TOPICS OF THE DAY.
A "PRACTICALLY READY" FLEET.
WHAT has happened to the leaders of the Opposition? Have they all forgotten their duty to the Navy, or are they all hypnotised by the First Sea Lord, and determined that anything in regard to the Fleet which has his endorsement shall be considered as beyond criticism ? We have the most dangerous proposal for diminishing our effective force at sea which has been made within the course of the last twenty years in process of being actually carried out, and yet neither the leader of the Opposition nor any of his lieutenants has even taken the trouble to test what is being done, either by questions in Parliament, or by insisting that the Board of Admiralty shall lay its policy openly before the country.
No one can say that the explanation of the new policy and of the so-called readjustment of naval force published last week was, as it stood, anything but most vague and nebulous. To many it seemed directly misleading,—a piece of pure special pleading. The semi-official announce- ment published through the Press Association on Thurs- day is equally confused and confusing. Now, it has Always been held that in , matters of public concern it is the duty of the Opposition to play the part of. the vigilant critic, and to insist that the Government of the day shall serve its masters—the people—by loyally telling them the real facts, and not keeping them in the dark in regard to any of its actions. One would have thought, therefore, that the Opposition leaders would at this moment be vying with each other for the honour of insisting that the Admiralty's so-called explanations should be cleared up and substantiated in the face of the nation. Instead, we find not only the Opposition leaders in Parliament, but even a large portion of the Opposition Press—with the honourable exception of the Standard, to which the country as a whole. owes its warmest gratitude—keeping silence on the matter. The essential question which we Urged last week—" Are you going to reduce the number of ships, officers, and men afloat and in full commission? "—has not been pressed home from the Opposition Front Bench, and the adjourn- ment of the House has not been moved in order that the whole question might be thrashed out in debate, and the Admiralty case for the new disposition's made clear.—We cannot reckon as adequate action a question . or two from unimportant Unionist Members.—What makes the matter more astonishing and inexplicable is the fact that the Opposition Front Bench contains several men who profess themselves devoted to the Fleet and to our naval interests, and who should have been able to speak with knowledge and authority. One would have imagined that Mr. Balfour, as the creator of the Imperial Defence Committee, and. as a statesman who specially prides himself upon his acquaintance with strategic problems, naval and military, would have insisted at once on hearing exactly how we are to stand under the new scheme and what can be said in its favour. Yet lie has remained dumb. Again, there are Mr. Arnold-Forster and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who have both held positions at the -Admiralty, and who both must be presumed to be deeply concerned with the problem of our naval efficiency. How is it that they have spoken no word ? Lord Cawdor, not a year ago, was the head of the Admiralty and responsible to the nation for its efficiency. How comes it that he has not raised his voic3 in the House of Lords in *protest, or, at any rate, in a demand for enlightenment? We can only ,suppose that this astounding silence, this neglect of the first duty of an Opposition, is due to the fact that the politicians we have named have in some way or another been convinced that the new scheme is perfectly satisfactory, and that they have no case against the Admiralty. If that is so, then we must take leave to warn them that the responsibility for the diminution of the fighting efficiency of the Fleet must fall upon them equally with the present 'Government. The nation will regard them as having proved unworthy of its confidence should the criticisms that have been made against the policy of the Admiralty be justified, as we believe they will be justified. •We must, we regret to say, censure as strongly several of our Unionist contemporaries in the Press. Their silence, or at best their half-hearted criticismi sandwiched between sophistical semi-official explanations of and apologies for the action of the Admiralty, make them participes criminis. To excuse them because of trade rivalry, and because one newspaper does not care to advertise another, is a defence absolutely unworthy -of the British Press, and one which we are bound to say we do not believe for a moment. In plenty of other cases the whole of the Press has followed one particular newspaper without any thought of jealousy. On the present occasion, then, those Unionist newspapers which have failed to play their part in rousing the nation in regard to the new Admiraltypolicy must, we suppose, be held to have done so deliberately, and because they believed in the Admiralty's proposals. Meantime, the credit due to the Standard is all the greater. Differing as we do profoundly from that paper on the chief political question of the day, we are bound to say that it has acted in this matter with the greatest possible public spirit and. good sense. In its position as one of the principal organs of the Tariff Reform Party, it cannot have been pleasant for it to take a line which is apparently so unsympathetic to its leaders. Yet, in spite of that, and in spite of naval influences which we need not further specify at the moment, it has assumed a position of independence in every way worthy of the best traditions of the British Press. If no help is to be forthcoming from the leaders of the Opposition, and very little from the majority of Unionist newspapers, it is all the more essential that those who, like ourselves, recognise the gravity of the issue should speak plainly to the public, for it is clearly only through an awakened public opinion that we can now hope to change the policy of the Admiralty. Parliament and the party politicians on both sides have failed us.
