THE OUTLOOK IN RUSSIA.
ON Tuesday Russia celebrated with an orderliness which looks almost like apathy the anniversary of her first step to Constitutional freedom,—the famous Proclamation of October 30th. Much water has flowed under the bridges since this time last year. The Duma has come and gone. Voices hitherto silent have been heard on all sides throughout the country ; political parties have formed, and changed, and disappeared as in a kaleidoscope ; new men have appeared ; unexpected talent has been revealed ; and for the first time in her history Russia has allowed her people to speak. As was to be expected, the early utterances were crude and confused, and in time the Closure descended, and they became officially dumb again. But no Closure could undo the work which the Duma had inaugurated, and in the succeeding months, amid anarchy and reaction, the movement towards national self-consciousness continued. The Puma naturally had been inclined to wholesale and somewhat febrile reforms. Its Members had assembled for one pur- pose, and they had no room for other considerations. But after its dissolution it became clear that the keynote of the Duma was not quite the keynote of the country. The Duma was urgent and self-confident and hasty ; the country is slow, not yet clear in its own mind, and very busy with its own political education. In a word, the Russian people has discovered itself behind all the various Terrorist and reactionary organisations. Many of the most powerful reform associations, like the Peasants' Union and the Council of Working Men Deputies, are highly conscious of the limitations of their knowledge, and refuse to pledge themselves to any doctrinaire scheme of change. The revolution has not failed ; indeed, its forces were never more potent, for now they seem to be reflective as well as dynamic, and a revolutionary spirit which can think out its desires and bide its time is irresistible. If we cannot call the year which has gone a year of definite progress in Russia, it may yet be called a year of suspended reaction; which in' the circumstances is all that could be hoped for. We agree with the Russian Minister's summing-up of the situation. "When a man is very ill, and his friends say there is no change for the worse, we take hope."
We have often regretted in these columns that the Russian crisis had thrown up no man of the first ability capable of riding the storm. It is still too early to dogmatise, but we are far from certain that in M. Stolypin such a leader has not arrived. He has made no dramatic entrance on the stage. Slipping quietly into office after the dissolution of the Duma, he was regarded as an ineffective Moderate, who had a certain academic sympathy with Constitutionalism, but would prove in spite of it a willing tool of the bureaucracy. The outrage at his house, when his children were maimed and he himself narrowly escaped, showed that at any rate he was a brave man who was not to be driven from his post by terrorism. Gradually it became clear that he was working out a scheme of practical reform with the Czar's approval. The hideous campaign of pogrom, for which he was in no way responsible, brought him odium with the popular party, while the prompt measures he took to prevent their recurrence drove the reactionaries into furious opposition. But M. Stolypin in his quiet way was not to be shaken, and be showed that alike against Terrorists and the League of the Russian People he would, so far as he bad power, enforce the law. It would almost seem as if he has had his reward. The Times corre- spondent, by no means a partial critic, announces that on Tuesday Russia was quieter and more hopeful than she has been since the outbreak of the revolution. The gloom, he says, is lifting, because the people recognise that at last they have got a Government which, in spite of mistakes, is doing its best. So far, then, the omens are favourable. Of M. Stolypin's good intentions there is no doubt. The question we must ask is Cromwell's old question, Will the results be answerable to the honesty and simplicity of the design ? '
We are fortunate in having in an interview in Wednesr day's Times the view of the situation taken by a member of the Government. The Minister's attitude is sober and critical. He has no read--made scheme of reconstruction, no panacea to heal all the ills of the body politic. But he thinks he can put his finger on the root of the evil. "Our political edifice," he says, "has been constructed on the principles of topsy-turvydom. There was a roof, but no foundations." Too many people have tried to tinker at or to destroy the roof, which in all conscience needs attention; but unless the foundations are looked to first of all, any attempts on the roof will bring down the whole edifice about the reformers' ears. The present Russian Govern- ment is highly centralised, and if it be destroyed there is nothing to take its place. Now it is useless to destroy any necessity of life unless you have something to put in its place, and M. Stolypin appeals to men of all parties to•help him in creating this alternative. The commune, he says, must be made a real administrative un,it, for any Constitutional reform must begin from below. The nation must be educated in practical politics, given administrative experience, taught that responsible government is a practical thing, involving duties as well as rights,—a science and not a sentiment. When that end is achieved, the time will be ripe for mending the roof of the building or putting on a new one. The objection to the Duma was that no Member quite knew his own mind. All vaguely wanted Constitutional reforms, but the basis for such reform had not been laid, and. therefore any experiments would have been abortive. What the nation needs, so runs the argument, is practical reform, a change in the whole economic and social structure, and not adventures in abstract Constitutionalism. M. Stolypin's Ministry claim that they are busy at such practical work. The peasants must be given means of obtaining land, and relieved of old class and communal restrictions. There must be a removal of religious dis- abilities. They also announce a serious attempt, based on extensive investigations, to alleviate the position of the Jews. And the nation, they assert, is with them. The elections for the new Duma, to be held at an early date, are being awaited with a curious popular apathy. Political parties are in process of transformation, and their policy is in a state of flux. The heart of the nation is neither ,er with the ittrolittionatiell nor With the reaktiOnaries. imp yet be won by a Government which is ready to post- pone the question of a responsible Constitution to the more urgent matter of social reform.
Such a doctrine in English ears rings with a familiar sound. We do not deny its statesmanship, but the question remains whether it harmonises with Russian opinion. It is open to the objection that the Government propose to do things for the nation instead of allowing the nation to do them for itself. Such an objection, however, may not appeal to the Russian mind as it would to a, country with a long tradition of popular government, and if the things done are well done, it may be that the nation will be content. We think that men are inclined to underestimate the power of a moderate party in a time of revolution. If every- thing is in confusion, then, indeed, the only hope is in the strong violent man, and the moderate line in such a crisis is as futile as Falkland's ingemina- tion of peace. Moderation in time of revolution requires to have a certain impetus behind it ; but if that impetus be there, there is nothing to prevent it winning the day. In Russia the Government is still sup- ported by old loyalties, and by the fact that there is no alternative which would not lead to anarchy. In such circumstances, there is a chance that a great middle party may be created among the people to strengthen M. Stolypin's hands. The key of the situation remains where it has always been,—with the Czar. If he is prepared to stand by his present Ministry, there seems to us a good chance of a pacific and gradual revolution from the foundations upwards. But it must not be forgotten that M. Stolypin's authority rests, not with the people, but with his Imperial master. If he fails to carry the Czar with him in his schemes, he must fall without hope of appeal. That is the weakness of the situation—and the weakness of all autocracies.