TOPICS. OF THE DAY.
AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE.
WE are delighted to see that the Morning Poet, in a leading article published in its issue of Mon- day, has had the courage and good sense to advocate what we have for several years desired, namely, that the entente with France should be developed into a definite alliance. We have little doubt that the first inclination of the great majority of those who read these words will be to " shy" at them. They will say that the entente already commits us quite sufficiently, that our intentions towards France are perfectly sound and honourable, and that it would be the greatest mistake to tie ourselves too tightly to any foreign Power, and thus get entangled in policies and schemes which might not concern us. Much as there seems to be in this view at first eight, and much as we are in the abstract inclined to agree with the principle that this country should maintain its freedom of action, we venture to say that it can be shown conclusively that a formal alliance based on a properly drawn treaty would be far safer and far less entangling, and, therefore, would leave this country far more real freedom, than the present vague understanding with our neighbour.
To realize this one must ask on what the entente is based. It is not based on sentiment. It is based on com- mon sense, and so on necessity. We cannot allow France to be overwhelmed by Germany. There is the essential fact. If Germany were to make war on France, and were by any chance to be successful in that war, France as a Power would, for the next fifty years at any rate, be wiped off the map of Europe. Mark, we do not say that Germany could certainly destroy France, even if France had to" fight a lone hand." We have too much respect for the French Army and the splendid spirit of the French people to assume such a result as inevitable. Still the facts that Germany now possesses, so far as France is concerned, the command of the seas that the numbers of her army and of her population now greatly exceed those of France, and finally that Italy, instead of being, as she was in 1870, inclined to be friendly with France, has become a satellite, even if not a very willing satellite, of Germany oblige us to face the possibility of the destruction of France.
But if France were overwhelmed, and the balance of power on the Continent destroyed, the situation for this country would be intolerable. It is impossible for any one possessed of the slightest degree of political imagination to contemplate a victorious Germany, a Germany gorged with new territories at home and abroad, with a triumphant army and in possession of the whole French fleet, without the utmost alarm. To say that Germany would be the dictator of Europe is not a piece of cheap rhetoric, but a deadly reality. Our turn must come next. Considering the history of the last ten years, it is certain that we should be forced either to become one of the satellites of Germany or else to fight out the question of the command of the sea, not in conjunction with the navy and army of France, but with our backs to the wall, in isola- tion and in peril. We do not say that even then we should be defeated, but it is obviously bad business to run risks so i great when they are unnecessary. To put it plainly, even if we were the most heartless and cynical Power m the world, and cared nothing for the freedom and independence of other nations, we dare not let France go under. If France, then, becomes involved in a war with Germany, we must stand by her side, as was realized so clearly by the present Government last August, and would have been realized by the people as a whole the moment the matter was explained to them by any competent authority. The plain meaning of all this is that, whether we have an alliance with France or not, we are face to face with the consequences of a defensive alliance of the most rigorous kind. At present we have all the disadvantages of a strict alliance and none of its advantages. We are obliged from motives of self-preservation to follow France wherever she may lead us, and we have no explicit right to consult with France in regard to the conduct of her foreign policy or to take joint measures with her for the preservation of the peace. As things now stand a hotheaded or foolish Prime Minister—a Prime Minister like M Cantu; whose true nature had not been found out by the French people—might easily commit us to war. But under a properly drawn alliance, following, for example, the linos of our alliance with Japan, we should be to a great extent freed from this danger. Remember in the first place that the alliance would not be an aggressive alliance, but an alliance the whole object of which would be to keep the peace. That would be its essential principle. Its most important practical clause would be to bind either Power to consult the other on all matters of foreign policy involving issues of peace and war. Thus in order to obtain the benefits of the alliance neither Power could move without the fullest consultation. Each Power would possess the right of representing the cause of peace in the councils of the other. The entangle- ments would all be on the side of peace and against war. Both would have a mediator at hand to prevent war arising on some punctilio of national honour or for some of those reasons which, whether in private or in public life, seem before they are calmly discussed with a friend so much more important than they really are. Provision in both cases would be made against what the French used to call a guerre des gleetione, that is, against a panic war —a war undertaken because a nation has become seized with a notion that war is inevitable, and that it is better to get it over as quickly as possible. The need for consultation with an ally gives time for matters to cool and prevents the sudden blow struck in heat.
