HITLER'S METHODS AND THE ANSWER V ERY soon after these words
are published Herr Hitler will have delivered his Reichstag speech and the world will know what he thinks of Mr. Roosevelt's proposals. At the moment, most political observers here are speculating upon what he will say, and it is interesting to note that there is little difference of opinion on the subject. The Fiihrer will reject the new peace plan in language which will satisfy his own extremists but will also leave the door open, so that the neutral States cannot point to the Third Reich as the aggressor in any future war. Hitler and his intimate co- operators are too well-versed in mass psychology to have allowed the American President to seize the leadership of world-opinion for peace without a struggle, and they realised too clearly a fortnight ago what Roosevelt's action would mean to ignore it. The very fact that the Reichstag was summoned to hear the reply is significant as indicating that even the Nazis had become alarmed at the possible conse- quences of encirclement despite all they have done - to belittle it.
A moment has been reached in European history when the democracies will be able to prevent war or humiliation only by understanding clearly the methods of their totali- tarian opponents. One of the most tragic aspects of the developments of the past few years to most detached observers in Germany has been English diplomatic reaction to all that the Nazis have done. If it was ignorance then it was simply appalling; if it was anything else, then it was criminal beyond words, because it was a deceitful betrayal of those democratic principles to which our statesmen pay lip- service every time they rise in Parliament. Be that as it may—it is a question on which history will decide—our past experience should certainly not be forgotten in dealing with imminent developments. And in this connexion there are one or two things which it is essential that every Englishman should know, particularly since the issues of war and peace hang like a heavy pall over all of us today.
Above all it should be printed on every page of the scrap- book of the diplomat who has to deal with the Nazis, that though their methods may change, though they may have to slacken their pace, they have no intention of abandoning their goals. There is no excuse for not realising this fact. Dr. Goebbels recently stated it plainly, and his words are borne out in deeds. The Nazis are determined to extend their political and economic sway over Central and East Europe to the exclusion of any other Great Power, to obtain their colonies again, to exclude Russia from any European settlement, and to continue their present economic methods until they have ruined all world-trade by fair and open bargaining.
It was mentioned above that they would change their methods, but not in the sense that they could come to agree- ment by round-table discussions—unless, of course, they are compelled to do so by the resolution and strength of their adversaries. The belief in might as the only right has in- creased proportionately with the Reich's bloodless foreign political conquests and with the increase of its military striking-power. Throughout all its successes is it not remark- able that there never has been any genuine amnesty, and that tolerance for the humanitarian virtues has become markedly less in those States which have lost their inctependence?
Whatever Hitler says in the Reichstag, his policy will only be changed by stronger force from outside. And one of the greatest of his qualities is that he can and will wait for his opportunity. Important decisions as to England's future foreign commitments have been made in London, but it is not too much to say that here in Berlin the authorities still believe that they are merely bluff. It is felt that the present position is more or less what it was in May, 1938, except that then it was Czecho-Slovakia, and now it is Poland. Hitler regarded the Czecho-Slovak mobilisation of May 21st, 1938, as a diplomatic defeat. He sees the failure to settle the Danzig and Polish Corridor problems a few weeks ago in the same light. And though it is true that he thinks the Poles are more temperamentvoll than the Czechs, still he believes that, but for the English guarantee, Poland today would be little larger than Congress Poland of the eighteenth century. For this he holds the English responsible, and it would be merely burying our heads in the sand not to realie that England has for long become his principal adversary.
He does not propose to fight England if he can avoid it. Rather, he expects that what happened in the case of Czeche- Slovakia will be reproduced in that of Poland. It is hardly conceivable that the English Government would send another " observer " with no knowledge of local conditions nor of the languages spoken to report on a centuries-old problem in a few weeks, but it is expected here that England can be occu- pied with problems elsewhere and so supply the opportunity for Germany to press her Polish claims in such a way that Poland "will see reason." And as for the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, will not English class-interests prevent this from amounting to anything very effective ?
A study of the character and career of both Hitler and his closest associates indicates a determination to achieve all their ambitions in due course ; e.g., Hitler's refusal of Cabinet rank lower than that of Chancellor in the autumn of 1932 speaks volumes to those who have the ear to hear. It should also never be forgotten that Hitler does not intend to have war, because he knows what it would mean for Ger- many. Yet, how much bluff is there about all his actions. And this has been helped considerably by the alarmed con- cern with which the English Press treats the reports of the launching of a new German warship, or the awe with which it regards the German military forces—and all this at a time when people here who ought to know unhesitatingly maintain that the military and economic leaders would not dare to venture on a European war either now or for a long time to come.
The Reichstag meeting is significant as a proof that Hitler "thought twice" about the forces which Roosevelt's pro- posals might unite against him ; and he will as soon forgive the Anglo-Saxon world for this action as he will King Carol of Rumania for the shooting of Codreanu and other mem- bers of the Iron Guard. The road to collective security against aggression is not going to be easy, but every step along it is a definite blow against German hegemony in Europe. The struggle as seen in Berlin has now developed into one of " nerves " and methods, and the Nazis appear confident that they can hold out the longer.
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