LOYALISTS IN SOUTH APRIC.A.
TT was always probable that to a certain section of those British subjects in South Africa who remained loyal during the war the idea of our doing anything to help the Boers after peace had been declared would be distasteful, and perhaps something more. They remembered, many of them, the end of the war in 1881, and the humiliations suffered by those who up to the last refused to believe that England would not go on with what she had begun ; they were doubtful whether twenty years later it would pay to be loyal any better than in the shilly-shallying days of Majuba. They wished to be sure that England would not allow at least one thing to happen again,—namely, that those who stood fast by England should suffer for doing so. They did not want a reward for being loyal, but at least they did not want to lose by being loyal ; above all things, they were angry at the idea that possibly their enemies might find themselves better treated at the end of the war than they themselves, who had fought on our side, or whose farms and stock had been pillaged by the Boers or the rebel Dutch. Such fears and doubts were perfectly natural, and certainly quite justified by what had happened in the past. The question is whether they are not justified by what is happening to-day.
We wish that we could be sure that this is not so. We do not, of course, admit that it would have been wise, even if it had been possible, to let the Boers struggle back to their farms and try to rebuild and restock them, without making an effort on our part to see that they attained some measure of content and prosperity as soon as possible, —that is, without granting them, where such, a grant was necessary, money to rebuild and opportunities of restocking. It is true that after the American Civil War the South was given no such grants and no such opportunities by the North, and as a consequence many Southern families were wholly ruined. Our action in granting money to the Boers, therefore, was not due to regard for precedent. But it was due to something far greater, and in the circum- stances far more necessary,—namely, the desire to render South Africa as a whole, and in the shortest possible space of time, a contented and prosperous portion of the Empire. We granted the Boers, then, three millions in cash down, and the opportunity of contracting loans on exceptionally favourable terms, and we hold that it was right and politic to do so. But there is another side to the question. In granting money and aid to our late enemies did we make certain not only that we were not neglecting our friends, but that we were giving them our first consideration ? Did we make, and are we making, every effort to see that, so far as is possible, no loyalist is kept waiting for compensation and assistance while Dutch- men who have fought against us are already in receipt of relief ? If we can get at a proper impression of the situa- tion in South Africa from the various letters and stories which appear in the papers, we did not make that effort, and we are not making it now. We referred last week to a letter which was published in the Times of September 19th under the beading "British Loyalists in South Africa."
In it the writer complained that it was not the English loyalists but the Boers who were receiving the first con- sideration at the hands of our officials. "The Government are supplying almost all their waggons to the Boers.
Boers can have free rations, free passes to their farms ; those who have suffered for England's sake are refused everything." Definite instances were given of occasions when loyalists were unable to get assistance from our officials simply because they were loyalists, and it was stated in another letter that English ladies anxious to get back to their families were "actually being passed as Dutch, because the military only assist Boers. It is, as we said last week, difficult to believe that our officers could be guilty of such criminal favouritism, but almost every mail brings .fresh evidence that in the desire—praise. Worthy as it no doubt is—to do everything to make the return of our new Colonists to their farms as easy as possible, we are neglecting the old Colonists whose farms were destroyed and whose stock was looted by our late enemies. A letter in Monday's Standard gives the experiences of another "loyal." The writer points out that while the war was actually going on it was possible for a Colonial driven by the enemy from his farm to earn a pittance for his wife and family by joining one of the Colonial Volunteer forces or a town guard. Now that the local forces have been disbanded he finds himself with- out money, with his stock looted, and without even the opportunity of getting back to his farm. The Compensa- tion Courts work slowly, and only grant the sums allowed in monthly instalments, which means that paying form- work cannot begin until the full sum is delivered ; mean- while the money allowed each month has to go in the herding of cattle which cannot plough without ploughs, or in buying waggons which cannot be drawn without cattle, or in farm instruments which are useless without seed to sow. Unable in some cases to obtain compensation or relief except at intervals of time so long as to make such compensation useless, and unable in other cases to obtain relief at all, the farmer who remained loyal to us, or who actually fought under our flag, sees the men who drove him from his farm "returning to their homes, helped with seed, with means of transport, with food, and in some cases with temporary dwellings. If that is a true picture of what is happening in the majority of cases of distressed loyalists, it is one which is extremely discreditable to us as a nation, and it reveals a situation which ought to be rectified at once. Neither those who have fought against us nor those who have fought for us think any the better of Englishmen for it. The Boers see in it the old apathy and weakness which many of them regard as our national characteristics ; the British are bitterly reminded of what was said and thought of "those at home" in 1881. In the resettling of South Africa, and in the granting of help to. those, whether they have been our enemies or our friends, who have been ruined or seriously affected by the war, there ought to be one ruling principle. It is, as we have said, in our opinion, and looking to the eventual prosperity of the South African Colonies, right to get the Boers whom we have taken prisoners or who have sur- rendered back to their farms as quickly as possible, and right to see that when they return to their farms they can make a living. But right as it is to break up the prisoners' and concentration camps as soon as possible, even if only because of the money we save by so doing, economy ought not to be our first aim. Our first aim ought to be to look to the eventual prosperity and content of the country, and the country will not become prosperous and contented if we neglect those who have suffered in our cause. We ought, then, to relieve those who have remained loyal to us first. No man in South Africa ought to be able to say that he has been punished because he did not join our enemies. That is so clearly right and necessary that it max seem hardly worth while insisting upon it ; but the answer to those who think insistence unnecessary is supplied by the loyalists' letters to which we have referred. Next to the British subjects who have fought or suffered in our cause ought to come the National Scouts. The National Scouts cannot be expected to be popular with the men against whom they fought; but we promised to give them exceptional consideration, and we ought to keep our promise. Third ought tocome the Boers whom we have taken prisoners or who have surrendered, at whatever period of the war. Doubtless among this class, especially among those who held out to the last, we shall find some of those of our enemies who are best worth open-banded and generous treatment. But they held out to the end knowing what their action in so doing entailed; we ought not to reward them for doing so by placing them in a list above those who helped, like the National Scouts, to bring the end nearer. Even here, though, we would not draw a hard- and-fast line. If it seemed likely to be for the per- manent good of the country, we would place prominent men among those who came in after June 5th imme- diately in positions in which they could help in the management of the new Colonies. But, above all, there must be no favouritism. Each man who is kept waiting must know why he is kept waiting, and must know that no one with a worse claim on us than he has been helped before him. We cannot, as we have said, judge fully of all the circumstances, since full details are wanting; but it certainly looks as if we are not at present holding to the principle of "friends first." If we are not doing that, we are not only breaking the most sacred of our . national obligations, but we are going the best way to promote dis- content and disloyalty in South Africa in the future. It has been only too justly said of us by Englishmen in South Africa in the past that England cannot be trusted to keep her promises, and that is a reputation which we ought to spare no effort to live down.
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