THE NEED FOR SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST.
IParis on Wednesday the Conference was opened at 1 which everyone hopes the problems of the Near East will at last be solved. One might say without exaggera- tion that it is a case of now or never. The long and entirely unnecessary delay has shown us how many and poillonous diseases develop in the climate of doubt. To go on delaying might well be to turn dangers into realities, and to infect the Allies with mortal illness. The delay in settling with the Turks unsettled France and caused _her to go behind our backs in making the secret Treaty of Angora with the powerful Turkish rebels who are the real rulers of Turkey ; it has stiffened the spirit of the Turks themselves ; it has encouraged Italy to believe, what she would not otherwise have believed, that her most profitable policy lies in helping the Turks ; and it has greatly aggravated the spurious Caliphate agitation in India. It has done damage all along the line. And what an irony it all is ! Immediately after the War the Turks were in an unusually sober frame of mind, and would have. accepted whatever terms the Allies had thought it right and just co impose. But it was not only delay that 'brought us into the present mess. There have been sins of commission as well as of omission. The chief of these was the extraordinary and mysterious decision of Mr. Lloyd George to put the interests of the Allies as it were in the keeping of the Greeks. It has been said that when he took this decision the Italian delegates were temporarily absent from the Conference. Anyhow, the decision to back up the Greeks and to encourage them, not only to possess themselves of Smyrna but to challenge the Kemalist Government at Angora, accounts for the chagrin of the Italians, which has expressed itself in liberally helping the Turks with munitions of war. We have few points of agreement with Mr. Montagu, but we are bound to say that in his recent speech at Cambridge he touched upon a matter that urgently needs explanation when he asked what was the motive which led Mr. Lloyd George to commit himself to this great political gamble. Who was it who inspired or instigated Mr. Lloyd George ? Mr. Montagu hinted at a transaction which must some day be -revealed. We -should be greatly obliged to anyone who could clear up the mystery. It must now be frankly admitted that in a large sense we have become the victims of evdnts. The Treaty of Sevres in its original form • cannot stand, if only for the reason that it has been _torpedoed by the Angora Treaty. It is necessary, there- fore, to make certain concessions- to the Turks, which must be very unpalatable to a great many Englishmen . who have a strong belief in the old tradition that the -Turks should not be allowed to return to any territory of which they have been dispossessed.
But what are the concessions to be ? The Turkish mission which has just visited Britain, strongly encouraged, of course, by the recent unfortunate manifesto by the Government of India, has demanded the restoration of all Thrace and of Smyrna and the evacuation of Constanti- nople. The claim is being supported by some British Socialists and Radicals, in whose mouths this political programme seems new and strange. All Socialists and Radicals used to be Philhellene and anti-Turk, and their change of policy may be attributed partly to their . temperamental habit of resisting the foreign policy of the Government and partly to the impression which has been made upon them by the evidence that certain Greeks in Smyrna have been guilty of that very sort of atrocity which they have for generations charged against the Turks.
The particular argument used by those who want to restore to Turkey far more than seems to us necessary is that Mr. Lloyd George promised not to deprive Turkey of either Thrace or Asia Minor. Mr. Lloyd George's statement on this subject is referred to as an unqualified pledge to Turkey, the violation of which would bring eternal disgrace upon the British Empire. But let us look into the facts. In January, 1918, some ten months before the War ended, Mr. Lloyd George, in the hope of weakening the affiance between Turkey and Germany, stated that the Turks had no real interest in going on fighting, as it was not the intention of the Allies to deprive them of their capital or of " the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." "-We do not challenge," he went on, " the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homeland of the Turkish race with its capital in Constantinople." - He then added that the Straits must be neutralized and that the separate nationality of Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine must be recognized. - What happened next ? The Turks did not accept the invitation. They went on fighting, and remained in the War to the end. To argue now that an offer, however " &Ili," made to belligerents and not accepted by them -is an unqualified pledge_ applying to the post-War period seems to us to be so ingenuous .(or perhaps disingenuous) that it does not reflect very much credit on those who make use of it. The 'term " homeland " in connexion with the Turks in Thrace and Asia Minor is one of those unhappy phrases which prove Mr. Lloyd George to -be a very slack student of history.. The Christian Byzantine Empire existed for a thousand years. It is true that for half a century or more before its fall in 1453 Constantinople was more or less isolated. But the Turks did not appear in any part of Europe till the middle of the fourteenth century. Many of the mosques in which they have worshipped for nearly 500 years had been the sites, if not the aetnal places, of Christian worship for a much longer period. " Homeland " was indeed a badly chosen word to describe the Turkish title to possession. -The real title was conquest, justified by no moral principle except that Mohammedanism is a religion of the sword. The title deeds were secured by means of persecutions and massacres unmatched in the history of any other nation which has remained in close contact with high states of civilization.
