FRENCH DIPLOMACY.
pERHAPS the most curious incident in the whole Fashoda controversy was the feeling expressed in a great many quarters in France as to what should be the future trend of French diplomacy. You have got the better of us in Fashoda,' said in effect a large section of the Parisian Press, 'but remember that in the future you will find the diplomacy of France solidly against you. Henceforth France will oppose you and hamper you wherever possible, and instead of, as formerly, a Power anxious not to be unduly hostile, you will find persistent friction. You will then realise how dearly the evacuation of Fashoda has been purchased.' At first sight such a threat seemed, no doubt, very serious. France is so great a Power that the notion of her persistent animosity on all points could not be regarded as anything but extremely disagreeable. Yet, in spite of this, those who knew most of our relations with France, of her action towards us during recent years, and of her capacities and opportunities for hostility, regarded these threats with the most perfect equanimity. And for a very good reason. France has acted with such persistent, deliberate, and detailed hostility towards us during the last ten or fifteen years that it is simply impossible for her to increase her hostility without actual war. France cannot play the card of doing us a bad turn wherever possible because she has played it already. That we have good warrant for this statement is shown by the cool and temperate, but none the less impressive, speech of Sir Edward Grey, and by the more plain-spoken words of Mr. Chamber- lain. Sir Edward Grey, no doubt, rather inferred than drew his conclusion, but Mr. Chamberlain was quite specific. He showed how in Egypt, in Newfoundland, in West Africa, in Siam, in Madagascar, in China, in Abya- sinia, in South Africa, France has worked against us. It would not, of course, be fair to complain because France has not been actively friendly. Very likely we could. not expect that from France since she considers her- self our rival in so many places. But it is not of any want of active support and help that we complain. What English diplomatists have found all the world over is active hostility,—a hostility such as, for example, has never been shown by France towards Germany. When- ever any new international question arises we may be sure of French opposition, no matter whether the subject concerns her or not. When our statesmen la f eon. eider a new departure they never dare say: 'Well, French interests are not in the least involved, and so we need not consider French action either way.' Instead, they have to say : 'Though France has no real claim to interfere in any way, we must ask whether there is any loophole for French objection and French opposition, because if there is France is quite certain to employ it,—not to help herself, but to injure us. Whenever she can get her knife into us diplomatically she will.' Mr. Chamberlain quoted from the Malin a passage in which afar-seeing French publicist fully admits the accuracy of this view of recent French diplomacy. "We (the French)," says the Malin, "have inaugurated the policy of playing tricks on Great Britain,—a policy which had no definite object and which was bound to turn out badly. We now find ourselves confronted by a people who have at last been exasperated by the continual pin- pricks which we have given them." Mr. Chamberlain's comment is also worth quoting :—" I venture to say that that is absolutely true. In our sincere desire for peace successive British Governments have borne more from the French Government than any other great nation would have tolerated. We have been taunted with our conces- sions, and there has grown up a feeling that the spirit of conciliation by which successive Governments have been governed is a spirit of pusillanimity and of fear, and it has been actually alleged that British statesmen will yield anything to pressure." It is clear, then, that we have nothing to fear from French threats of hostility in the future. Diplomatic hostility at every point from France merely means the status quo. That is a fact about which there must be no mistake.
That good may very possibly come from the open acknowledgment of French animosity is, we think, not improbable. In the first place, it may produce a certain effect upon French public opinion. We agree with the able Paris correspondent of the Daily News in thinking that the French people have not hitherto realised the policy of exasperation pursued towards England by suc- cessive French Governments. When, or rather if, they do realise it, it is by no means impossible that they may see how mischievous and injurious to their own true interests has been the course of French diplomacy. In any case, the true attitude of the French Foreign Office has become manifest to the British people ; and they may be relied on in the future to insist that it shall be met with open eyes, and not with the pretence that all is well between the two nations. Our leading statesmen and diplomatists on both sides are above all things anxious for peace. They deem it, and, as we think, rightly deem it, their main business to keep the peace and prevent, as they are apt to put it, a war about a lobster or a swamp. Hence they have hitherto done their beat to conceal the persistent hostility of France towards England. As far as possible, it has been ignored in private, and before the public every effort has been made to prevent the idea growing up that France may always be relied on to do her best to oppose us. Up to a certain point this desire to throw a veil over French hostility was, we hold, justified. Now, however, con- cealment of the true position is no longer possible, and the public is face to face with the fact of French hostility. Under these circumstances, it will be well for our states- men to make France realise that if she means to continue her policy of hostility wherever possible, we shall copy her methods, and that instead of trying to smooth over difficulties in order to oblige her, as in Siam, in Madagascar, and in Tunis, we shall do the very reverse. Up till now our policy has been: France wants this very much : it will not hurt us for her to have it : by all means then satisfy her in the matter.' In future it must be : Until France changes her attitude towards us, do nothing to gratify her, and maintain every difficulty in her path.' For example, under our former policy we gave up our perpetual treaty of commerce with Tunis because France so ardently desired us to do so. Now we should maintain such a treaty, not for its intrinsic merits, but simply te show France that we too can play the game of general opposition. It is, we need not say, most deeply to be regretted that we shall have to adopt that policy towards France, but unless France changes her attitude we have no choice. We have tried the plan of concessions, and it has brought us to the verge of war. If France had not been possessed of the notion that we always gave way, is it conceivable that she would have first torn up the odaupp Convention and then deliberately planned an expedition to enter the Nile Valley ? Our desire to make concessions wherever possible has acted positively as an incentive to French aggression. Amiability has failed to get us French friend- ship; let us see whether a stern and uncompromising atti- tude towards France will not be more productive of a good understanding. If France had been even moderately friendly towards us during the past ten years, her threat of animosity would have been a most serious one. As it is, it can have no terrors whatever for the British people.
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