success. The Russian Czars, absolute as they, are, have period
of subordinate self-government., having grown gaining the power of living its own life in civilised security, seldom resisted military pressure, and though Nicholas and each throwing up personages, whether Kings or states- dislikes war, he will be profoundly moved by the sufferuig men, to whom the people can look for guidance with of men who look to him for aid, and of whom he hopes to need not be grateful to the man_ who while you are reasonable hope. Stambouloff would have been ins. struggling in a war covers you with jeers and curses, possible while the rule of the Porte continued. and when you get out by yourself encumbers you with Nothing, it is true, is ultimately settled by this his assistance. To the question, Are we likely to gain the device. The great war for ascendency or dominion in the goodwill of any other Power by an alliance with Germany ? Balkan Peninsula may still break out, but it may be a very easy answer can be given. Germany is the most postponed indefinitely, and when it breaks out it will be unpopular Power on the Continent, and instead of au- a war of States ruled by men with settled purposes, and ance with her producing goodwill in other quarters, it not a murderous anarchy. The Powers should act at once, would be certain to produce the very opposite effect. It for at this moment the danger lest that war should break would at once destroy those better relations which have out prematurely is much more real than many observers been growing up with France, and would certainly tend to suppose. The misgovernment of Macedonia is worse than increased friction with Russia. On the other hand, ever ; the revolutionary leaders are weary of waiting, they neither Italy nor Austria would be in the least pleased by have called out their boldest followers, and it is believea the alliance. Both those Powers wish to stand well with that three thousand men have burst into insurrection so us, but not through the auspices of Germany. They do open that they have attacked and defeated parties of not want to see Germany made stronger diplomatically, Turkish troops. The Porte has met the outbreak in its but like to see her weak, as she is then so much less harsh usual way, by an unhesitating resort to force. The and exacting to her allies. Lastly, we must ask,—Could Reserves have been called out to the number of fifteen Germany do us any harm out of spite at the rejection of thousand, instructions have been given to restore order at her advances ? By no means. There is no quarter in which once, and it is expected that, an usual, many villages will be civil war ; Mussulmans attacked by Christians are THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION. utterly merciless. The Sultan knows by pleasing "- Hence that mere massacre does not greatly disturb the make, if not subjects, at least dependent allies. He may be driven into action as his grandfather was ; and another war between Russia and Turkey may at once destroy the unstable equilibrium of Europe upon which the hopes of peace now rest. The alternative we suggest could probably, if the tribute were liberal and were guaranteed, be secured peace- fully, for the Sultan, if pressed by the six Powers who enfranchised Crete, would plainly be yielding to force majeure, and. would therefore lose no honour in the Mussulman world ; he would be no weaker, for a province always on the edge of rebellion is no source of strength ; and his finances would be positively improved. Iliere would be no talk of danger to Constantinople, and the jealous European Powers would find their position within the Balkans almost exactly what it was. They could intrigue and struggle over Macedonia the principality just as well as they now struggle and intrigue over Macedonia the province ; and the great war of the future would still be indefinitely postponed. On the other hand, the chance of the revolutionaries would be over. The mere an- nouncement that Macedonia would become a principality would put an end to risings, the Macedonians knowing quite well that no Prince would misgovern as the Pashas do, or be willing to sacrifice his chance of a plentiful revenue and his repute as a good administrator by destroy- ing his own villages. He would want order, quiet, and prosperity for his own sake, and he could obtain them only through a strong police, reasonably good government, and moderate taxation. Europe at large would welcome the solution as the best obtainable, and as relieving it of an apprehension which those who understand the situation best seem most to feel. It needs but an agreement among three men—William II., Nicholas IL, and Francis Joseph —to make identical representations to the Porte for the Macedonian question to disappear.
Previous page
