The World War as a Whole HERE, within a reasonable
compass and price, the cleverest of our younger military historians has given us a bird's-eye view of a drama of which no man, with his own eyes, ever saw or could see more than a fraction. And this is a considerable feat, for although it is true that no event in history has ever been so fully documented, there has also been no event so confusing at once by the numbers involved and by the range over which they operated.
To have compressed this almost overwhelming mass of material into 180,000 very readable words might be in itself journalism of a high order ; but this book is much more than that : it is the review of great events by a finely tempered mind, the considered judgment of one who combines academic distinction with a limpid style, and depth with brilliance—in short, an Aldous Huxley amongst modern strateffists. More- over, the method is as good as the matter. There is a mas- terly introduction on The origins of the War ; and a chapter on the opposing forces and plans in 1914; then each year is
treated in a separate chapter, followed by a total of twenty-six " scenes " illustrating its chief features ; an epilogue ; com- fortable end-maps of the Eastern and Western fronts to sup- plement the other twenty-three maps in the text; an excellent subject-inclex ; and a carefully chosen bibliography corre- sponding to the chapter headings. -We found no misprints. Nothing, in short, has been neglected by Captain Liddell Hart to make this volume complete for the student and attractive to the general reader.
"Military technique," he writes—" how competent in peace to gain *ar ; how impotent in war to gain victory ! " A "War mentality" was the reason, if not the cause, of the incidents which led to the hurried mobilizations, the ineluctable march towards a general madness, against the wishes and advice of all the wiser heads in Europe. And military technique, as Cap- tain Liddell Hart very cogently Proves, brought Germany to her ruin, even as early as the summer of 1914, for had not von Pifoltke insisted on marching through Belgium the British Cabinet would not have declared war on August 4th.
In a supreme flash of genius (the words are the author's -
and it is a mark of his perspicacity that he does credit to Kitchener's vision while not blind to his faults) the British Secretary of State for War " had grasped, in contrast to Governments and General Staffs alike, the probable duration of the struggle." Like an ever-rising flood, the New Armies came into being, to be dedicated to 'those places so drenched with English blood—Ypres and Gallipoli.
Then deadlock came to the Western Front. Russia urged for a demonstration against Constantinople to relieve the pressure of the attacks against her troops in the Caucasus. Mr. Churchill had long advocated the landing at the Dar- danelles, and now Kitchener and Fisher consented, although unwillingly. "Sired by strategic confusion and dammed by naval negation, the landing on Gallipoli was born—and marred in delivery by muddled military midwifery." Captain Liddell Hart is rarely so bitter and so punning, but his phrase is warranted. We have not space, however, to follow him through even one of the campaigns which he vividly describes.
The year of 1914 is entitled "The Clinch," and two opera- tions are described in detail : "The battle that was not, yet turned the tide" (the Marne) and "The field of legend" (Tan- nenberg). "The Deadlock" of 1915 is illustrated by two sections on the Dardanelles operations, one on Ypres (" the gas-cloud ") and one on Loos (" the unwanted battle "). The following year is called "The Dog-fall," and the immortal defence of Verdun, the Russian offensive, the equally bloody Somme, the growing-pains of the Tank, the swallowing of Rumania, the capture of Baghdad, and the sea-fight of Jutland are chosen as descriptive pivots—the latter being aptly characterized as "the battle of blind man's buff." "The Strain" of 1917 has sections on "The Halt and Lame Offen- sive" of Arras in April ; "The Siege-war masterpiece- Messines " ; "The Road to Passchendaele," "The Tank Surprise at Cambrai " and Caporetto. The last year (" The Break ") has eight sections which show the relentless pressure of the blockade, and the gradual realization of the Central European Powers that they could no longer look for a decision by armed force. Lord Allenby's victory at Megiddo has a " scene " to itself, admirable in its grasp of essentials ; one of the incidents is the appearance of the Desert Mounted Corps under the command of Colonel Lawrence :— "A messenger reported :—There's an Arab on the top of the hill over there in a Rolls-Royce ; talks English perfectly and in a hell of a rage !' For no pursuit could be fast enough to satisfy Lawrence's ardent spirit as he urged his Arabs on toward the city of desire. . . In a war singularly barren of surprise and mobility, their (the cavalry's) value had been signally vindicated at the last, and in one theatre at least . . . Because a preliminary condition of trench warfare existed, the infantry and heavy artillery were necessary to break the lock. But once the normal conditions of warfare were thus restored, the victory was achieved by the mobile elements—cavalry, aircraft, armoured cars and Arabs. . . And it was achieved not by physical force, but by the demoralising application of mobility."
"Some may say that the War depicted here is not the real war,' " writes Captain Liddell Hart ; "that this is to be dis- covered in the torn bodies and minds of individuals. It is far from my purpose to ignore or deny this aspect of the truth." But, he adds, "although the War was, it is true, waged and decided in the minds of individuals more than in the physical clash of forces . . . these decisive impressions were received and made in the Cabinets and the military head- quarters, not in the ranks of the infantry or the solitude of btricken homes." The author has neither exaggerated the imperfections of individuals nor glossed over disturbing facts in order that reputations may be preserved. What he his
s done, with a skill and courage deserving the highest praise, is to collate and clarify a vast bulk of histories and memoirs, making from them a book which may be read in a day or two, and is yet a monument not soon to be forgotten.
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