25 MARCH 1922, Page 4

THE COURSE OF THE CRISIS AND TWO WARNINGS.

%AT E have given our reasons for believing that . the Unionist Party is not going to let itself be tricked into supporting Mr. Lloyd George's demand that, though he will not become a Unionist, the Unionists must render him the kind of passive obedience which they would.never dream of rendering to a member of their own Party. The Unionist Party has never been a servile Party. Therefore we are satisfied that the ultimate develop- ments of the resignation crisis will be favourable, and will not result in " come-to-heel " triumph for the Emeritus, or rather Demeritus, Premier—for that is what he is fast becoming in the opinion of the rank and file Unionists in the constitueneies. There are only two things which can, we believe, seriously interfere with the development of events in the direction that will lead to the ultimate unification of the Unionist Party on sound, constitutional and democratic lines. The first of these would be a breach between the two sections of the Unionist Party, such as would almost certainly occur if the House of Lords insisted upon a drastic amendment of the Irish Bill. This would enable, nay, would compel, the warring factions in Southern Ireland to repudiate the Treaty and so bring about a Dissolution, in the course of which the false cry would be raised of " Shall we break our faith to Ireland ? "

We fully admit that the Treaty was inspired by panic and bad policy rather than by good policy, and that the negotia- tions were as ill-conducted as the rest of Mr. Lloyd George's dealings with Ireland. Since, however, we were foolish enough to make Mr. Lloyd George our guide through the Irish bogs, we shall get into worse trouble if we now repudiate his ill-drawn Treaty and abandon the line of retreat he has marked out for us. The Irish imbroglio is bad enough without our making it worse by giving the Irish an excuse for saying that we have betrayed them. We sincerely hope that the experiment of founding a Dominion in the South of Ireland will not break down, though we confess that it is a hope based upon no very firm foundations. If, however, our fears prove justified, it is essential that the breakdown should be seen to come from the nature of the Sinn Fein policy and methods, and that it should not be possible to lay the blame, as the blame of so many failures in Ireland has been laid, upon the innocent shoulders of the English. The history of Ireland might almost be described as a continual shifting of responsibility from the place to which it belongs to the place where it does not. We have become pledged, unwisely as we think, to let the Sinn Feiners try what they can do under a system of autonomy so complete that the constitution of the Southern Free State will be a republic in everything but in name. If a miracle happens, that experiment may be successful. If the experiment succeeds, we shall all rejoice. If, however, it does not succeed, the cause must be made clear to the whole English- speaking world. But we have gone too far to go back by the old road. We must give the new short cut an honest trial.

The other point about which we are anxious is that the Centre Section of the Unionists should not, in their very proper determination to make themselves a homogeneous, united, democratic party with cer- tain very definite aims and objects, cause misunder- standing among those whom we may call the rank and file of the Coalitionist Liberals. As things are, there is a distinct danger that a large number of men who were once Liberals may imagine that their aid and support will not in the future be welcomed by the Unionists. These men detest the policy of the Independent Liberals, and are at heart Constitutionalists and anti-Socialists. Further, they are determined to resist the claim of the members of Trade Unions to be accorded a position of privilege in the Constitution. They are, however, bewildered by names. They are inclined to think that the differences between themselves and the Unionists are much greater and much harder to surmount than they really are. Yet in truth no sane Unionist, as we can testify, wishes for a moment to exclude allies so valuable. On the con- trary, not only are the gates of the Unionist. Party always open to honest recruits, but the Unionists are quite willing to make their entry into the Party as easy and as honour- able as possible. Naturally, the Unionists cannot allow any dilution of their own principles in order to secure the Liberal Coalitionists. But, as a matter of fact, no such dilution has ever been demanded, or could be demanded, by the better part of the Liberal Coalitionists. For they are not less but rather more anti-Socialistically inclined than a large number of the Unionists. Again, they are very often not less, but distinctly more constitu- tional, and so more conservative in their general outlook. The notion, fostered by Mr. Lloyd George. that the National Liberals are persons who are making great sacrifices - of principles in order to support him in the Coalition is a pure delusion. If there has been any- thing in the nature of conflict between the two halves of the Coalition it has been a kind of stage combat between the chiefs. Among the rank and file there has not been even a pretended scuffle.

What we have said can be illustrated by a concrete example. Does anyone suppose that Sir Alfred Mond is at heart an ardent supporter of anti-capitalist legisla- tion such as a capital levy, and that he is with diffi- culty restrained from making an affiance with the Labour Party for the purpose of revising the Constitu- tion on Communist lines ? Can he be represented as a man who has to make considerable sacrifices in order to act with a haughty aristocrat and friend of privilege and despotism such as Lord Hugh Cecil or Mr. Rupert Gwynne ? There is, in truth, no difference of principles or policy between the bulk of National Liberals and the Unionists. Hitherto their gradual fusion has been prevented by the determination of Mr. Lloyd George to keep a private Party of his own in the House of Commons, and also by the not unnatural desire of the National Liberal leaders to get the very favourable Cabinet terms which they have secured by insisting that they are a separate political Party. The facts with which we are dealing are not very clearly known to- the rank and file of the National Liberals. They are a little confused, and inclined to be aggrieved when they think that the Unionist leaders, like Sir George Younger, arc in effect saying to them, " We don't want you. We would rather be without you." That, of course, is not in the least the attitude of Sir George Younger, or, indeed, of anybody in the Unionist Party. All the same, the misunderstanding we have described may be worked upon by interested persons and great harm may be done. Wt should like to see some representative of Central Unionism, preferably Sir George Younger, make the position clear. He should tell the National Liberals in plain terms that they would be most welcome in the Unionist Party, and that a place would always be found for them. It would not be a place of privilege, but it would be a place of honour and one which they could accept without the slightest lack of self-respect. They would come in, that is, on exactly equal terms with the existing Unionists in support of sound and uncorrupt government. They would soon find that they could win in the Unionist Party all the prestige and all the power to which their abilities will entitle them. No doubt the National Liberals would have to make certain sacrifices. Sacrifices are inevitable after a break-up such as that which rent asunder the Liberal Party. When Mr. Lloyd George wrecked the Liberal Party in December, 1916, he did not do the work by halves.

We have had enough of shams and make-believe in our system of government. We now want homogeneous parties and clear issues. It is the business of the Unionist Party to take the lead. They must insist upon party homogeneity and devotion to fixed principles, but at the same time they must be as wide-minded and as compre- hensive as possible in the matter of personnel. Once more, they must not be content with the fact that this is what is in their hearts, as we are perfectly certain it is. They must proclaim it to the world.