TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND JAPAN.
A S we write on Friday the air is thick with conflicting -O.. rumours in regard to the situation in the Far East. According to one set, Japanese opinion is rising to fever- heat in favour of war, and will insist upon Japan sending an ultimatum to Russia which will be certain to result in war. According to another set, Japan and Russia have at the last moment struck a bargain, and have agreed that while Russia is to have Manchuria, Japan is to take Korea. For ourselves, we should be delighted to hear that such an arrangement had been arrived at. It would eliminate many dangerous elements from the situation in the Far East, and would allow both Russia and Japan to indulge their respective aspirations for expansion without risk of involving the rest of the world. We fear, how- ever, that the chances of such agreement are small. Russia would imagine that Japan, once entrenched on the main- land, would be in too strong a position for influencing China; while Japan would dislike the idea of acquiescing in Russia's permanent occupation of so important a province of that Chinese Empire which it is her dream to revive in the future under Japanese leadership.
But if this agreement cannot be reached, what is likely to be the result? That is a question of the utmost im- portance, and deserves the close consideration of the British people. The first point to be dealt with is,—will the Japanese really fight, or will they only push their claims up to the point just short of war? The answer to this question depends upon many things. The Japanese statesmen, who are very able and astute men, will certainly not wish to fight unless they can feel reasonably sure of winning. Can they feel that their Fleet and their Army are capable of beating those of Russia ? A correspondent in our last issue in a very interesting letter stated his belief that the Japanese Army is not as strong SS it appears to be to many foreign critics, and gave his reasons. To-day he writes of the Japanese Navy. In both cases he admits that a section of the force is of absolutely first-class fighting value, but he in effect contends that owing to a process of dilution the Army and Navy have ceased to be quite as good as they were,—though he evidently thinks that this pro- cess has gone a good deal less far in the Navy. In gaining in size the fighting forces of Japan have lost in quality. If he were asked how these doubts as to the . value of the Japanese Army are to be recon- ciled with the fact that the Japanese force engaged in rescuing the Pekin Legations won the approval of every foreign critic, he would, we imagine, reply that the Japanese expeditionary force was a picked force, and not a fair sample of the Army as a whole ; and that, judged in isolation, though it was one of the best fighting forces ever seen, it must not be taken as representative. Whether our correspondent is right in these criticisms, or whether we ought to take the enthusiastic view of Japan's fighting capacity, which is assuredly the more popular view just now, we cannot pretend to say. We will not go farther than to point out that Mr. Norman's opinion is unquestionably de- serving of public attention. If he is right, the Japanese Government will almost certainly not wish to fight. It may be, however, that, though unwilling, they will be forced to fight, for public opinion exercises a great weight in Japan. Undoubtedly there are many elements in Japan that make for war. In the first place, there are the Jingoes, who desire to fight, and especially to fight Russia; and next, it is said that owing to a very complicated political situation, it is to the supposed interest of certain parties in the State that war should break out. The classes now struggling to obtain a share of political power are alleged to believe that if the country were at war the honours and emoluments and privileges of office could not any longer be withheld from them, and that the ruling caste would be obliged to share power with those below it. It is possible, then, that war may come even though the ruling statesmen do not in their hearts believe that Japan is equal to the task.
But though we think that the public here should not, if war breaks out, be too confident that Japan will carry all before hr at sea, and be able even on land to confront Russia with success, we are well aware that Russia's Army and Navy suffer equally—as, indeed, do iiiI"Itiliaieript armies—from the process of dilution. We see nO ftaeon to believe that the Russian ships or Russian regiment's will be specially well equipped. It is notorious that corruption is to be found in both the Russian Army and the Russian Navy, and we should be greatly surprised if it had not impaired efficiency in both cases. Still, Russia has immense wealth and irresistible numbers, and these are certain to tell. In other, words, Russia could afford to be beaten at the beginning of a war, while Japan could not. In spite, however, of these considerations, it is, we admit, possible that Japan, even if her Navy is not so perfect as it seems, might be able to annihilate the Russian Fleet in the Far East. Suppose this to have happened, what would be the next step? We presume that Japan would next use her sea-power, supplemented by a land force, to make Port Arthur and a part of Manchuria un- tenable by Russia. Could she succeed here? Would not Russia, thanks to her Siberian Railway, be able to pour in troops sufficient to drive out the Japanese intruders ? We cannot answer these questions dogmatically, but we con- fess that we do not see how Japan would be able to deal in any way effectively with Russia on land in the Far East.
We have dealt above with the problem as it affects Japan and Russia ; but it is impossible for a British news- paper to approach the questions of war between these two Powers without also considering how it will affect this country. Happily, under our Treaty of Alliance with Japan we are not bound to come to her aid unless she is attacked by two Powers. Is there any fear of another Power joining Russia? Probably there is not; but we must not forget that France is bound by ties of alliance to Russia which, in effect, would oblige her to help Russia if Russia were involved in war with two Powers. Would France, we wonder, consider that the cams foederis had arisen if China, as is by no means impossible, joined Japan in an attack on Russia ? That France would be very loth to do so we may feel certain, but she might be placed in a very difficult position if Russia said to her Either come to our aid with your Fleet in the Far East, or understand that you cannot any longer count on our help if you are attacked by the Triple Alliance.' Could France risk giving up her Russian Alliance, knowing that if she said " No ' to the question we have just formulated the German Emperor would offer to Russia, if not active help in the Far East, at any rate his general friendship and support, and, in fact, apply for the place of first friend just vacated by France? That would clearly create so dangerous a situation for France that she must either yield to Russia, or find another make-weight by arranging terms of insurance with Britain and Italy against an attack from Germany If we were willing to give them, she might be able to forego the Russian Alliance,—though Russia, being on the other side of the enemy, is clearly a more valuable ally than we should be. But if France thought it dangerous to risk part- ing from Russia, and came to her aid, we must, of course, come to the help of Japan, and engage in war by sea and land with France and Russia. That risk is the price we have to pay for a Japanese Alliance It really comes to this, then : that if Russia were to be beaten by Japan, we should find ourselves either at war with France and Russia, or else forced to make an alliance with France guaranteeing her against a German invasion,—an entangling alliance of just the kind we have always tried to avoid. Possibly we may have the good luck to escape from the dilemma 'altogether, but the risk is not a very pleasant one, and, we think, justifies the opposition originally offered by us and those who agreed with us to the Alliance with Japan. We saki then that the Alliance placed us at the mercy of Japan, and that our only hope was that Japan would. prove merciful, and not involve us in what, from our point of view, would be a perfectly gratuitous risk. It is still our hope. Probably the next few days will decide whether Japan is or is not going to expose us to this risk.
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