How far the Government's pernicious policy of land-sailors and harbour-going ships is being pushed is to be seen in the astounding announcement that the Dreadnought,' the new battleship on which so many hopes rest, is as soon as she is completed to be passed into the so-called Home Fleet—. merely another name for a Reserve squadron—and to lie at Sheerness, not in commission, but with a nucleus crew. The mere landsman would have supposed that the very first thing that the Admiralty would have done with the 'Dreadnought' as soon as she was fully equipped would have been to place on board her the most competent Captain in the Navy, with the best possible officers and crew, and to add her either to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Fleet, there to undergo every possible trial from wind and weather and in- steam tactics, and to gain in every way the maximum of blue- water experience. In this way not only would the ship be tested and all her geed qualities and bad qualities be brought out in the strongest possible relief, but her officers and crew would be raised to the highest pitch of efficiency. Granted, as we hope and believe will be the case, that the ' Dreadnought ' proves to be by far "the strongest and swiftest thing afloat "—the very nonpareil of battleships— her officers and crew should learn by constant work to be in all respects worthy of her. We want the finest-and most efficient ship's company in the finest and most efficient ship in the world. But that can only be got by keeping the ' Dreadnought ' at sea in full commission.- Instead, we are to have an untested ship lying at Sheerness with not even an untested ship's company, but, what is worse, with a mere nucleus crew. The proposal for dealing with this great and splendid ship would be ridiculous if it were not heart-breaking. As it is, we can only turn in shame and sorrow from this Chinese scheme,—a scheme which, remember, is not a landsman's device, but one for which the Sea Lords are responsible.
A great lawyer once declared that whenever in counsel's speech, in a witness's evidence, or in a commercial or other document you saw the word "practically," you-might be perfectly certain that there was an intention to deceive, or, as he put it, that there was a swindle meant. With- out going quite as far as this in condemnation of the word, we note with anxiety its appearance in the semi- official explanation of and apology for what is being done with the ' Dreadnought ' put forward through. the Press Association. This egregious document states that instead of Britain's latest battleship "being in commission in the Atlantic Squadron or cruising in the Mediterranean, where her value would not be utilised to its complete extent, as her speed would have to be that of her much slower consorts, she will be at the Nore, practically ready for wax at a few hours' notice." •Lot the public remember that-the "practically ready" here means no more and no 'less than "unready." A "practically ready" "Dread- - nought' means a 'Dreadnought' not ready in any of the essentials which make a fully commissioned ship, ready and able to play her part in the great drama of war. A " pradically ready" ship with a nucleus crew is like an understudy who goes on and reads his part in the hope that the public will extend its indulgence to him for his unavoidable inability to do full justice to the play. Note, too, how far the belittlement of ships in full commission, and ' the magnifying of the policy of "practically ready," has gone in the semi-official statement. "Being in commission' in the Atlantic Squadron or cruising in the Mediterranean" is apparently regarded as a worthless, or at any rate unnecessary, condition, and not to be compared for a moment with the efficiency attained by lying off 'Sheerness with a nucleus crew We must end by once more imploring our readers, and the British public as a whole, to keep their eyes on the central fact of the whole controversy. It is that between ships with nucleus crews on board and ships afloat in full commission there is, regarding them as instruments of war, a whole world of difference. One is like a dog chained up at home, who can only be let out after a key has been produced and turned in a padlock. The other is like a dog actually in the field, standing ready to obey his master's order on the 'instant. The chained dog may be useful for many purposes, but it is on the dog that is loose that the whole of our national safety may depend. Let them remember also that in regard to ships in full commission they have some guarantee that efficiency is really being. maintained, for the ships have to keep the sea and are constantly exercised in every possible way. Inefficiency soon shows itself, even to a landsman's eyes, on the blue water. In the case of ships in Reserve, even with nucleus crews, there is no such guarantee. They .not only tend to degenerate, like all things that are shut up, but it is quite impossible for the public to know whether or not they have been or are being neglected. To take ships out of the old dead. -Reserve and give them nucleus crews was no doubt 'a great advance and a great improvement. To reverse the process, and to take ships out of commission and put them into the "practically ready"- class, on the ground that they are "practically " as useful in this class as in full commis- sion, is the capital maritime error. When the Fleet receives the call of the nation to defend her—and that all may come far sooner than now seems possible—we want the reply of our seamen to be, not a halting, confused "Practically ready," but the old clear naval answer,—" Ready, aye ready ! "
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