" ENTANGLING ALLIANCES."
WE have no desire that Italy should leave the Triple Alliance. On the contrary, remembering that peace is the greatest of British interests, we desire that Italy should continue therein. When there is danger on the great scale she unquestionably acts as a drag upon her chief partner, and in conjunction with Austria. Hungary tends to restrain bellicose aspirations in the direction of Russia, of France, or of Britain. Some thirty years ago Mr. Chamberlain in an impatient speech described the assistance afforded to the Liberal Party by Lord Hartington and the Whigs as the kind of help given by men who cling round the legs of those who are about to charge the enemy. A German Jingo might easily adopt such language in regard to Italy. But though we have no desire to say anything that would prevent Italy continuing to play this useful part—we admit, of course, that it has only a limited application and that Italy's power for good in this respect must not be exaggerated—we can well understand that at the present juncture many thoughtful Italians must at heart be cursing the Triple Alliance and recalling the words in which General Washington warned his countrymen against " entangling alliances." From the purely Italian point of view the Triple Alliance, as we noted last week, is proving very much of an entanglement. Italy—and we say it with the deepest regret, for we are heart and soul pro- Italian—is at the present moment in a dangerous and difficult position. Under modern conditions when war prevails every sound statesman must feel the deepest anxiety to get the war finished as soon as possible. Even if no other motives are present the economic considera- tions are bound to make prolonged hostilities perilous in a high degree. The drain of modern wars is terrible, and the loss cannot be measured solely in the money paid. out of the Treasury. There is certain to be a great deal of indirect pecuniary loss. In addition the military systems of the Continental Powers bear the strain of oversea war with difficulty. Modern armies based on universal service and the calling-up of reserves are designed for a particular purpose—that of the defence of the national territory and of action. close to the frontiers. To send an army even of only 120,000 men out of the country, especially when these troops for health and other reasons have to be selected troops, is apt to throw the whole army organization out of gear. Again, there is the strain and loss imposed upon a Power by keeping her fleet on a war footing for many months. The wastage of material and the deterioration in ships and guns are very great. For all these reasons far- sighted Italian statesmen must be exceedingly anxious to bring the war with Turkey to a close. But you cannot bring a war to a close unless you havegot a free hand in dealing with your enemy. This, how- ever, Italy has not got, and she has not got it because of the alliance with Germany and Austria- Hungary. Her commitments to these two Powers prevent her being mistress of her fate. Germany no doubt, so far as she is personally concerned, does not care how or where Turkey is hit, but Austria-Hungary cares very much, and Germany is bound in this matter to use her whole influence in the alliance to support Austria-Hungary. As was clear from the course of events and is still clearer from the words used by Count Berchtold (the new Austro- Hungarian Foreign Minister) in his speech last Tuesday, Italy was not permitted to begin the war with .Turkey until she had given positive assurances to her allies that the war would be conducted on certain proscribed lines. Thus, unfortunately for her, Italy started on the great and dangerous enterprise of the Tripoli expedition with one hand tied. tightly behind her back, and it was her partners in the Triple Alliance who fastened the cords. That is what we mean by an entangling alliance. It m' be that the entanglement is worth while or unavoidable, but regarded from the military point of view an entangle- ment it certainly is. To understand what we mean let any one with any knowledge, however elementary, of military considerations look at the map and consider in vacuo the problem of how Italy—given the problem of forcing Turkey to end the war—ought to act ; given also, of course, Italy's supremacy at sea. Opposite the eastern shore of Southern Italy stretches some two hundred miles of the coast line of Turkey in Europe. The Italian ports of Brindisi and Otranto are quite close to the Albanian coast. They are, indeed, only about three times the distance between Dover and Calais from the nearest point of Turkey. Clearly, then, the natural objective of Italy is Albania. Another powerful argument for acting in Albania is the fact that the inhabitants of that mountain region are already in a state of insurrection, and that the Christian tribes, at any rate, would welcome Italian troops as deliverers. We admit that the country a very little way in from the shore is some of the most difficult in the world. Still, combined military and naval action on the coast must be terribly embarrassing to Turkey. This embarrassment could be further increased by a simultaneous Italian naval attack on the great city of Salonika and by the landing of Italian troops on the coast of Macedonia. No doubt the Italians would be confronted with a superior Turkish mili- tary force, but unquestionably joint pressure in Albania and in Macedonia would be anything but agreeable to the Turks, and must alter the whole situation.—At present the Turks are playing, so to speak, with the spot stroke barred to their antagonist.—But pressure of a potent kind and the making use of Italy's natural advantages are in existing circum- stances impossible, for Italy, owing to her entanglement in the Triple Alliance, has already promised Austria-Hungary and Germany not to make use of those advantages. And that promise was not in any sense an accidental false step. It was one which she could not have avoided making so long as she remained in the Triple Alliance.