As regards Thrace, then, we would say that there is no sufficient reason for agreeing to the Turkish demand. It ought to be refused. Thrace should remain non-Turkish in accordance with the Treaty of Sevres. As for Con- stantinople, we have no strong prejudices. We shall be quite content to see the Turks allowed to carry on their Government there in a manner which would be satis- factory to them, provided that the freedom of the Straits is absolutely secured. The neutrality of the Straits is essential. If, as the result of the new settlement, the Government of Constantinople makes formal peace with the Kemalist Government, so much the better. It would be an advantage in all future negotiations to. have to deal with only one Turkish Government instead of with two.
We now pass to Asia Minor. Spring has come, and the Kemalists at Angora are reported to be preparing to take the offensive against the Greeks. The Greek officers, we believe, have not-been paid for 'some time ; and the Greeks are less likely to produce an efficient military machine this year than they were last year. As they failed in their first attempt to beat the Kemalists, 'they are very unlikely to succeed in the second. The probability is that the disheartened Greek army would be swept into the sea. Nobody, wants this sort of tragedy to happen, for in one sense we are all Philhellenes, though we are not Tinophils. It ought to be arranged as quickly as possible—within the next fort- night let us hope—that the Greeks shall evacuate Smyrna. What is to happen to Smyrna then In our opinion it ought to revert to Turkey, but only in a formal sense. We mean that, while Turkey will have every opportunity of making use of the riches and resources of Smyrna, there ought to be the most rigid and constant provision for the safety of the Greek and other non-Turkish popula- tion of the province. The best plan might be to Lebanonize Smyrna. Armenia ought to be made autono- mous, as provided in the Treaty of Sevres. There is no reason for preserving in Armenia so close a connexion with Turkey as is necessary in Smyrna. We must not forget the Christians in Northern Syria who were abandoned to their fate when France, ignoring her mandate, con- tracted her frontier. Of course, there were material reasons why the French could not or would not carry on. They were continually being 'harassed by the Turks, and the drain upon French lives and upon the French taxpayer was heavy and incessant. Moreover, when we complain that the French made their manoeuvre without consulting their Allies, we have unfortunately to remember that the French can bring a similar charge against us in connexion with the Greek enterprise in Smyrna. At first, of course, it will appear that there is a wide gulf between what the Turks demand and the concessions which the Allies might reasonably make. We would suggest that a factor which has been useful on countless occasions in _dealing with the Turks should be introduced —that is to say, the money factor. The Turks are more than ever in want of money. The railways in Asia Minor, if they are not soon attended to, will rot away ; yet the prosperity of trade in Asia Minor depends upon them. Why should not a loan of reasonable amount be made to the Turks ? If the money were properly applied the -- Allies would more than recoup themselves out of the • resulting revival of trade. It may be said that the Turks cannot be trusted to use money for the .purposes for which it was allotted. But, fortunately, there is always in Turkey the Administration of the Ottoman Debt. In form this institution is Turkish, and no offence could be given to the Turks by insisting that money lent to -Turkey should be handled by -it: -The officers of-the Administration are not only Western Europeans, but are highly trained and highly experienced managers of finance. We need Only "meaiticiii Sir Adam Block, who for so many years has performed the feat of doing his whole duty to his own country while being a really wise guide and friend to the Turks.
If British people cannot any longer consent to be the stalking-horse for the Greeks, equally they will not consent • to be dictated to by Indian Moslems: The only safe rule for a Government which presides over so many races and so many creeds as have been brought together in the British Empire is to do what it thinks is right and just. This has always been the rule, as it is the secret, of the Empire. We shall change it at our peril. If the Govern- ment ever takes the wishes of a section for its political motto the Empire will begin to fall to pieces. As we have said, the Caliphate demaAds in India are spurious. After the sixteenth century even the Ottoman Turks themselves in Europe never troubled about the Caliphate—perhaps they hardly knew of it—until the prerogative was revived by Abdul Hamid barely forty years ago. There are few more pitiful experiences in political life than to watch politicians implanting ideas in the minds of Indians, who of their own accord would never have given a thought to them, and then to hear these same politicians citing the Indian reaction to the incitement as evidence of first- rate importance. The highest degree of absurdity has not yet been reached, but if anybody wants to reach it we can give him a hint. Let him remind the Indian Moslems that for many years while the Moors were in Spain Cordova was the Western seat of the Caliphate. It might be quite useful if the Indian Moslems would lay claim to Cordova— or perhaps to all Spain, if any champion of the cause could be found foolish enough—and see what happens. At least the situation would be an illuminating comment upon the politician's practice of encouraging perilous arguments. because they happen to be convenient to him at the moment.
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