TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WHY NOT A BUFFER-STATE ON THE BAHR- EL-GHAZEL ?
T"public are too much inclined to believe that the chief difficulties with regard to France are settled or shortly to be settled. That belief, however, is not altogether justified. Though a great deal was accom- plished when the French agreed to evacuate Fashoda, and so leave the main stream of the Nile, the problem was by no means solved. The matters that remain over for settlement by negotiation are in reality hardly less serious, though less sensational in appearance, than the original point of debate,—the occupation of a post on the White Nile. Speaking generally, our statesmen have said—Mr. Chamberlain laid down the position in his speech on Tuesday—that we cannot agree to any solution that will not produce the evacuation by France of all places now held by her in the Valley of the Nile and in the former possession of Egypt. This is a clear, reasonable, and perfectly sound position to take up in principle and one which is intelligible to the whole country. When, however, the principle has to be applied in practice in a country about which very little is known, it will be found that there is a certain amount of room for ambiguity, or, to put it in another way, for give and take. About the main stream of the Nile from the Lakes to the junction with the Bahr-el-Ghazel there can, of course, be no doubt. That must remain in our own hands at all costs. Again, as to the lower part of the Bahr-el-Ghazel—the great western affluent of the Nile—there can be no compromise. The lower part of the Bahr-el-Ghazel must be in Anglo-Egyptian hands. It is when we get to the upper part of the Bahr-el-Ghazel Valley, which is made up of a number of smaller rivers and streams, that it becomes necessary to ask whether we ought or ought not to insist upon a precise, or if you will, pedantic, application of the principle that the whole Nile Valley must remain in our hands. That is, are we to insist that every part of the vast swampy district out of which are flowing waters which will one day reach the Nile shall be retained by England and Egypt ? We do not put this question to prejudice the matter, nor do we mean to argue positively that we ought not in this way to insist on having the whole watershed. We see, indeed, many reasons for doing so. In the first place, we should by so insisting adopt a clear geographical principle in regard to boundaries, and avoid the extreme difficulty of drawing an arbitrary and artificial frontier right across the upper waters of the Bahr-el-Ghazel. Again, by taking the watershed as the boundary we more or lees keep to the tribal divisions, and do not cut the Shillooks and the Denkas in two. That is a very important matter, for black tribes with two masters might be sources of great future diffi- culty and danger. There is, then, a great deal to be said in favour of our Government hardening its heart and insisting that the French shall leave, and we occupy, the whole of the Bahr-el-Gbazel watershed.
It is quite possible that this might be the best, as it cer- tainly is the simplest, plan, and it may well be argued that it will be as easy to compel the French to do this as to make them agree to a more complicated scheme of compromise. Against this view it is, however, necessary to adduce the fact that France several years ago crossed the actual watershed from the Upper Ubanghi, and got upon the upper affluents of the Bahr-el-Ghazel, and that, therefore, it would be a considerable blow to French amour propre to see_their flag superseded by ours and that of Egypt in these places. What, then, we have to consider is,—how can we get the French out of the Bahr-el-Ghazel with the minimum of injury to their amour propre ? The time-honoured plan in a, dispute between two men about an object which is not per se very valuable, but which has become a matter of contention, is to give it to same third person. Would not that be possible in the present case ? Why not give the Upper Bahr-el-Ghazel to the Belgians of the Congo Free State ? They might be made to act as a buffer-State between us and the French, and it would certainly be far easier for the French to evacuate posts in favour of the Belgians than in favour of the English. What should also tell in favour of the suggested scheme is that the Belgians les than four years ago were in actual occupation of th upper portion of the Bahr-el-Ghazel. That occupatio we, as the guardians and. protectors of Egypt, could not of course, pass over, but we regularised it by granting. lease of the Bahr-el-Ghazel territory to the Congo Fr State. The French, however, went behind our backs, and forced the Sovereign of the Congo State to give up all the leased territory with the exception of a small irregula triangle based on a line drawn from Lake Albert Nyanza to Lado. The Belgian forces were thereupon withdrawn from the Upper Bahr-el-Ghazel, and the posts once in their hand were subsequently occupied by the French. It might not now be advisable to restore the leases resorted to by Lord Rosebery in exactly identical terms, but we do not se why they should not be revived in principle, in order to make things easier for both France and England. Again, arrangements might be made that French corn. merce should reach the Nile without impediment. Then, care must be taken to secure the Denkas and Shillooks from interference. Again, it would probably be best to make the leased territory end at Meshra-er-Rek, on the Bahr-el-Ghazel,—a frontier line being drawn thence to Lado as straight as the geographical accidents would permit. Lastly, it would be necessary to stipulate very strictly that no " nibbling " at the territory of the buffer- State would be allowed.
We are not greatly enamoured of amateur dip matists, especially . when they are journalists, and is therefore with considerable diffidence that we ma1 the suggestions set forth above. It is quite possible that the idea has already occurred to those whose business It is to deal with these matters in detail, and that the have rejected it for good and sufficient reasons. On the other hand, it is also just possible that the notion o reviving Lord Rosebery's plan of leasing the Bahr-el Ghazel territories to the Belgians has not yet been con- sidered. If not, we suggest with all due respect that it i worth the attention of our diplomatists, and also of tho of France. Events have certainly proved that Lord Rosebery showed great prescience, as well as grea ingenuity, when he conceived and negotiated the origins scheme. Had he been able to maintain his arrangement the European situation would to-day be far less gloomy than it is. Lord Rosebery could not manage to maintai his lease, but at any rate he showed a statesman's instinct in making it. If, happily, his design could be revived to settle the present difficulty, he would have the righ to feel that a scheme which at first seemed only destined to bring him discredit had ended in doing th exact work it was intended to accomplish,—i.e., prevent collision between France and England on the Upper Nile Let us say in conclusion that we do not for a, moment desire to insist on the details of the scheme we have'ae forth. They are set down chiefly by way of specific illus tration. All that is essential in our suggestion is tha the mother-thought of the Congo lease should be revive in order to make it easier for France to leave the Bahr- el-Ghazel and to provide a buffer-State between her an us in Central Africa.
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