GERMANY'S ASPIRATIONS IN REGARD TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY.
TN the October number of the National Review the 1 editor, who is often well informed on matters con- nected with foreign policy, raises what is, if his facts are torrect, a very important question. He tells us, in effect, that at the present moment a great effort is being made by Germany to obtain control of our foreign policy, and "to 'ticket' England as a German sheep' in the Euro- pean fold." It is, he holds, the fixed intention of the German Emperor to try to entangle us in some form of alliance, or at any rate to make the rest of the world think that we are so entangled. It was for this reason that he was so eager to get Mr. Brodrick to attend the German manceuvres. He wished Europe to draw the inference that a War Minister does not attend the manceuvres of a foreign Power and accept foreign decora- tions unless his State stands in a special relation to that Power. This process of entanglement, declares the editor of the National Review, is to be continued when the Kaiser comes to Sandringham, and it is hinted that then an even more definite attempt will be made to show the world that Germany controls our foreign policy, and that we follow where Germany leads.
Without wishing to endorse the precise processes of entanglement suggested by the National Review, we do not doubt that the aim of the German Emperor is in its essentials that described by the editor. A very little reflection will show that the German Emperor has the very strongest inducements to try to obtain a hold over our foreign policy sufficient to make the world believe that Germany and England would stand together in a moment of stress. If he can achieve such a result, and commit us, in however small a degree, to some kind of an understand- ing, his present precarious position is greatly benefited. If he cannot, and if, on the other hand, it should become dear that we are under no sort of obligation to Germany, the international position of the Kaiser becomes one of very great embarrassment, if not of positive danger. Think for a moment of how things stand in Europe just now. The Triple Alliance, if it has not actually been broken through, is a shell which has worn very thin indeed. A very little pressure would break the shell and reveal how little there is inside. Meantime Italy has sought new friends in Russia and in France; while Austria, thoroughly alarmed at last by the adulation of Russia practised in Germany, by the provocative policy pursued towards the Poles in Posen, and finally, by reason of Germany's action at Constantinople and in the Levant, is in no mood to make sacrifices for the Prussians. Spain, again, which was once a very useful satellite of the Triple .,„"nnne, is now rapidly passing under the influence of lance. At the same time, France has greatly increased in POWer and self-confidence, and will not brook the kind of treatment that she was obliged to put up with some ten or fifteen years ago. Lastly, the Pan-German movement, with its covert encouragement from high quarters, has created throughout Europe a great deal of alarm and distrust. Even Switzerland, the least impressionable of Powers, has been moved by the menace of Pan-Germanism ; while in Hungary and in Slavonic Austria that movement has given the direst offence and caused a very real alarm. Germany, in truth, for all the brave show made by her Emperor when he greets the Czar, or the Bing of Italy, or his Austrian brother, is not only in a position of isolation, but is profoundly distrusted as the trouble-house of Europe. No wonder, then, that Germany is looking out for a firm shoulder to lean on, and by which to steady herself till more propitious times make it prudent for her to spurn support no longer necessary for her.
But though it may be very natural for Germany to want our alliance just now, it does not follow that it would be wise for us to grant it. When a Power in so difficult and uncertain a position as Germany wants our benevolent assistance, the only thing we have got to think of is—will it be worth our while to agree to her overtures ? Is Germany able, granted she is willing, to give us anything which we require ? Has her conduct towards us in the past been so friendly, so loyal, and so helpful that an understanding with her now would be nothing but the just payment of a debt of gratitude? Will the admission of Germany into special relations with us make us stand better or worse with other Powers who are in a position to interfere with our interests? Lastly, is there any way in which Germany can harm us if we reject her advances ? These are the questions which must be asked and answered before we can take the prof- fered hand of Germany. If they cannot be answered satis- factorily, it is clear that it would be most foolish to yield to Germany merely because of her importunity, and to give in to her threats that if we will not have her as a friend we shall find her a most disagreeable enemy. Let us take these questions in order. Is there anything that we want which Germany can give us ? We certainly do not want her colonies. We would not take them as a gift. Again, we do not want German aid in China or in Turkey. We can get on far better when we deal with those 'Powers alone. But perhaps it will be said that Germany, if we become fast friends with her, will be able to be of great help to us if we get into difficulties with Russia or France. Our friend, it is assumed, will be pleased to offer to put her vast armies at our disposal if we are ever forced to present anything in the shape of an ultimatum to Russia or to France. If this is the suggested consideration for an alliance with Germany, it is one which is utterly vain and empty. It is absolutely certain that, however great might be the protestations of alliance made by Germany, she would never run the smallest iota of risk of a European war to carry out those protestations. Those who imagine that if we had a German alliance the military strength of Germany would be in any way at our disposal are entirely mistaken. If Germany is attacked she will fight, but nothing else will make her run the risk of the war with two fronts. Germany, in truth, has nothing more sub- stantial to offer us than fine words as consideration for an alliance.