We have naturally looked at the matter from our point of view, but all the arguments we have used apply equally well to the French. They realize that if we were to get into a quarrel with Germany, whatever its merits at the outset, they must stand by us lest we should first be overwhelmed and they should then be left alone to face a triumphant Germany. They would no doubt feel far safer if they had to be consulted before an outbreak of war. Though here we may leave to ridicule, and rightly leave to ridicule, the preposterous notion of our making a sudden attack upon the German fleet, a certain number of French people prob- ably believe in the possibility. They would feel protected from any such event if we were bound to consult them first and to take no step without their agreement. The friends of peace in this country, if they only knew their own business, should certainly be in favour of an alliance rather than an entente, for an alliance provides the only effective drag against a nation being carried away by a, gust of passion. The maxim, " Now or never "—a, maxim which in the past has hurried so many Powers into war—cannot be acted on by a Power which has an equal ally. By the time the necessary consultations have taken place, war on that principle has ceased to be a possibility. For these reasons a really aggressive State will never bind itself by an alliance with an equal, though it may be willing enough to have satellites which must follow its lead. An aggressive Power must be able to act swiftly and fall like a thunderbolt upon the Power against which it has hostile designs. Bismarck could not have sent the Ems telegram and produced a sudden war if he had had an ally who must have been con- sulted before he acted.
Possibly it will be said in this country that one of the dangers of an alliance would be that under it we might. be forced to alter our military system. The French, it is urged, might, if a formal alliance existed, demand that we should very greatly increase our military force and indeed, adopt something in the nature of universal service. That, we venture to say, is an entire delusion. It rests upon a misunderstanding. An alliance such as we desire to see substituted for the informal entente would say nothing as to the military or naval force of either nation and would bind neither Power in the matter of its preparations. Very possibly French War Ministers would like to see our military forces increased, but they would soon find that any demand of that kind had better not be contemplated. It might so easily be met by the counter- demand on our part for a great increase in the French Fleet—an increase which the French might very properly consider inexpedient, or, indeed, impossible in view of the financial burden of their army. Just as we could not presume to interfere with the French naval force and dictate to them how many battleships they should build and maintain, so they could not presume to ask us to alter our military system. Each Power would contribute to the conduct of the war the resources which it has de- veloped in accordance with its own traditions. Our con- tribution to the common fund for the preservation of peace would be the command of the sea plus a relatively small but very highly efficient and well-organized expeditionary force. France would bring her magnificent army and her fleet, which if; like our expeditionary force, relatively small might nevertheless be of very great assistance in maintaining the command of the sea and securing free- dom from attack for the French coasts and colonies. In other words, nothing would be said in the treaty of alliance which would bind either Power to maintain any quota of men or of ships. Let us say once more that the essential character of the alliance would be pacific. It would be an alliance for pre- serving peace and maintaining the status quo, which is nearly the same thing as the balance of power. If either Power chose to be so mad as to engage in an aggressive war the alliance would ipso facto be dissolved. If, however, either Power wore attacked and in danger of being overwhelmed, the other party to the alliance would come to its assistance with all its resources by land and sea, and would be obliged to prosecute the war with vigour. It would be an alliance for peace and an alliance for defence, but never for aggres- sion. Finally, those objects would be secured by the clause under which both Powers would be bound to the fullest and freest consultation and mutual agreement before any hostile act could be taken. That such an alliance would preserve the peace of the world we do not doubt. One of the dangers of the present situation is that the greater part of the German people do not seriously believe in the entente—do not understand, that is, that if France were attacked by them we should go to the assist- ance of France. It was that ignorance which tempted the Germans to take the action they did last summer. German diplomacy would be much cooler if the Germans were not tempted by the thought that the rope which binds us to France would be cut in case of real peril. Another immense advantage of a clear and formal alliance would be found at home. Our peace party here, or at any rate the reasonable section of it, would realize that our policy is a peace policy—as it has always been—and that there is not the slightest risk of any Ministry entering upon a war of aggression. We should further be formally bound to submit any quarrels between us and France to arbitration, which in itself would be a great advance in the direction of peace. At the same time neither ally could get entangled in a war without the free and full consultation for which the treaty would provide. Each Foreign Office would be fitted with a. brake, and a very efficient one.
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