in accordance with the prearranged plan. Not ono of the batteries of all the different calibre. ran the least danger of exhausting its ammunition supply."
That in itself goes far to explain why we did not take Gommecourt. At Vimy and Nleseinea the enemy batteries were o:nothercd by our heavy, sustained, and accurate gunfire and could not support their infantry, but at Conunecourt our gunnelrn hail not yet developed their counter-battery work to such a pitch of excellence. Tho enemy commander testified to the fact that our aeroplanes " had a most disturbing effect during the preparatory period as well as during the actual attack," and described how they directed or warned the attacking troops and " in one case attacked with flOchettes the reserves conning up from the fourth lino trench." Nowadays our airmen are far more numerous and make a practice of using their machine-gum, which aro much, more effective than darts. In fact, the art of war hes developed so rapidly since the battle of the Somme began that the tactical references in this detailed account of Gonuneeourt from the enemy's side already went antiquated. The splinter-proof concrete sentry-posts which, the commander suggested in his report are tho " pill-boxes " now commonly seed by the enemy in Flandere, and tine dug-outs jointed by underground galleries that ho reconunended have chhco given the Allies trouble, especially at Thniipval and on the Ain= front. But the German regimental diary io none the lees worth studying, na an undceigned tribute to General Allenby's bravo mon, who, with a little more luck amd a little more support, would have done am well as General Rawlitmou'o men further south at Montauban, on that terrible First of July.
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