Has Germany in the past behaved to us in a way which would justify an alliance of gratitude ? Is the German Emperor's telegram to Mr. Kruger, followed by the declaration of the German Foreign Office that the independence of the Transvaal was a German interest, a matter for gratitude ? Can the action of Germany during the Fashoda crisis be regarded as deserving of gratitude ? Since then, has the 'official behaviour of Germany during the war, and the unofficial behaviour of a Press which, as we know by the examples of Russia and France, is always most amenable to official control, been of a kind to win our gratitude? Next, ought we to be grateful for the way in which the Government a the Kaiser tried to play the part of agent-provocateur as regards our relations with Russia in China, and as regards the part played by us in the Spanish-American War ? Lastly, is there much food for gratitude in the way in which the question of the reception of the Boer generals by the Kaiser is being handled in Germany just now ? No, we do not think we could be called ungrateful by the Kaiser if we refused his proffers of friendship. One us, but not through the auspices of Germany. They do open that they have attacked and defeated parties of not want to see Germany made stronger diplomatically, Turkish troops. The Porte has met the outbreak in its but like to see her weak, as she is then so much less harsh usual way, by an unhesitating resort to force. The and exacting to her allies. Lastly, we must ask,—Could Reserves have been called out to the number of fifteen Germany do us any harm out of spite at the rejection of thousand, instructions have been given to restore order at her advances ? By no means. There is no quarter in which once, and it is expected that, an usual, many villages will be she could injure us single-handed, while her diplomatic destroyed, and after some shocking scenes of slaughter the character is now too well known to make it possible for Macedonians will resume their usual attitude of despairing her to succeed in the role of agent-provocateur, even if she quiescence. That, however, is this time not so certain. tried. But in all probability she would not, but would The revolutionaries think that as winter is near at hand instead strive by patience and good offices to see they can maintain a protracted guerilla war; and if they can, whether she could not neutralise the opposition to her of one of two results may be accepted as nearly certain. The which we should have given so signal an example. chiefs may gain some small dramatic successes ; and if they Germany is always more friendly after a rebuff than when do, the smaller States will be thrown into a dangerous she has been treated too complacently. ferment. Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria each considers that We trust, then, most sincerely that when the Emperor it has historic rights in Macedonia, each believes that its visits us and makes his proposals for a working under- future is involved in the maintenance of those rights, and standing with Britain, under which he would have all each has an army which, however efficient or inefficient it the benefits and we all the risks, our Government will may be, can be put rapidly in motion. Each will ally inform him plainly that no such idea can possibly be enter- itself with the revolutionaries in the hope of becoming tamed, and that our object is rather to improve our relit- popular, and disorder will rapidly spread through the tions with Russia and France,—a policy which would be whole Peninsula. The people of these States, too, are jeopardised by anything which could be represented as a hardly able to bear stories they receive from the Mace- German alliance. But in any case, our Ministers will only donians, and have from long experience a horror of the be deceiving the Emperor if they try to evade the disagree- Turk which when they are excited deprives them of all able task of repelling his advances, and let him imagine judgment and sense of proportion. If there is a chance that a semi-alliance with Britain is possible. We are of the revolutionaries succeeding, there will be a horrible convinced that in this matter, as always in foreign-policy scramble, certain before it ends to involve the great matters of the very first moment, there is only one thing 'neighbouring Powers, who cannot be expected to act in that really counts, and that is the will of the British concert. The interest of Russia is to make a Greater people. They have formed their opinion of a German Bulgaria, such as the Treaty of San Stefano would have alliance, and nothing will induce them to alter it. The built up ; the interest of Austria is to clear her road to country will not have a German alliance, weak or strong, Salonica, where only she can hope to acquire Oriental real or make-believe, deep or shallow, permanent or tern- trade ; and the interest of Italy, or her presumed interest, porary, at any price, and even if Ministers made an is to obtain some foothold on the eastern shore of the alliance, no matter how formal and solemn, it would Adriatic. There will be just the kind of muddle of ambi- be broken by the nation as soon as they became aware tions, national aspirations, and diplomatic plans which of it. It is only fair that the Kaiser should know almost invariably ends in an appeal to the sword. this, and should realise that what he has got to win here is This is one danger ; and the other is more serious still. not merely Royal sympathy, or the goodwill and favour of If the revolt becomes formidable, or even troublesome, the individual Ministers, or even of the whole Cabinet, but the Turks may repeat the massacres by which they crushed the confidence of the British people. But this he cannot resistance in Bulgaria and Armenia. They have no other win through the personal magnetism which he finds so notion of defeating insurrection than slaughtering out in- very useful in the case of individuals. The confidence of surgents. Their soldiers will not be paid, they will be the British people can only be won by means which we driven to make requisitions, and they will be exasperated by expect would exhaust the patience of William II., and by a attacks which they will regard as murderous. Their Sultan careful building up of the assurance that this country has can no doubt hold them in, for he did so hold them in the secured the goodwill of the whole German people, and not case of Greece ; but will he ? Greece was a foreign State merely that of their lord and master. But is that likely to under strong protection, defended by a Regular Army such be obtained under the conditions which have grown up in as it was; but Macedonia in Turkish eyes is a rebellious Germany during the last fifteen years,—conditions very province disturbed by a turbulent peasantry who de not largely due to the influence of the German Government ? know what they want. War with its people will be
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