Perhaps it will be said that we are exaggerating the effect of Italy's entanglement, because even if the alliance had not existed Austria-Hungary would have had sufficient power to prevent her neighbour operating in Albania, and, further, that Austria-Hungary would here have been sup- ported by the other great Powers anxious, above all things, to prevent the reopening of the Balkan problem in its most aggravated form. No doubt there is a good deal of truth in this view, but those who urge it must remember that it cuts both ways. If Italy had been free to use the threat of double operations on the Albanian and on the Mace- donian coast the threat would probably have been enough to end the war. If Italy, with her fleet and army already mobilized, had told the Powers that she was going imme- diately to take action such as we have suggested, they would in all probability have come to the conclusion that the safest thing to do would be to send a. joint ultimatum to the Turks telling them that they must come to terms with Italy. At any rate, by means of this threat Italy would have had a very powerful. lever for putting an end to he war. As it is, Italy cannot use this threat because all the Powers know that her place in the Triple Alliance and her engagements to her allies preclude any operations in Albania and Macedonia. Therefore, as we have said, Italy fights with one hand tied behind her back, and the Powers feel they need not " fuss " themselves about the war. Italy is safely " trussed."
How Italy is to end the war under existing conditions it is not for us to say. No doubt she could take practically the whole of the Turkish islands in the Elven without difficulty, but the trouble then would be how to hold them. If she aid not put garrisons into them the Turks would soon reconquer them ; and if she did put garrisons strong enough to hold them against Turkish action from the mainland, which would be undertaken as soon as the Italian cruisers had turned their backs, she would fritter away a very large number of troops. As has already been shown by experiment, the attempt at blockading the Dardanelles is no good because it punishes European Powers like Russia and Britain—which are friendly to Italy—rather than the Turks. In our opinion the only way out for Italy is to come to an understanding with the Turks on the question of annexa- tion. After all, as wo said last week, what has proved good enough for us in Egypt and what is good enough for the French in Morocco might very well prove good enough for Italy in Tripoli. Let her make a formal acknowledg- ment of Turkish suzerainty and accept something in the nature of a lease from the Sultan. Under such a treaty the Turkish troops would be withdrawn and the Italian troops remain as an army of occupation. Italy could then begin to do what it is essential she should do in a country like Tripoli—organize Arab troops. And here the paper suzerainty of the Sultan would help her greatly, for if the Sultan were still the nominal sovereign, Mohammedans would find it much easier to take service with the Italians.
If Italy made such a treaty with Turkey, clauses might be inserted which would give Italy a position of great import- ance in any final readjustment of the affairs of the Turkish Empire. After all, Turkey is not a Power that bears malice against those who have been at war with her, and we feel certain that it is not beyond the resources of diplomacy for Italy and Turkey to come to a working arrangement which might be of great use to both Powers and at the same time free Italy to some extent from the entanglement which she has found to be so hampering. We do not mean by this to suggest-for a moment that she should leave the Triple Alliance, but merely that an under- standing with Turkey, while not involving any breach of the alliance, might relieve her of a certain sense of dependence which she now feels in regard to her neighbour to the north.
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