THE GERMAN MA.WEUVRES IN MECKLENBURG.*
IT is not so long since Colonel Gadke, of the Prussian Service, felt himself impelled to give to the world the plain, unvarnished truth—as it presented itself to his mind—regarding the • The German Anew Manonivrea : a &rico of Articles Reprinted from the *" TiMeS." London: The Tins Office. Led. net.]
military value of the British Army. Cruel only to be kind no doubt, be certainly did not spare the feelings of those whom he criticised. Were it not that the strongest—if not
the most obvious—characteristic of the Englishman is a humble willingness to be taught, the Times military corre-
spondent's account of the German Army manoeuvres of 1911 would almost suggest that its author's frame of mind was not one of perfect patience under criticism. " Do you bite your thumb at us, sir F" "I do bite my thumb, sir." The suggestion may be quite unjustified, in which case our apologies are tendered in advance. But the tone of the articles now reprinted raises the suspicion that • the writer at least does not regret the opportunity for a retort. The " far-famed Prussian Infantry " is " a pretty good In- fantry, no doubt "; the "German Staff is good enough in favourable conditions," and " it quite frequently brings its troops to the right place at the right time." The service of aeroplanes, like that of quick-firing artillery, is not well suited to large bodies and slow minds." The German Army appears "to be unequal to the repute in which it is commonly held "; in some ways it " does not rise above the level of the second- rate." It seems so stale that, failing a war, " the best thing to restore new life to the Army would be to disband it for a year, in order to give everybody, from top to bottom, a much- needed rest."
" I do bite my thumb, sir."
It must not be imagined that any doubt is cast upon the general trustworthiness of the Times correspondent's report. His criticism of the conduct of the manoeuvres is substantiated by his lucid narrative of the operations. But it is permissible to wonder if he does not prove too much, and if his strictures are couched in the most convincing form. It is not only in the Kaisermanover that there is a tendency on occasion to sacrifice reality for the sake of the " gala " spectacle. It is not only the German Army that suffers by comparison with the French in respect of artillery material and of the standard of excellence attained by the air corps. Cases are on record of manoeuvres in other countries at which the higher leading has not been altogether above reproach. Everywhere there is experienced the difficulty of keeping up the interest of the junior ranks in the safe but unexciting campaigns of peace manoeuvres, and of inducing men to aim correctly when they have no bullets in their own rifles, or to make the best use of ground when there are no bullets in the rifles of their enemies. It would be easy to overdo censure of these common failings.
The account of the Mecklenburg operations shows once more that the Germans rely much on envelopment, on " attack everywhere and always," and on numbers. This reli- ance doubtless accounts for a certain lack of finesse, for failure to emphasize the necessity for economizing losses by the most thorough use of ground, and, perhaps, for some carelessness in reconnoitring duties. It may be mentioned in parenthesis that the Times correspondent makes an interesting point with regard to the necessity for concealing movements and disposi- tions from aerial reconnaissance, a matter that is likely to become of the most vital importance in future wars. It is very possible that a long era of peace, together with the con- fidence which is based on triumphs a generation old, may have affected the question of the relative military efficiency of Germany and her neighbours. Nevertheless the organization remains; the Teuton orderliness, thoroughness, method, and perseverance ; the moral bred of confidence, albeit of tot great confidence ; the belief in the destiny of the Fatherland ; and the patriotism that places the Commonwealth before the individual. If to these be added the weight of numbers, it will be obvious that an over-estimate of the military value of our good cousins is wiser than an under-estimate.
The great essentials for an army—after leadership—are moral, discipline, stedfastness in adverse circumstances, and, lastly, numbers. Genius in the Commander can only be tested in war, but it would seem that the German military theory in this respect makes less exacting demands upon the higher leaders than the French. Assuming that moral and discipline are practically equal on either side of the Vosges, in
numbers at least the Germans are superior; while as regards steadfastness, General Bonnal himself believes that the effects
of a reverse in the early stages of a war would be more serious for his own countrymen than for their eastern neighbours. "The German Army is still a great and formidable machine," says the Times correspondent. " No one should entertain
any illusion on this subject." And his conclusion is that we must " spare no efforts to build up year by year more numerous and more efficient forces for the day of trial which may be near at hand." There is more practical wisdom in this cosilusion than in the suggestion that the German Army requires a year's holiday.
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