GERMANY AND THE GULF OF FINLAND.
Germans have obtained almost complete control of
the Gulf of Finland. It would be useless to try to disguise this fact. They have just accomplished what they tried bat failed to achieve earlier in the war. It is necessary to admit this clearly, because when one has to think out a new situation the worst possible basis for discussion is a delusion. This is certainly not a moment for reproaohea. Although the Russian Fleet, if it had been in an efficient condition, ought to have been able to command the intricate channels of the Gulf by means of mines and submarines, not to mention the heavy batteries on the islands which stretch across the mouth of the Gulf, we have to remember the state in which Russia finds herself—to sympathize with her leaders rather than blame them, and to hope that the very, instant threat to Petrograd which is now offered by the much nearer approach of the Germans will powerfully operate through the winter to unite and reinvigorate the various Russian factions.
Let us describe briefly what has happened. Ever since the Germans took Windau, and still more since they took Riga, they have wanted to secure the passages of the Gulf of Riga. The obvious method of doing this was to rapture the islands of Oesel Dago, and Moon, which make a barrier across the mouth of the Gulf. There are two channels into the Gulf. First, there is the wide channel of Irben between the mainland and the southern end of Oesel ; and secondly, there is the Moon Sound, a narrow strait which runs between Moon and the mainland north of the Gulf. The islands were reputed to be possessed of powerful artillery, and history text-books of the future will undoubtedly cite the capture of the islands as an instance of ships of war venturing under the fire of land batteries. On Friday week the Germans landed at two or three places on Oesel. Their naval force is said to have consisted of about eight Dreadnoughts, a dozen light cruisers, and forty destroyers, besides minesweepers. The Russian naval attack was apparently delayed till it was too late, but it is said that a German destroyer was sunk and a Dreadnought was mined, though she did not sink. The landing party is said to have consisted of not more than two divisions, but these quickly marched across the island and herded that part of the Russian garrison which resisted into the promontory of Swathe, et the southern end of the island. It was important for the Russians to hold that peninsula if they could, for the guns there commanded the passage through the Irben Channel. Within four or five days, how- ever, the Russian garrison in the peninsula capitulated. The Germans also control the small island of Abro, and another small island called Runo which is in the middle of the Gulf.
Any one who looks at the map will see that if the Germans can make good the Moon Sound, and establish themselves on the mainland anywhere in the neighbourhood of Pernau or Hansel or Revel, they will have placed themselves in a most threatening attitude upon the right flank of the Russian Army. Revel is some eighty miles nearer than Riga to Petrograd. Tho whole operation, in fact, is an excellent example of the use of naval power to turn the flank of the land forces of an enemy. The German strategists are entitled to full credit for perceiving their opportunity and using it. But it is quite another matter to suppose that this stroke, accomplished, as we gather from H. Kerensky's messages to the Russian Fleet, in the face of an inadequate resistance, will end in great.profit to the Germans. It would be easy to exaggerate the paralysing influences of the Russian winter. Those influences are more felt on land than on sea. Seamen generally reckon to be able to make use of a large part of the Gulf of Finland up to December. On the other ,hand, naval action alone will not be sufficient for any grandiose German schemes. The General Staff will need to have troops at their disposal as well as sailors. We .must assume that the Germans have very few troops indeed .to spare to occupy fresh territory on their Eastern Front, and we cannot help remembering that ships acting in isolation—without the .0o-operation of armies—have before now found -the Baltic a cemetery, of ardent hopes. Every one who knows the history of the Crimean War will call to mind the high and, as they now seem, ridiculous expectations which were excited in the spring of 1854 when Sir Charles Napier was despatched to the Baltic. There was that famous semi-public dinner at the Reform Club at which—so it was ea-id—Admiral Napier promised that what had been done at Sidon. and Acre would be repeated at Cronstadt or Ilelaingfors. The event, _how- ever, turned out quite otherwise. When Napier reached the Baltic he decided that his snips could not pOssibly engage the
fortresses of Crenate& and Sveaborg and Revel, which were bristling with guns. It is true that lie captured Bonmrsund, but this was done with the help of a landing party of ten thousand men who were sent from France.
In our opinion, Germany has not enough men both to make sure of defending her Western Front and to undertake large and speculative adventures 'n Russia. So long as the Russians remain true to their present convictions, as we are sure they will, and absolutely refuse to entertain the thought of a separate peace, they will keep the Germans in a state of suspense. If the Germans occupy towns of importance and large pieces of fresh territory, they will have to find the men to garrison them and to man their continually increasing lines of communication. Remembering that the Germans, throughout the whole of this year, have not been able to undertake any offensive where serious resistance was offered, we cannot believe that they will commit themselves to many hazards in Russia while trying, as desperately as at present, to hold their lines in France and Flanders. This dilemma for the Germans causes us to consider seriously a very interesting possibility which we see put forward and argued with great ingenuity in the Manchester Guardian. The possibility is tide. Revel is only fifty miles, across the Gulf of Finland, from Helsingfors, the capital of Finland. Viborg, the most easterly town of Finland, is only thirty miles from Petrograd. Now it is well known that Finland, the Ireland of Russia, is in a state of intense disaffection. The Finns have never forgotten their grievances against Russia of the old regime. Germany—there is already evidence of this—is trying to bring the revolt to a head in Finland, just as she has tried, and perhaps is still trying, to engineer insurrection in Ireland. If she were able to work up a rising on a large Beale in Finland, and if the country were put at her disposal for operations against Petrograd, she would be in a very strong position in that part of the world. But, as we have said, she certainly would not have enough men to undertake this kind of adventure, and also to hold her Western Front. Very likely she wants to do no more for the present than establish bases on the mainland. She may not contemplate reaching Bevel before the spring. But once at Revel she would be able to prosecute her intrigues in Finland for all they were worth. Even during the autumn or winter she may see her way more clearly, and if she Is sufficiently encouraged she may make all her plans to divert very con- siderable forces to Finland and take what might be called the bold retrograde course of abandoning Belgium altogether and retiring behind the line of the Meuse. This interesting possibility is at least worth keeping in view. Desperate minds sometimes hatch startling schemes. The Germans have changed their plans not once but several times during the war, and it is just conceivable that the most dramatic change of all has yet to come.
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