THE FINANCIERS IN POLITICS. T HAT is a very curious and
not very creditable story which Madame Adam and M. de Blowitz between them tell of M. Hanotaux's transaction with the Czar in the matter of the Turkish Debt. When Nicholas II. visited Paris, and all France flung itself at his feet, he of course expected that advantage would be taken of his presence to solidify and define the Franco-Russian Alliance, but he found M. Hanotaux preoccupied with another and smaller matter, the affairs of the Otto. Alliance, but he found M. Hanotaux preoccupied with another and smaller matter, the affairs of the Otto.
man bondholders. The Russians fight shy of Turkish bonds ; the Russian Government had never acknowledged the Debt, and there were reasons, connected with the indemnity still due to Russia, why it never should. The future inheritor of Turkey is, however, believed on the Continent to be Russia, and the bondholders were most anxious that the Russian Government should formally recognise the Turkish Debt. Acting, there can be no doubt, under pressure from them, the French Foreign Minister pressed the Czar to appoint a representative on the European Commission of the Turkish Debt, thus recognising it in the most emphatic way. The Czar did not know much about the matter, and did not like the request, but as M. Hanotaux persisted, he passed his word that there should be a Russian Commissioner. M. de Witte, the head of the Russian Treasury, said to be the ablest and one of the richest men in St. Petersburg, was greatly annoyed, and even remarked that Russia, holding no Turkish stock, would have to buy some to qualify herself to interfere ; but the Imperial word could not be withdrawn, pressure was put on in Constantinople in the regular way, and though no Russian Commissioner was appointed, Turkey was informed that Russia would rigorously insist on the payment of the Debt, to the great glee and gratification of all Ottoman bondholders, who saw themselves made the petted protggds of all Europe, which, though it did not guarantee their rubbishy paper, did agree to manage many Turkish revenues in their interest.
Nobody, we suppose, doubts that the " pressure " on M. Hanotaux was really exercised by great financiers holding large blocks of Turkish stock, and it becomes a question of some political interest to ascertain whence their influence is derived. They certainly do not buy Ministers in the great Courts, M. Hanotaux in particular being quite beyond suspicion of that kind ; and how do they contrive to alarm them, as it is evident they do? With poor Courts the thing is explicable enough. Such Courts are always wanting money, or expecting to want money, or fearing that if certain contingencies occur they will want money, suddenly and in large sums, and as they cannot drain their banks without creating crises, they must keep on good terms with the great financiers, who not only want favours sometimes, but regarding them- selves as Princes of a kind, are very apt to resent refusals. France, however, is rich, the Government has always the Bank of France at its back, one of the mightiest of financial corporations, and its statesmen might, one would think, decline very coolly even to consider any question not strictly national. What is the most mammoth-like millionaire to the man who can ask France for her savings and never fear a refusal ? They yield, neverthe- less, pretty often, and we suppose the truth is that the financiers are more necessary to the Treasury than appears; that they have immense influence in the Chambers and the Press, being mortgagees of all "concessions"; and that, remembering the volcanic character of French pohtics, statesmen do not like to offend men who in the hour of crisis could make revolution at least possible. It was always said that had M. Laffitte been Royalist or Republican "the glorious days of July" would have had a very different ending, and the history of Europe would have taken another direction.
"The financiers" are, in fact, a great force in Europe, and one not likely to diminish, and it is interesting. to think out the character of the influence they must exercise. We suppose it must be, as a rule, an influence favourable to peace. That was not the case in 1860, when they had made up their minds that Austria would win ; but as a rule they can hardly wish for disturbance, which if it.con- dunes inevitably lowers the value of all paper securities. No doubt loan-mongering pays splendidly, but it would not pay if wars were very long, or if States were often left after a war in the present position of Spain. The per- manent interest of the money dealers, particularly since industrial undertakings, railway schemes, and concessions assumed such vast proportions, must be peace, and that is to be remembered to their credit. On the other hand, though an individual financier may be a patriot or a philanthropist, the " interest " as a whole must always be on the side of the profitable rather than the right, and must sway slightly against the only two Powers that are independent of monetary pressure,—England and America. Nobody in London or Washington can say that he will be attended to, or there shall be a financial crisis, and that fact, when immense pecuniary interests are at stake, must create in the class a certain distaste both for Great Britain and America. Then the financiers, as a body, not only lend money, but invest and deal in it, and hold great sums in stocks which while they can be kept going return large dividends, and if they collapse involve great losses to the holders. The temptation to bold stocks which the world thinks rubbish, but which you know to be protected by international arrangements, must be very great indeed ; and the financiers, therefore, are apt to make a sturdy effort to prop up States which, like Turkey or Spain or Portugal, had much better be left to the fate they have, in the course of centuries of misgovernment, brought upon themselves. The Turkish Debt now, for example, in a certain degree prevents Armenians from being emancipated, because if Russia marched into Armenia, as she ought to do, the Turkish Debt would be endangered ; and Russia, over-persuaded by M. Hanotaux, who was egged on by financiers, has in a sense promised that Turkish interest shall be paid. That is hard on Armenians, who are in fact slaughtered and plundered at discretion in order that Ottoman bonds may not fall, to the inconvenience of great Parisian "houses." On the other hand, there is no doubt that the financiers help to protect British ascendency in Egypt, because if it ended, they and their clients would lose at once five-and-twenty per cent. of their stake in Egyptian bonds, and might, if a native rule were inaugurated, especially a rule depending on support from Constanti- nople, lose the whole.
We have said that the influence of financiers must be favourable to peace, but we sometimes wonder whether the immense complexity which begins to mark modern international relations tends to good and peace, or evil and war. It should tend to good and peace, for it leaves the control of international affairs more and more in the hands of experts who alone understand their endless ramifications ; but we do not feel sure that it does so tend. The experts are often con- trolled, as M. Hanotaux in this instance clearly was, by unsuspected influences, which need not be always as honest as M. de Blowitz says was this time the case; and as regards peace, there is the vote of the peoples to be considered too. They rule in the end in spite of every- body, and if they who rule are profoundly and necessarily ignorant of the forces they are ordering to move, there will occasionally be great disasters, or at all events great explosions. A thief in a china-shop is a nuisance to the dealer in hardware, but if one cares for the china itself he is not half such a nuisance as a bull. M. de Blowitz may find before he dies that M. Hanotaux in so anxiously Protecting Turkish bondholders helped to prepare a catastrophe amidst which the Turkish peoples will profit, and not their very astute and slightly unscrupulous public Creditors.
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